







Plurality in Finnegans Wake 



















The challenge of James Joyce’s final work, Finnegans Wake, is an ethical one, and 
one whose implications extend far beyond the boundaries of that particular book. 
Joyce’s dismantling of language is too often dismissed as either a meaningless 
experiment or else a superficial attribute, beneath which we can postulate a truer 
writing that is perfectly straightforward. 
I argue that taking seriously the strangeness of Finnegans Wake leads to an 
interaction with alterity. Confronting us with a writing that we can only assimilate 
insofar as we do violence to its illegibility, Joyce drives a wedge between 
knowledge and mastery. Ultimately, the Wake requires us to develop modes of 
interpretation that acknowledge their own status as necessarily incomplete, and 
that resemble what post-structuralist ethics conceptualises as the questioning of 
the self in an encounter with the other. 
This is an exemplification – not a negation – of the workings of knowledge 
production in virtually all linguistic codes. To examine the hermeneutic critique 
that Joyce effectively offers, I draw on Jacques Derrida’s analyses of signification 
and of hospitality, as well as on Jacques Lacan’s theorising of the subject’s 
implication in a symbolic system whose descriptive powers are constitutively 
insufficient. 
The chapters deal, in turn, with Joyce’s depiction of the imaginary nature 
of essential meaning (chapter one), the impossibility of an author completely 
controlling the writing process or of a reader isolating the traces of what authorial 
control there is (chapter two), the splitting of the authorial gesture into a plurality 
of meanings, and Joyce’s implementation of this plurality as a value in itself 
(chapter three), and the need, in any exploration of such plurality, for hospitality 
towards other positions (chapter four). I conclude that the language of Finnegans 
Wake represents Joyce’s criticism of an ideal of univocal expression, putting to 
work the very mechanisms that render transparency impossible so as to achieve a 
poetics and an ethics of openness towards the undecidable. 
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Note on Cited Texts 
 
 
The edition of Finnegans Wake used is that published by Oxford University Press 
in 2012, edited by Robbert-Jan Henkes, Erik Bindervoet, and Finn Fordham. Like 
the majority of editions of the Wake, it follows the practice of reproducing the first 
edition, including its pagination and lineation. References are given by page and 
line numbers. References to Ulysses are given by chapter and line numbers and 
are to Hans Walter Gabler’s edition of the text. I use the MLA referencing system 
for any other works. 
I cite texts by Jacques Derrida and by Jacques Lacan in English translation. 
At the time of this thesis’s submission, no English translation has been published 
of Lacan’s 23rd seminar, Le Sinthome. I therefore cite it in the French original and 
provide my own translations in footnotes. Since several different versions of 







Theory and responsibility 
This thesis argues that James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake develops an artistic vision 
and a philosophical position that have a great deal to say about the processes of 
writing and reading. To make this case is not simply to repeat the critical 
commonplace that the Wake is a handbook to its own interpretation. Rather, I will 
show that Joyce’s final work engages in inquiries of a hermeneutic kind, asking of 
language a number of questions whose significance is in no way limited to Joyce’s 
own writing. 
In order to examine this claim, I will draw on the work of philosopher 
Jacques Derrida as well as on that of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. In 
demonstrating how both Derrida’s and Lacan’s examinations of language can be 
brought to resonate with Joyce’s position, I will therefore argue two additional 
points in support of my central one. I will suggest that, contrary to the customary 
reading that opposes Lacan and Derrida, their work is compatible: that on the 
subject of signification – an issue central to both authors – their analyses overlap 
to a considerable extent. Secondly, I will argue that a return to these two early 
exponents of theory (I use the term in an unspecific sense, for reasons I will 
presently discuss) is not an anachronistic strategy, but an approach well suited to 
throwing into relief Joyce’s ideas about reading and writing – and their 
undiminished relevance today. Joyce is concerned with the fact that our languages 
are hardly perfect tools: that, time and again, we are confronted with gaps in our 
expressive capacities. This theme parallels a common concern of Derrida’s and 
Lacan’s, who both accentuate the extent to which language is shaped, even 
constituted, by its own limitations, and who investigate the far-reaching 
consequences of such a constitution. 
Bringing this kind of theory to Finnegans Wake is not in itself a new 
procedure. Key texts relating Joyce to Derrida or to Lacan include Alan Roughley’s 
Reading Derrida Reading Joyce (1999), Christine van Boheemen-Saaf’s Joyce, 
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Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of History (1999), Luke Thurston’s James Joyce and 
the Problem of Psychoanalysis (2004), Peter Mahon’s Imagining Joyce and Derrida 
(2007), Sheldon Brivic’s Joyce Through Lacan and Žižek (2008), as well as the 2013 
essays collection Derrida and Joyce: Texts and Contexts, edited by Andrew Mitchell 
and Sam Slote. As I draw on some of these texts over the course of this thesis, it 
will become apparent that critical enterprises that trace theory’s debts to Joyce, 
provide theoretical models for reading Joyce’s work, or use Joyce’s work to 
exemplify theoretical discussions of other subjects can all draw on significant 
affinities between theory and Joyce’s writing, particularly Finnegans Wake. But it 
will also emerge that it is possible to go beyond what these studies already 
achieve, by shifting emphasis away from the Wake as an object-text on which or 
with which theories of interpretation can be seen to work, and towards a 
theoretically informed articulation of the considerable scope and the systematic 
nature of the Wake’s own hermeneutics. 
In discussing the correspondences between Derrida’s analysis of the 
signifier, Lacan’s understanding of the symbolic, and Joyce’s linguistic 
experimentation, I will insist on the implications that each of these explorations 
has for virtually any activity of reading or writing. In particular, I will emphasise the 
broadness of the Wake’s horizon, not only as far as content is concerned (as 
commentary on the Wake has long been over-enthusiastic in its insistence on the 
book’s universal range) but particularly in relation to form, typically seen as the 
attribute regarding which Finnegans Wake more or less stands alone. I want to 
propose that the Wake is not only a text about which certain things can be known, 
but also a text that inflects what it means to know, and that it does so precisely by 
way of its own impenetrability. Joyce confronts us with radical cases of opacity, 
but like Lacan and Derrida, he maintains that the occurrence of such opacity is a 
constitutive feature of signifying systems in general. Thus, on the one hand, I hope 
to make a contribution to Finnegans Wake criticism, where certain aspects of the 
Wake’s questioning of language have gone insufficiently examined. On the other 
hand, these aspects will lead me to suggestions pertaining to a theoretical analysis 
of signification – as opposed to theoretical analysis of Finnegans Wake – since they 
show Joyce himself to be examining the problem of the inexpressible in general. 
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And I want to suggest that if the Wake poses the question of how we are to come 
to terms with what remains indecipherable and unassimilable in language, the key 
aspect of this question is its ethical demand. 
In outlining my approach, the first issue I want to address in the following 
is therefore that of literary theory’s relationship to ethics. In the next subsection, 
“Responding to the text,” I will explain how this relation informs my usage of 
Derrida’s work. Then, I will address Joyce’s implementation of language’s 
imperfection in “Joyce’s ethics of form,” where I also outline which parts of the 
Wake this thesis focuses on. In the final subsection, “Lacan and language’s 
beleaguered subject,” I outline how my reading of the Wake’s hermeneutics will 
also draw on Lacan’s thought in order to address a dimension of psychological 
urgency. In the present subsection, I first of all want to ask in what ways it is 
possible for theory to be ethical, if ethical import requires a minimum of pragmatic 
applicability that sits uneasily with what is often seen as theory’s speculative, 
unpractical nature. 
The response I want to develop is that this view of literary theory is a 
misapprehension. Such an argument, of course, is far from new. For instance, 2014 
saw the publication of the third, expanded edition of Simon Critchley’s The Ethics 
of Deconstruction, which may indicate two things. First, that the question of how 
a theoretical endeavour such as deconstruction relates to ethics is still pertinent, 
enough so to merit a second reissuing of a book chiefly dedicated to the topic. And 
secondly, that this question is still being debated. Critchley’s book was originally 
published in 1992 and was at the time one of the first texts to extensively engage 
with the theme (together with J. Hillis Miller’s The Ethics of Reading, to which I will 
return in this introduction). If critical debates had since either largely subsumed or 
largely displaced Critchley’s ideas, then his argument that deconstruction revolves 
around the task of responsible reading would arguably no longer constitute a 
current intervention. The point, then, bears repeating – if only because doing so 
will situate my own approach within the on-going debate. In the following, I sketch 
an overview of theory that is preliminary to the presentation of my own 
interpretative project, but that may help to contextualise this presentation. 
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If some who have taken issue with theoretical interventions would 
emphasise theory’s hermetic quality, we need to recall that the first thing argued 
by this allegedly hermetic critique of discourse is that there is no such thing as 
pure discourse. Any signifying gesture unfailingly positions us in a history of 
interpretative frameworks. Theory furthermore maintains that these frameworks 
are never simply given; they are the product of decisions and of conventions, of 
the whole complex machinery through which we acquire knowledge. Already 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology, one of the seminal works in establishing what we now 
encounter under the name of theory, does not offer its critique of logocentrism in 
a philosophical vacuum, but painstakingly engages with a metaphysics of presence 
that reaches back to Plato. This is not to say that theory holds that nothing exists 
outside of discourse. It holds that there is an irreducible complexity to our 
conceptualising of, engaging with, and communicating about things. This 
complexity is what any metaphysics of presence dissimulates when it maintains 
that relating to the factuality of the world is or should be straightforward. From 
the beginning and from its beginnings, theory is thus ideally situated to serve in a 
rethinking of ethical discourse itself. For theory has the potential to intervene in 
our discourses in such a way as to achieve significant re-evaluations of our 
thinking, of our lives, and of the world around us. Most importantly, perhaps, 
theory enables us to better understand the very link between discourse and world, 
that is to say: the palpable impact on our experiences made by our ways of 
thinking about these experiences, of speaking about them, and of writing about 
them. 
It is worth pointing out here that Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (Of 
Grammatology 158) is at best rendered confusingly in the English translation: 
“There is nothing outside of the text” (158). Derrida is not proposing to idolise 
whatever text one happens to be reading, and to declare the rest of the world 
inexistent. He is arguing almost the exact opposite: a meaning that would be 
better expressed by saying “there is nothing that escapes being text.” Any given 
text comes out of a historical, political, social, personal world that provides the 
context of its writing. What gets in the way of directly and without uncertainty 
accessing such a world is not that it does not exist, but precisely that the world 
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comes to us only in the form of readings filtered through discourse. Derrida 
emphasises that the world reveals itself, to an observer, not in any unchanging 
aspect but only ever as this observer can live it and conceptualise it in their here 
and now, on the basis of their perception and of their stored-up knowledge and 
experience up to that point. Therefore, not only is Derrida saying – and most 
emphatically so – that our writing and our reading are contextualised, that texts 
are never cut off from the world; there is in a crucial sense nothing but context, 
nothing but engaging with the world in what is always a particular time and space. 
It is to this particularity that Derrida is referring when he says that as far as 
perception and sense-making are concerned, the condition of being text can be 
seen to include the world, leaving nothing outside of it (“il n’y a pas de hors-
texte”). Of his example, Rousseau’s Confessions, Derrida explains on the very next 
page that “in what one calls the real life of these existences ‘of flesh and bone,’ 
beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau’s text, 
there has never been anything but writing; […] the ‘real’ supervening, and being 
added only while taking on meaning from a trace” (159) – that is, from the 
differential structure of signification, as I will elaborate in chapter one. This 
interaction between world and discourse means that “world” cannot simply be 
delineated as a solid basis of existence, but is formed, by multilateral activities, 
into a polyvalence of worlds, whereas “discourse” cannot be limited to a 
representation of these worlds, because it is itself a formative activity, impacting 
what it codifies (I will return to this thought when I argue that a formal attribute 
of a text can at the same time constitute an ethical attribute). 
In the study of literature, theory should therefore not be taken to indicate 
an essentially counterproductive debt to abstract thinking – be it in the shape of a 
disavowed preference of philosophy over literature, or in the shape of a 
preference of inconsequential philosophical ideas over philosophy’s applicable 
concepts. On the contrary, one of the things literary theory argues on the basis of 
the world-discourse interaction is that literature constitutes an activity in the 
world, not a secluded realm of its own. If the “theory” part of “literary theory” 
means anything at all, it means this: to formalise textual effects in order to make 
them more concrete and appreciable, and in order to thus address the 
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practicalities and urgencies we encounter through these effects. In what is no 
doubt already an overly schematic manner, one could therefore say that theory in 
literary criticism does not manifest itself as a method – a set of ready-made tools 
that can be applied to texts – but as a point of view regarding what is at stake in 
reading. 
Even a list of only the most frequently found applications of theory in 
current literary criticism demonstrates that far from being abstract in any negative 
sense, theory is practical (and often manifestly political). Approaches that draw on 
theory include feminist criticism, postcolonial criticism, queer theory, Marxist 
criticism, disability studies, and ecocriticism, among others. If there is something 
all of these modes of reading have in common, it is that they use theoretical 
analysis in order to bring specific aspects of political and social life to bear on 
literature, and to bring literature to bear on them. In other words, literary theory 
frequently strives (though certainly not as the only form of criticism to do so) to 
bring criticism into dialogue with epistemes outside of literature. This is significant, 
since it constitutes an illuminating contrast to the idea that theory, fond of 
paradoxes, counterfactuals, and opaque jargon, is chiefly a solipsistic activity. 
However, it is also at this point that a by now well-worn discussion sets in: the 
debate on whether theory actually contributes to these fields, or whether its 
meditations are so self-contained, abstract, or plain difficult, as to render its 
endeavours into these topics ineffective. 
Responses to this question have produced essays and entire volumes; I will 
give only one example that can do no more than indicate the direction in which I 
would argue (and I will briefly revisit the question in the conclusion). As recent 
debates on theory and textual difficulty have taken the writings of Judith Butler as 
one of their focal points (see for instance Martha Nussbaum’s “The Professor of 
Parody” and the essay collection Just Being Difficult?, edited by Jonathan Culler 
and Kevin Lamb), I will share my own anecdote relating to her work. If this example 
takes me away from the modes of theoretical enquiry I employ in this study (as 
Butler is not among the theorists I chiefly draw on) as well as from my subject 
matter, I hope that it can nevertheless serve to underline how, in arguing that our 
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speaking about the world can significantly impact our experience of the world, I 
am not simply echoing an unexamined axiom. 
On 15 November 2014, the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University 
of Fribourg/Freiburg, Switzerland, conferred an honorary doctorate upon Butler. 
The decision was surrounded by some controversy. Opposition against honouring 
Butler originated largely with a number of Catholic organisations outside the 
university itself as well as with parts of the university’s Faculty of Theology. 
Significantly, the arguments against the doctorate honoris causa were centred less 
on an evaluation of Butler’s work in particular than on an assessment of the field 
within which that work was perceived to be situated: the field of gender studies. 
For instance, a member of the academic staff is cited by the Fribourg/Freiburg 
newspaper La Liberté as having stated that he “ne souscrit ni au ‘gender’ ni à la 
remise de ce doctorat” (qtd. in Zoellig), which I would translate as: “subscribes 
neither to ‘gender [studies]’ nor to the conferral of this doctorate.” 
I do not wish to suggest that the originator of this comment necessarily 
failed to grasp Butler’s work; nor do I wish to find fault with the form of protest 
that was enacted on the evening of 14 November, in the context of Butler’s 
plenary address (which I attended). Butler’s subject was non-violent resistance, 
and the people who held a vigil outside the lecture theatre effectively 
implemented a version of this strategy in defence of their own views. What I want 
to argue is that there is a tension between these two reactions. The groups that 
regarded Butler’s presence in Freiburg/Fribourg with scepticism, even as they 
dismissed her outlooks as unscientific and untenable, were also triggered into an 
emphatic resistance. There was thus a momentary surfacing of fault-lines, as two 
largely incompatible sets of arguments were mobilised in the name of one and the 
same cause. On the one hand, it was ventured that gender theory is “just a 
theory,” and a rather preposterous one at that: one that defies common sense and 
biological fact and whose uselessness as a scientific approach is therefore self-
explanatory (one does not subscribe to it, does not credit it as a serious discipline). 
On the other hand, it was given to understand that gender theory is something of 
a menace, opposing itself to a formative discourse – that of traditional gender 
roles and relations between genders – but offering arguments apparently 
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intriguing enough to nevertheless pose a threat to that discourse and (unless duly 
protested) potentially dislodge age-old value systems. 
The cause that fused together these largely contradictory statements can 
in part be subsumed under the injunction that the subversive nature of theory 
should be met with some form of control, with reliable formulations of normativity 
and stability. In putting things this way, I am not suggesting that subversive 
approaches intrinsically occupy a moral high ground. I simply want to offer the 
image of the protesters standing outside that lecture hall – as well as the image of 
the people inside attending Butler’s lecture in what I would call a charged 
atmosphere – as a counter-example to the view that theory’s worrying of 
discursive standards is an altogether inconsequential activity, safely ignored by 
those whose allegiance is to the world as we actually experience it. And I want to 
suggest that the energies that theory can muster against such a classification 
consist largely in its subversive, transformative qualities. As one of the members 
of the awarding committee, François Gauthier, puts it in an article about the event: 
with Butler, “la pensée émane de la vie dont elle doit, par méthode, se distancier 
- mais seulement pour y retourner” (§ 5).1 
This is not to say that theory can be equated with one monolithic instance 
of resistance – even though this is more or less what is implied by its name, 
particularly if it is spelled as “Theory.” The diversity of critical approaches listed 
above goes to show that theoretical criticism reserves the right to ask a great 
number of different questions and to employ a heterogeneous and indeed 
constantly evolving set of methodologies. Martin McQuillan remarks on a similar 
issue when he writes that “‘Theory’ is a name that traps by an aberrant nomial 
[sic] effect the transformative critique” (xix, my emphasis) of which theory’s work 
consists. Theory seeks to transform both its subject matter and itself, for any 
application of theory is in part an attempt at re-inventing the coordinates of a 
specific question: an attempt at not taking for granted – not accepting as self-
evident or natural – epistemological frameworks that are anything but. 
                                                          
1 “the thinking derives from life, from which it must distance itself through methodology 
– but only in order to return to it” (my translation) 
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It is important, then, not to be too quick to equate theory with one simple 
agenda or procedure. Theory “as such” does not exist, except as an umbrella term 
that can be handy as long as it remains flexible and as long as we remember that 
it covers over important debate internal to what the term purports to designate 
as one homogeneous field. In fact, the difficulties we encounter in describing 
theory can be seen as partaking in something like theory’s essence – although 
“essence” is of course exactly the wrong word. Theory, one could say, is 
programmatically difficult to pin down, and it is partly for this reason that it is 
programmatically controversial. As Paul de Man writes: “Nothing can overcome 
the resistance to theory since theory is itself this resistance” (19). Theory is the 
resistance to its own simplification, to its own solidification, to the belief that 
anything – including theory – can be understood once and for all, in an act of 
apprehension that escapes its own contexts and temporality. As we will see, a 
crucial part of the theoretical project is to demonstrate the dependence (however 
minimal) of any purportedly objective signification on specific frameworks 
pertaining to its interpretation. The task of defining theory, too, is therefore one 
that continually renews itself as contexts and applications change. A central 
concern of all theoretical inquiry, and one that will be important to my argument 
in this thesis, is therefore the need to reinvent your interpretative approach in 
response to each individual interpretive task (I will return to this notion in the 
following subsection). 
Yet for all this, theory does not indefinitely defer, nor dissolve in 
equivocality, the need for explicit stances. There is no conflict between, on the 
one hand, commitment to a precisely defined position and, on the other hand, 
theory’s questioning of seemingly self-evident truths, its usage of defamiliarising 
techniques, or its refusal to simulate stability in lieu of the complexity of the 
problems it addresses. In fact, the latter procedures can serve as means for 
attaining the goal of precision. When Derrida claims the global applicability of the 
values of democracy beyond any cultural differences (in “Autoimmunity”) or when 
Butler urges the need to review the legal basis of indefinite detention (in 
Precarious Life), the fact that they base their arguments on theoretical 
considerations (the conditions of decision-making and the possibility of the future 
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in Derrida, the categories of sovereignty and governmentality in Butler) does not 
take away from the concreteness and seriousness of their demands; it lends its 
rigour to their formulation of these demands. 
Nor do we have to turn to recent theoretical work (cultural studies, broadly 
speaking) to witness a deeply ingrained concern with social organisation, justice, 
and emancipation. To realise this, one merely has to do a roll call of early theorists: 
Louis Althusser begins a Marxist analysis of culture in the 1960s, Luce Irigaray 
publishes Speculum of the Other Woman in 1974, Michel Foucault publishes 
Discipline and Punish in 1975, and so on. Derrida, I would argue, is no exception 
from this list. The positing of a political turn in his work misrepresents the fact that 
his philosophy is politically pertinent from its early stages on, because in this early 
work, Derrida critiques dominant, phallogocentric modes of thought whose 
ideologically inflected nature is precisely one of his main themes. Nicholas Royle, 
in his book In Memory of Jacques Derrida, advocates that we need “to get beyond 
the notion that his writing or his thinking, his language, if you will, takes on an 
increasingly political character, starting perhaps with ‘The Force of Law’ in 1989 or 
Spectres of Marx in 1993. It’s political all the way down the line” (106). 
I have already pointed to the important role played by Of Grammatology. 
In To Follow, Peggy Kamuf recounts, with regard to this text, which examines forms 
of violence that interlink writing, heritage, and authority, how, on its original 
publication, it “gave us the means to re-establish links between current politics 
[student demonstrations against the Vietnam war] and the metaphysics of 
presence that he showed to have been long at work in the philosophical 
tradition” (43). Looking back, and drawing on the experience related by critics like 
Kamuf, we should not read works like Specters of Marx or “Force of Law” as 
deviations from, or corrections of, a deconstructive project originally undertaken 
in a more self-contained manner. Arguing that no hermeneutical activity and no 
linguistic practice is truly self-contained, Derrida’s work in the 1960s and 70s 
already engages in the critical analysis of frameworks that merely pose as 
unpolitical and self-evident. And it counters this pose with a thinking of the 
situated-ness and particularity of frameworks – or as Derrida puts it in Rogues: 
“the thinking of différance [was] always a thinking of the political” (39). 
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Theory questions the grounds on which we construct certitude. It does not 
abandon the factuality of our inhabiting the world; it works on the question of how 
what is presented as factual is often the result of discursive strategies – an 
investigative attitude frequently misread by critiques that urge a return to the 
factual world as accessed through (what they call) objective or ideologically 
neutral modes of thought. Theory, moreover, is not a cynical, destructive, or 
nihilistic exercise. It opens up spaces and develops vocabularies for the 
articulation of new and alternative visions of inhabiting the world. In this view, the 
relation between theory and ethics is perhaps best summed up by Adam Newton’s 
comment in Narrative Ethics. Newton writes that “ethics apparently imposes a 
responsibility to the world and the word, whereas deconstruction – especially the 
brand perfected by Paul de Man – seems to abjure such responsibility. But that 
easy opposition trivializes the tension in each term.” (37). Newton suggests that 
what deconstruction does is in fact one version of the ethical task of stopping and 
asking questions before acting: a mode of inquiry that avoids pre-emptive 
certitude. “Ethical answerability here is not a flattened prescription for action; it 
is not a moral recipe book. Nor is deconstruction an indifference to answerability; 
it is at its best a scrupulous hesitation, an extreme care occasioned by the 
treachery of words and the danger of easy answers.” (37). My thesis is concerned 
with such a mode of scrupulous hesitation. 
 
Responding to the text 
I provide this brief review of theory in general and of Derrida’s contribution in 
particular in order to indicate two things. First, that theory is interested in 
questioning the normative and the seemingly self-evident because such 
questioning can reveal a number of productive fault-lines. Secondly, that in doing 
so, theory is not opposed to practicality. What I want to demonstrate now is that 
this includes the practice of engaging with texts: that in problematizing the lure of 




One question that I touch on above but have not yet explicitly addressed is 
whether theoretical reading is still a form of literary criticism, or whether it uses 
the (quite literal) pretext of discussing literature in order to develop ideas that 
have little to do with the texts it pertains to study (although these ideas may be of 
importance to other fields, such as politics). Can a theoretical reading of a literary 
work constitute a response to this work, or is its claim to be interpreting literature 
disingenuous? The answer I would give is that, naturally, it depends on the manner 
in which theory is employed in an individual piece of criticism. As in any other 
mode of interpretation, there is a risk of bringing preconceptions to the table and 
of tweaking the data so as to match the model. But this is not theory’s intrinsic 
fate. It certainly is not its aim. 
Subjecting the apparently self-evident to careful examination is not 
synonymous with a claim for the boundless mutability of meaning. Rather, as 
Derek Attridge writes in Reading and Responsibility, with regard to deconstructive 
reading: “The spectre of deconstruction is present – or perhaps somewhere 
between present and absent – whenever a wariness is expressed about too-simple 
appeals to categories such as truth, meaning and, indeed, presence” (37). Such 
undue simplicity, I propose, includes not only incautious assertions of objectivity, 
but also unbridled invention. To altogether abandon the question of what is 
present in a text is yet another unwary conceptualisation of presence and 
meaning. Indeed, nothing could be further off track than the reprimand that 
Derrida’s deconstructive project argues the irrelevance of authorial intention, and 
that literary theorists use this thought to make claims about texts that invert or 
ignore these texts’ original meanings. 
If, as we will see, Derrida’s work on language insists on how the lack of 
univocality is what makes expression possible in the first place, and how the logic 
of marginalisation structures the very centres of communication, it is always 
because the aberration, the misadventure, the risk, the effect we would like to be 
a mere secondary addition, can never be clearly identified or neatly separated 
from what we would prefer to be the purity of a primal, original, and central 
meaning. Deconstruction, then, does not teach a toolkit for reading texts against 
the grain. It teaches that the grain behaves in a most curious manner – a manner 
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that effectively frustrates the search for any such simple direction as “with” or 
“against.” 
In Derrida’s writings, this concern is at times obscured by a tendency to 
speak of possibilities when what is being analysed are irreducible risks. The 
possibility of misunderstanding a signifier, for instance, should not be (but often 
is) taken to indicate a choice, a decision to be made between the option of taking 
a speaker or writer at their word and the option of twisting their signifying gesture 
into creative new meanings. This type of reduction to once again clear-cut terms 
fails to take into account Derrida’s critique of such concepts as centre, self-
identity, or self-evidence. Based on his examinations of these notions, which I will 
outline in the following chapters, Derrida argues that an interpretative shift is 
always possible, that its possibility consists in its imperceptibility, that the 
possibility of its occurring or its having occurred can thus never be excluded, that 
although this risk can be handled with caution and insight, it can never be entirely 
evaded, and that, ultimately, we can never reach a point where we can assert with 
total accuracy that the meaning we have now identified is indeed the intended 
one. 
In thus analysing the possibility of misunderstanding as the effective 
inescapability of uncertainty, Derrida does not attest the reader a choice or an 
interpretative free pass. On the contrary, he insists on the irreducible difficulty of 
reading as well as on the virtually unlimited need for rigour that this difficulty 
carries with it. For this difficulty means that an interpretation’s apparent centrality 
can never completely assure us of the marginality of alternatives. Rather, the 
appearance of centrality is contingent on the conditions of its observation to an 
extent that we can and must problematize, but that is not exhaustively calculable. 
To respond to this dilemma by gesturing towards the supposedly fail-safe 
organisation of an interpretative procedure – the careful contextualisation that 
keeps in check all bias – is to remain blind to the fact that whereas uncertainty can 
be productively engaged with, there is a minimal degree of it that remains 
insurmountable and that troubles our insight, indefinitely and never in the mode 
of exhaustively defined alternatives. 
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In formalising these issues, deconstruction therefore raises the question of 
the reader’s responsibility. As Derrida puts it in the “Afterword” to Limited Inc, the 
irreducibility of uncertainty 
calls for decision in the order of ethical-political responsibility. It is 
even its necessary condition. A decision can only come into being in 
a space that exceeds the calculable program that would destroy all 
responsibility by transforming it into a programmable effect of 
determinate causes. (116) 
Deconstruction in this sense is an examination of the conditions under which 
responsible reading is possible. As Geoffrey Harpham comments, Derrida is in fact 
“trying to determine the conditions under which a reading [becomes] truly 
responsible by identifying a phase of undecidability through which reading must 
pass, a phase in which conclusions that [have] been taken for granted become 
subject to disinterested questioning” (23). However, I disagree with Harpham in 
that I would maintain that this questioning is not (and cannot be) disinterested; it 
is more accurately described as being engaged in an interested reflection on 
interests. 
The argument put forward by Derrida is that since no act of reading is 
programmable without remainder, any act of reading is the result of decisions and 
of ideological frameworks – including deconstructive readings, but also including 
any other interpretative procedure. By extension, the ethical dimension of reading 
consists in acknowledging the responsibility entailed by such decisions, and in 
formulating one’s reading strategies in reaction to this responsibility. As Critchley 
writes in The Ethics of Deconstruction, “[t]he ethical moment that motivates 
deconstruction is this Yes-saying to the unnameable, a moment of unconditional 
affirmation that is addressed to an alterity that can neither be excluded from nor 
included within logocentric conceptuality” (41). On this basis, Critchley argues that 
an ethical approach is not an extrapolation that is derived from deconstruction 
like “a superstructure from an infrastructure” (2). Deconstruction’s procedures 
are intrinsically ethical where they examine the irreducible alterity that makes 
assertions of certainty dangerous. 
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As I will argue in more detail in chapter two, there is, in reading, a complex 
interaction taking place between the reader and the other. The intervention that 
deconstruction makes in this interaction is not that of bestowing on the reader 
unlimited power over the other as author; on the contrary, deconstruction 
attempts to counteract the preconceptions through which a reader would 
reproduce only the discourses they already inhabit. The productive force of 
alterity that opposes itself to such immobility is what in The Ethics of Reading, 
Miller describes as “a necessary ethical moment in that act of reading as such, a 
moment neither cognitive, nor political, nor social, nor interpersonal, but properly 
and independently ethical” (1). This ethical moment is first of all a sense of being 
compelled. Miller describes it as an imperative that places certain constraints on 
the reader; it requires a reaction: not one in the (unethical) mode of total freedom, 
but one that “is a response to something, responsible to it, responsive to it, 
respectful of it” (4). The object of this responsibility is not a fixed attribute of the 
text; it is established as part of the relation between the text and the specific 
coordinates of a reading. Yet this does not mean that the constraints that make 
reading an ethical act are imposed on it in a prescriptive manner that would make 
of reading a means to an end. In order for reading to come into being as an ethical 
process, Miller specifies, “[t]he flow of power must not be all in one direction. 
There must be an influx of performative power from the linguistic transactions 
involved in the act of reading into the realms of knowledge, politics, and 
history” (5). Thus, reading emerges as an interaction with the text in which the 
reader acts upon the text in the attempt to do justice to it whilst also letting the 
text act upon herself or himself so as not to reduce it to a mere instrument. 
It is important that Miller develops this account of ethical reading without 
taking recourse to a concept of unchanging meaning. The responsibility of the 
reader is, for Miller, inscribed in a process of interpretation that is never separable 
from “the real situation of a man or woman reading a book, teaching a class, 
writing a critical essay” (4). The act of reading he describes is therefore not an 
attempt at reducing interpretation to a unilateral transmission of information (an 
attempt that can only stop any interpretative effort in its tracks). Rather, reading 
“faces in two directions” (4); what is ethical about it is that it simultaneously 
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reflects on the text and on the task of interpretation. On the one hand, reading 
enters into a specific situation within which the text can become the object of a 
certain responsibility. On the other hand, reading draws on the text to, as it were, 
interrupt this situation, to question and potentially change the frameworks that 
define it, including what Miller calls the realms of knowledge, politics, and history. 
Yet Miller makes it clear that by ethics he means this productive transaction of 
influxes, not an attitude that this transaction may depend on or produce. “No 
doubt the political and the ethical are always intimately intertwined, but an ethical 
act that is fully determined by political considerations or responsibilities is no 
longer ethical” (4). Perhaps essentialising matters, I would suggest that the 
question of politics is chiefly concerned with our conduct as part of a socius, with 
the alliances we form with others, the narratives into which we integrate 
ourselves, and so on. The question of ethics – interactive but less concretely 
interpersonal – is how we respond to the other (for instance to her or his writing) 
through a readiness to change ourselves (though I agree with Miller that these two 
questions are not separable). 
In reading, the ethical dimension that exists apart from the political one 
lies in our responsibility as readers towards the alterity of the text. In The 
Singularity of Literature, Attridge writes about the transformative quality of 
alterity: “If I succeed in responding adequately to the otherness and singularity of 
the other, it is the other in its relating to me – always in a specific time and place 
– to which I am responding, in creatively changing myself and perhaps a little of 
the world as well” (33). The otherness of a text can lead us to reflect on, and 
potentially re-invent, the very frameworks within which we read – and this is the 
only adequate response to a text insofar as it manifests itself as other than these 
frameworks. “There is thus an ethical dimension to any act of literary signification, 
and there is also a sense in which the formally innovative work, the one that most 
estranges itself from the reader, makes the most sharply challenging (which is not 
to say the most profound) ethical demand” (130-1). Literary capriciousness need 
not equal profundity, but there is a sense in which a formal challenge entails a 
heightened demand at the ethical level. 
23 
 
It is the question of this demand that my thesis investigates (and it should 
already be becoming clear that the demand made by a text as innovative as 
Finnegans Wake is likely to be a particularly challenging one). Having said this, I 
am aware that my own reader may find the first two chapters of this thesis largely 
technical, more concerned with formal aspects of the reading process than with 
questions of ethics. It is important, therefore, to keep in mind theory’s rethinking 
of the reader’s responsibility towards the text. Textual alterity, which I will discuss 
in chapters one and two, is an irreducible remainder that opposes itself to the neat 
unfolding of any exegetical programme. It requires not only the application of 
interpretative frameworks, but also their refashioning – which is also to say, a 
refashioning of world-discourse interaction. However, if part of what places us in 
a particular position in the world are the ways of speaking through which we 
articulate this position, then a change at the level of discourse is never innocent 
at the level of the self: it requires the sort of questioning of the self that we can 
call an ethical response. 
This is why we can say that formal innovation entails an ethical challenge, 
and it is why questions of ethics need not constitute a break with formal inquiry, 
but may represent a continuation of such inquiry. The ethical implications I discuss 
in chapter three and four (that there is in the very form of the Wake a demand for 
tolerance with regard to alterity and diversity) are inextricably linked to Joyce’s 
investigation of how alterity troubles the concepts of the self and of self-identity. 
Finally, all of this is why it comes as a considerable advantage of Derrida’s 
philosophy (as opposed to other types of theory concerned with more applied 
varieties of ethics) that he locates a question of responsibility at the formal level 
of language. For this allows us to describe how certain formal attributes already 
entail certain ethical considerations, as is the case in Joyce. 
 
Joyce’s ethics of form 
One of the early texts in which Derrida insists that the reader is inscribed in a 
complex interaction with the text – an interaction in which interpretation must be 
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neither totally active nor totally passive, but responsible – is “Plato’s Pharmacy.” 
In the opening pages of this essay, Derrida states: 
[T]hat person would have understood nothing of the game who, at 
this [du coup], would feel himself authorized merely to add on; that 
is, to add any old thing. He would add nothing: the seam wouldn’t 
hold. Reciprocally, he who through “methodological prudence,” 
“norms of objectivity,” or “safe-guards of knowledge” would refrain 
from committing anything of himself, would not read at all. (64) 
How, then, to read any text, let alone that famously illegible text, Finnegans Wake, 
without either producing inexcusable additions or else total silence? 
The first and most crucial response to this question is to note that the 
question is here neither mine nor Derrida’s – it is Joyce’s. As Mitchel and Slote put 
it in their introduction to Derrida and Joyce, “the Derrida/Joyce relationship” 
concerns “a relentless pursuit for the limits of any and all such efforts at 
totalization (appropriation, establishment, comprehension)” (2) – that is, Joyce’s 
writing is already partaking in this pursuit. Yet such a view is not merely a prejudice 
of theory. The pursuit in question is rather what Fritz Senn describes as “a 
recurrent, basic, Joycean motion” – namely, “an excessive bias, a tendency to 
overdo, to break out of norms, to go beyond” (35). If in committing a reading and 
committing myself to a reading I hope to avoid the danger of using a literary work 
to merely exemplify certain theoretical considerations, it is because the starting 
point of my reading of Finnegans Wake is an observation about the text itself: 
namely, that Finnegans Wake is difficult to read. 
In view of the sheer strangeness of the Wake, this may appear to be an 
issue that hardly merits argument. Consider, for example, the following passage, 
which is the second paragraph on the book’s first page: 
Sir Tristram, violer d'amores, fr'over the short sea, had passencore 
rearrived from North Armorica on this side the scraggy isthmus of 
Europe Minor to wielderfight his penisolate war: nor had 
topsawyer's rocks by the stream Oconee exaggerated themselse to 
Laurens County's gorgios while they went doublin their mumper all 
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the time: nor avoice from afire bellowsed mishe mishe to tauftauf 
thuartpeatrick: not yet, though venissoon after, had a kidscad 
buttended a bland old isaac: not yet, though all's fair in vanessy, 
were sosie sesthers wroth with twone nathandjoe. Rot a peck of 
pa's malt had Jhem or Shen brewed by arclight and rory end to the 
regginbrow was to be seen ringsome on the aquaface. (3.4-14) 
There is simultaneously too much meaning here and not enough. The material we 
are confronted with in this and almost every other passage in the Wake violates 
any number of conventions through which languages become what they are. Here, 
I repeat one of the most obvious statements to be made about this work. As 
Seamus Deane writes, “[t]he first thing to say about Finnegans Wake is that it is, 
in an important sense, unreadable” (vii). Yet in adopting this description, I would 
already raise the question of how we are to understand Deane’s cautious qualifier, 
“in an important sense.” 
As we will see, one crucial problem posed by Finnegans Wake is what we 
are to do with its unreadability as readers and as critics. Criticism may see it as its 
task to reduce difficulty: to elucidate the text and to present interpretations taken 
from the text but isolated and rendered more appreciable in their critical 
restatement. I find nothing inherently wrong with this approach, and partly follow 
it myself; the problem is that the Wake both invites and at the same time resists 
and problematizes these procedures. The difficulty of this text is in an important 
sense irreducible, for if we fashion the oddness of the Wake into a legible text, 
even if we do so with great rigour and only on the safest of grounds, we already 
pass over certain complications that, not least of all, put into question the very 
idea of legibility. 
The nature of these complications is such that theory can be helpful in 
addressing them. My comments in the previous subsections are meant to indicate 
– and I will argue this in greater detail – why literary theory is an apt tool for 
describing some of the challenges we face in reading the Wake. But first and 
foremost, these complications are Joyce’s own subject. To employ a simplifying 
but helpful division, we can say that Joyce’s text not only draws on these 
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complications at the level of form, structure, materiality, and so on; it also returns 
to them, again and again, at the level of content. As we will see, textual difficulty 
is one of Finnegans Wake’s themes. Which is also to say that it is not possible to 
divide criticism of the Wake into one set of studies that look at what we can say 
about the text itself (at what goes into its making both in terms of content and of 
form) and a separate set of studies interested in what the text can help us realise 
about our own predicaments as readers. With the Wake, a thorough examination 
of the world within the book reveals that a central element of this world is 
precisely the question of the book within the world. 
For these reasons, I subscribe to the position that Thurston outlines in 
James Joyce and the Problem of Psychoanalysis when he writes that we should 
reject any 
dichotomy between historical rigour and theoretical 
adventurousness, not only because such a dichotomy 
misrepresents the potential significance of still-current critical 
debates, but for a more direct reason: namely, that the principle 
[sic] site of our argument – the writings of James Joyce – entails in 
itself an urgent demand that we think through and beyond such a 
dualism, and escape from what Joyce sardonically portrays in 
Ulysses as a mythical choice between Scylla and Charybdis. (17) 
Any attempt at strictly differentiating between discourse and world ignores their 
interaction; which is not to say that they are the same, but that it is impossible to 
access one without going through the other. This is especially true with regard to 
Joyce’s texts. Joyce’s hyper-awareness of the relation between what he writes 
about and the mode of its expression (the “scrupulous meanness” of Dubliners, 
the evolving languages of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the way in which 
narrative impacts narration and narration impacts narrative in Ulysses) is a highly 
conscious implementation of the world-discourse interaction: an implementation 
that, as Thurston argues, undermines any strict separation of Joyce’s subject 
matter from his discursive strategy. Consider, for instance, Karen Lawrence’s 
reading of the multiple style of Ulysses, about which she writes: “We see the styles 
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as different but not definitive ways of filtering and ordering experience. This view 
of style obviates a ‘spatial apprehension’ of the book: one cannot see through the 
various styles to an ultimate Platonic pattern of meaning” (9).2 Form is not a veil 
we can remove to gain a clearer picture. With Joyce, a formal gesture can disclose 
a philosophy, a political stance, an entire mode of subjectivity. 
What I want to argue is that in Finnegans Wake, one of the positions 
expressed through form is a critique of the notion of presence in language. That is, 
I claim that the difficulty of the Wake is neither an instance of purely self-serving 
aestheticism nor a merely auxiliary instrument of expression. It is not, in short, a 
superficial attribute beneath which we can simply postulate a truer, perfectly 
straightforward writing. Drawing our attention towards that which escapes 
comprehension, Joyce can be seen to drive a wedge between understanding and 
mastery, between linguistic capacity and linguistic purity. The underlying 
assumption that would associate these terms is that a matter is properly 
understood only when it is assimilated, when it no longer raises any questions. 
Opposing this view, Finnegans Wake relies on an unassimilable alterity of writing 
in order to demonstrate the hermeneutical value of uncertainty: not in the mode 
of a lack of understanding, but in the mode of an appreciation of those remainders 
that no approach can fully integrate. In other words, the hermeneutics of the 
Wake is a hermeneutics of openness and of plurality. 
It should be clear, then, why I begin this introduction with a look at some 
of theory’s reflections on discourse. Joyce’s programme in the Wake, as it appears 
through the lens of difficulty, is notably similar to the theoretical position. It works 
against the notion that the production of knowledge happens through replication 
in the mode of identity, and instead gives due consideration to the alterity that 
unsettles ideals of univocality and self-sameness. Therefore, I will not so much 
apply theory to the Wake as draw parallels between the two. It is worth pointing 
out, however, that this is not fundamentally different from any other 
deconstructive reading. Deconstruction is not a method, nor is it a phenomenon 
                                                          
2 The example I cite from Lawrence is an early one, but questions of diegesis and 
representation are still very much part of the debate (see for instance the 2014 collection of essays 
James Joyce: The Recirculation of Realism, edited by Ruggieri and Terrinoni, in particular the article 
by Annalisa Federici). 
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that begins with Derrida’s philosophy. Deconstructive fault-lines are at work in all 
writing, and deconstruction is therefore not a procedure that defines itself 
independently from the texts to which it is applied, but represents a rethinking of 
what we already encounter in texts. The quality that sets Finnegans Wake apart, 
then, is not that it can be read with a view to these fault-lines (any text can), but 
that it is itself actively working with them. Joyce is in the precise sense of the word 
self-deconstructive. This is how, throughout this thesis, I will discuss the Wake as 
both a work exemplary of other texts and a case of particular interest. 
Here, however, we run up against a paradox of reading Finnegans Wake. 
We struggle in vain to make any kind of sense of the Wake without immediately 
undoing some of its far-reaching interrogation of sense-making itself. And the 
reception of Finnegans Wake, for all the ways in which it has singled out the book 
as the most illegible in recent memory, is also proof of the enormous assimilative 
powers of readers. Joyce may have spent an exorbitant amount of time and energy 
on, quite literally, tearing language to shreds; nonetheless, we as readers can still 
find ways to make sense of it. I will argue that this is in fact part of the point Joyce 
is making. Increasing his writing’s difficulty, he confronts us with the strength of 
our desire for meaning, and indeed with language’s powers of producing meaning 
under such extreme conditions. Yet there is also a risk here of responding to 
Joyce’s difficulty as if he were not raising any questions about intelligibility, but 
communicating in a manner whose intelligibility is merely eccentric. 
Interacting with Finnegans Wake, we are at all points tempted to return to 
the exegetical model of removing the veil of form so as to perceive meaning in its 
ipseity. This is not merely a manner of speaking: in Wake criticism, there is a long 
tradition of studies that attempt a return to intelligibility through isolating stable 
units of content. Yet I do not want to suggest that this tradition is simply a history 
of misreading. Given the illegibility of Finnegans Wake, there is a sense in which 
any reading of it is a misreading, seeing how it is a deviation from the actual text. 
This complicates the distinction between reading and misreading – without 
rendering this distinction any less significant or problematic. Conversely, the 
activity of making Joyce’s text readable is in many ways an appropriate and 
necessary interpretative response, no more or less at fault than many others. My 
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reader will find that in the outline of the Wake I give below, as well as throughout 
this thesis, I employ generalising notions of plot, situation, and character that 
derive precisely from this type of critical work. What I am taking issue with, then, 
is the notion that such reduction to familiar categories can close the question of 
what Finnegans Wake is about. Which is again to say that I hold that the Wake 
does not deny meaning, but pluralises it. 
Attempts at defusing the text’s plurality date back to before its original 
publication. Already the 1929 essay collection Our Exagmination Round his 
Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress combines some pieces that 
prepare the reader for the novelty of Joyce’s creation with other contributions 
that re-integrate the evolving book, serialised at the time as “Work in Progress,” 
into familiar frameworks. Stuart Gilbert, in “Prolegomena to Work in Progress” 
insists on the work’s readability along the lines of a thorough but ultimately 
straightforward exegesis. As Patrick McCarthy notes in “Postlegomena to Stuart 
Gilbert’s Prolegomena,” Gilbert appears determined in this essay to emphasise 
“the coherence of what others regarded as an incoherent work” (34) and “to 
counter the charge that Joyce was a proponent of the literary avant-garde” (36). 
If Gilbert may thus have started the trend, it is Joseph Campbell and Henry 
Morton Robinson’s 1944 A Skeleton Key to Finnegans Wake that canonised it. 
Towards the end of this study, Campbell and Robinson boldly assert that “[i]n 
every passage there is a key word which sounds the essential theme” (357) as well 
as that “there are no nonsense syllables in Joyce!” (358). They assure us that 
although Joyce’s literary extravaganza may initially look daunting, and although it 
demands some truly strenuous effort, there is nothing in it that requires us to think 
outside of such habitual notions as central and peripheral meaning, or reading as 
explication. This has subsequently become the underlying assumption of many 
studies of the Wake that produce insight by doing away with obscurity. Critical 
projects undertaken in this vein include William York Tindall’s A Reader’s Guide to 
Finnegans Wake, Danis Rose and John O’Hanlon’s Understanding Finnegans Wake, 
John Gordon’s Finnegans Wake: A Plot Summary, and John Bishop’s Joyce’s Book 
of the Dark, all of which retrieve from the Wake’s weave of material something 
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like a stable narrative world – although, it should be noted, with results that differ 
between these four studies. 
One significant departure from this style of reading is Margot Norris’s 1974 
The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake. In the book’s final chapter, having 
analysed what she calls the “lack of certainty in every aspect of the work” (120), 
Norris concludes that “[t]he greatest critical mistake in approaching Finnegans 
Wake has been the assumption that we can be certain of who, where, and when 
everything is in the Wake, if only we do enough research” (120). The obscurity of 
the Wake is not a surface layer that can be penetrated so as to reach an underlying 
clarity; the text is obscure through and through. The need to which Norris thus 
gives voice to critically examine the very notion of certitude is also taken up in 
Colin MacCabe’s 1978 James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word, which 
stipulates that “[t]he difficulty of reading Joyce is a difficulty in our notion of 
reading” and that Joyce “presents literary criticism with its own impossibility” (2). 
A similar attitude informs several contributions to the 1984 collection Post-
Structuralist Joyce, edited by Attridge and Ferrer. In Stephen Heath’s essay, 
“Ambiviolences: Notes for reading Joyce,” the post-structuralist programme is 
stated in the following terms: “The text is never closed and the ‘ideal reader’ will 
be the one who accedes to the play of this incompletion, placed in ‘a situation of 
writing’, ready no longer to master the text but now to become its actor” (32). 
The notion to be underlined here is that of refraining from attempts at 
mastering the text. The Wake’s obscurity requires that we develop critical 
responses that interact responsibly with the text – that become actors prompted 
by the text or acted upon by it – without subjecting the work to an exegetical 
mastery that forces Joyce’s writing into the normative patterns it is in fact evading. 
Joyce’s deliberate muddying of language demands that we come to terms with the 
productivity of his difficulty without taking recourse to the sort of certitude this 
difficulty works to undermine. It is thus necessary – and far from methodologically 
outdated – to continue work on Finnegans Wake in the mode developed by Norris, 
MacCabe, and others. Thus, in their introduction to the 2015 essay collection 
Joyce’s Allmaziful Plurabilities, editors Kimberly J. Devlin and Christine Smedley 
suggest that what justifies grappling with Joyce’s unreadable text to the extent to 
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which many readers and critics still do, more than seven decades after its original 
publication, is chiefly Joyce’s undoing of monovalence: what they call his 
“semantic excesses – pluralities of possibilities, in terms of meanings – that veer 
off in multiple, nonexclusive directions” (2). 
This line of inquiry is particularly relevant at the current moment, at which 
an important strand of Finnegans Wake criticism is again drawn towards an ideal 
of lucidity: namely, the lucidity promised by the consultation of the Wake’s avant-
textes. As I will examine at the end of chapter three, the philological approach, 
although it holds readers accountable to a formidable standard of knowledge 
about the making of Joyce’s text and, precisely by taking into account the range 
and variety of Joyce’s sources, steers clear of the idea of a single, overarching 
narrative, also risks atomising the text into manageable units, emphasising Joyce’s 
creative process to an extent that does away with much of what is remarkable – 
and disturbing – about that process’s result. 
To counteract the risk of neutralising, as it were, the obscurity of Finnegans 
Wake, it is necessary instead to give due consideration to the meaning that form 
carries, to the implications of Joyce’s complexity in and of itself. John Lurz’s article 
“Literal Darkness: Finnegans Wake and the Limits of Print” is one recent instance 
of a study that provides some reflections on this task. Lurz notes that in the Wake, 
writing markedly resists the role of docile carrier of meaning. Since the form Joyce 
gives his writing often serves to interrupt codes of intelligibility, the “exteriority” 
of his writing “is not merely a part of the process of signification but is, rather, 
something to notice in its own right” (680). Therefore, Finnegans Wake requires a 
reader “who is able to open his or her eyes to obscurity itself” (681), who is able 
to look at the page, not through the page. For instance, I would argue that 
attempts at looking through the above-cited “Sir Tristram” passage – by 
transforming it into something meaningful – inevitably do violence to the fact that 
many of this passage’s units, as they appear on the page, do not partake in any 
existing modes of meaning production. However, I also maintain that looking at 
this passage can show it to be evoking, manipulating, and even newly creating such 
modes, thus nevertheless inviting us to read. What makes Joyce’s experiment so 
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compelling is that his manipulations demand of us not that we surrender meaning, 
but that we transform the modes of its production. 
I therefore only partially agree with Lurz’s statement that “the printed 
letters and words in the Wake also function as a non-referential medium” (682), 
because I do not subscribe to the binary division this implies between lucid 
reference, on the one hand, and obscure materiality, on the other. Even where 
Joyce distorts the materiality of writing in order to disrupt procedures of 
reference, the very disruption is in itself productive of meaning. By contrast, Lurz’s 
argument (though not his terminology) aligns itself with Allon White’s proposition, 
in The Uses of Obscurity, that “it would be wrong to call ‘Finnegans Wake’ an 
obscure work” (20). In White’s sense, obscurity continues the production of 
meaning, whereas Finnegans Wake lacks “the desire for denotation” (20). 
Contrary to this rather sweeping verdict, I will argue that a sophisticated 
manipulation of desire is in fact one of the key aspects of the Wake’s unreadability. 
I therefore hold that the Wake is a perfect example of White’s notion that 
obscurity carries “distinct and distinctive kinds of meaning which are not 
secondary to an anterior obscured content. Obscurity signifies in the very act of 
obscuring” (18). Obscurity draws attention to itself, which is precisely what takes 
place in Finnegans Wake. 
Lurz offers another formulation that more closely matches this position 
when he writes that the task of Joyce’s reader is that “of accessing (without 
dispelling) hiddenness as such – of looking at the Wake’s dark print itself” (683). 
Where the Wake is materially unreadable, it does not hide neat and neatly 
retrievable units of meaning. Its obscurity, at these moments, is more 
fundamental, since any light to be shed would touch only on things other than 
what is actually on the page. To look at the darkness of the page is not therefore 
to search for hidden meaning; but neither is it to cease looking. Rather, it is to look 
at hiddenness without a hidden, to appreciate the meaningfulness of an obscurity 
that challenges meaning itself. 
What could be the meaning of such a challenge? In “Values of Difficulty,” 
Judith Butler suggests that to interrupt what she calls translatability – that is, the 
dynamics that transport information into familiar modes of understanding – is to 
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adopt a position that can be as productive as it is “isolating, estranging, difficult, 
and demanding” (203). The untranslatable or not fully translatable constitutes a 
painful breakdown of meaning, but it also contains “the possibility of meeting up 
with the limits of our own epistemological horizon, a limit that challenges what we 
know to be knowable” (206). It challenges this knowledge; it does not necessarily 
reconfirm it. Tracing the limits of our own understanding, as Joyce’s language 
does, need not newly confine us within those limits. Instead, the process of 
running up against the limits may find that the delineations of what is knowable 
are not absolute: we can change them, we can change the nature of knowing. The 
untranslatable thus brings about disruptions that can potentially break the mould 
of translatability and tautology; it reveals opportunities for crossing the 
boundaries of repeating only what we already know we can repeat. 
Yet, in engaging the limits of translatability, the aim cannot be to expand a 
realm of intelligibility that is itself perfectly homogenous. There is never simply 
one intelligibility that renders accessible all of the world or of the plurality of 
worlds; rather, there are what might be called epistemes, in Foucault’s sense: 
configurations of intelligibility. Where language’s capacity to make intelligible 
breaks down, we are not therefore confronted with an absolute limit to discourse, 
at least not in the sense of an absolute limit to world-discourse interaction. On the 
contrary, in indicating the limitedness, and thus partiality, of any discursive 
position (of any configuration of intelligibility), such a breakdown may point us in 
the direction of discourse’s non-absolute nature – of its openness to change. 
In this view, the richness and the ethical import of the meaning produced 
by Joyce’s particularly recalcitrant untranslatability can be read along the lines of 
Sara Salih’s argument in “Judith Butler and the ethics of ‘difficulty’.” About 
discourses that are not easily integrated into regimes of interpretative mastery 
(that are not easily translatable), Salih writes: “it is possible to read ‘difficulty’ as 
an important ethical component of the radical democratic project” (42). Difficulty 
is democratic not because it opens the floodgates of an undifferentiated 
relativism, but because difficulty of this kind opposes itself to what Salih terms 
“the anti-democratic uses of ‘clarity’” (42) – that is, “the exclusionary schemes of 
intelligibility which currently pass for the ontological norm” (43). 
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The call for clarity all too often carries with it a prohibition against 
explorations and questions that are disconcerting because they break with existing 
modes of knowledge-production. Yet if, as theory argues, all modes of knowledge-
production depend on discursive frameworks, such a prohibition can be seen to 
be exclusionary in a highly problematic manner. For it relies on an appearance of 
objectivity without examining the constructedness and mobility of this 
appearance. Difficulty, by contrast, actively underlines this constructedness and 
thus potentially confronts us with an alterity that can transform us by transforming 
the norms we live and think by. This is what Joyce is doing when he challenges the 
understanding of knowledge as mastery and opposes to it a thinking of knowledge 
as plurality. He is not employing illegibility in an aggressive dismantling of 
meaning; his undoing of language is itself meaningful. Which is not to say that the 
procedure in question is one of a wholesale rejection of existing practices. Attridge 
gives a helpful clarification of this when, in The Work of Literature, he writes: 
“Alterity […] is not a matter of simply opposing accepted norms, since oppositions 
occurs within a shared horizon; rather, it’s the introduction into the known of that 
which it excludes in constituting itself as the known” (219). If Finnegans Wake 
ventures into the space of an untranslatability that may disconcert us, it also 
succeeds in breaking open the evenness of discourse, allowing for the creation of 
new meaning and of new types of meaning. 
Still, Joyce achieves these meanings in a manner whose destructive 
qualities we should not dissimulate, as such dissimulation would, once again, 
return us to a concept of productiveness as neatness and control. In Finnegans 
Wake, I will argue, the aim of achieving such control is displaced by an 
acknowledgment of alterity, of that which will not let itself be assimilated and 
which catalyses change precisely because it resists the categories we possess. 
Reading Finnegans Wake without disregarding its strangeness thus leads to the 
ethical problem of encountering the other – and I will discuss Derrida’s analysis of 
hospitality in chapter four. At this point, we may also recall Philippe Sollers’s 
passionate defence, at the 1975 International James Joyce Symposium in Paris, of 
the political dimension of the Wake’s language. Speaking of what he calls Joyce’s 
“trans-nationalism,” Sollers ventures that “[i]n what he writes, nothing remains 
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but differences, and so he calls into question all and every community (this is 
referred to as his ‘unreadability’)” (4). And, famously, Sollers adds: “Finnegans 
Wake is the most formidably anti-fascist book produced between the two 
wars” (4). 
This is not to say that Joyce, writing in the 1920s and 30s, is giving his 
readers a recipe how to beat Nazism – a patently absurd idea for all sorts of 
reasons. What is at stake here is rather an anti-fascist stance whose outlines 
Patrick McGee denotes when he writes: “if there is anything that the patriarch, 
the imperialist, the capitalist and the fascist fear, it is the desire for desire, which 
has another name: hope” (177). As we will see in chapter one, the Wake stages 
the logic of desire in such a way as to undermine the notion that any particular 
readability could serve as the answer to desire. If such jouissance – desire in excess 
of desire – can be put to service by the structures McGee names (Slavoj Žižek 
demonstrates impressively how capitalism does this), it also opposes itself to the 
solidification of any given order. As Vincent Cheng argues in Joyce, Race and 
Empire, “[a]ll attempts to assert the Self by denying the Other are problematized 
as unstable in the multipleness of Finnegans Wake” (269). Which is to say that the 
Wake opposes itself to fascistoid thinking not by constructing a utopian, 
monolithic counter-narrative, but by destabilising all forms of monolithic 
readability. 
That this destabilisation is to a considerable extent achieved through the 
Wake’s form is something also taken into account by Len Platt’s Joyce, Race and 
Finnegans Wake. Writing about the Wake’s historical context with regard to 
racism, Platt argues that “the Wake is the racist’s […] worst nightmare at a number 
of different levels” (33), partly because it “is designed as a monstrous failure – a 
failure to concoct ‘pure’, original language, to find racial origins and to construct 
the dimensions of racial identity” (21). In Joyce’s text, the one pure utopia and/or 
dystopia is displaced by the challenge of an impure but lively chaos – especially 
linguistic chaos. Again McGee: “This is why Finnegans Wake is one of the most 
ethical books ever written […], it does not present us with a spectre coming from 
the future but with the grace that demands that we live in the present, that we 
never surrender our desire (not even to utopia)” (179). In view of such readings, I 
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would venture that as long as the comments by Sollers remain but an anecdote to 
be retold (whether dismissively or approvingly), we have not yet developed a 
sufficiently serious response to what he is describing as Joyce’s challenge to 
meaning as legibility, to community as homogeneity. 
This challenge is by no means marginal to Joyce’s literary project. In Ethical 
Joyce, Marian Eide demonstrates the crucial role that alterity plays in Joyce’s 
writing from Dubliners onwards, and argues that “[f]or Joyce, the first ethical 
consideration is the preservation of difference within a context of response or 
responsibility” (7). My reflections on the difficulty of the Wake proceed from a 
similar starting point, seeing how I am likewise interested in how Joyce represents 
strategies for encountering and preserving alterity. My approach differs from 
Eide’s, however, in that Eide aims to relate the reader’s experience to encounters 
within the text. Her method, she writes, is “to focus on specific textual moments 
throughout [Joyce’s] works that present particular ethical dilemmas or 
opportunities” (3), brought about by how characters relate to each other. This 
strikes me as a pertinent approach, but I rely on a slightly different one. Analysing 
the encounter with the other, I emphasise less negotiations between characters 
than a more abstract alterity, found in the textual difficulties faced  by both 
readers of Finnegans Wake and by readers within the Wake’s narratives (and 
where the reader is a character, my examination will shift the focus away from this 
fictional reader’s response to the fictional writer, towards the fictional reader’s 
response to the fictional written). In this way, I hope to do justice to Wake as a 
book that, as Eide puts it, “is not only descriptive but also performative in its 
effects” (1). Performing the ethical uses of plurality, the Wake not only conjures 
up encounters with various others, but explores a linguistic otherness that breaks 
with the very concepts of self-sameness, identity, and presence, to instead draw 
on a language of volatile and mutable plurality. 
If this plurality and illegibility loom large in the Wake’s language, they are 
also the focus of many moments in the text at which acts of reading or writing take 
centre-stage. There, we find Joyce explicitly addressing the predicaments that 
engaging with the alterity of language entails for both readers and writers. Before 
I turn to these scenes, however, which will also be the subject of my readings in 
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the following chapters, I will give a brief summary of those elements (or rather 
versions) of the text’s narrative that are important to my investigation. In this 
abstract, I will not problematize any scenes or any aspects of their telling, but aim 
to provide some minimal background for the argument I put forward. To give a 
sense of setting and of character relations, I will draw on essentialising strategies. 
Yet I understand my account here to be well short of completion: it does not cover 
the entire text and it is partial with regard to the sections covered. 
Chapter I.1. of Finnegans Wake introduces us to the idea that this is in 
many ways a book about crises, downfalls, and resurrections. There are allusions 
to various historical and mythological constellations, particularly conflicts, that 
relate this abstract theme to a cyclical pattern of rise and fall, catastrophe and new 
beginning, repeating itself throughout human memory. The chapter also provides 
the first glimpse of Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker (HCE), a more individual 
embodiment of human fallibility – although the nuclear family that is the Wake’s 
nearest approximation to main characters (HCE, ALP, and their children Issy, Shem, 
and Shaun) also undermine notions of individuality by blending with any number 
of figures and archetypes. I.2 closes in on HCE and his history. We learn about a 
mysterious crime he may have committed and witness how this transgression 
becomes public knowledge. I.3 and I.4 are then largely concerned with HCE’s trial, 
possibly including, in I.4, his execution and resurrection or else his being buried 
alive and escaping. Although he subsequently disappears, the trial continues, and 
the motif of an investigation is carried over into I.5, though not necessarily in the 
context of the trial narrative. I.5 features the close examination of the missing 
piece of evidence, a letter. It also introduces in more detail the figure of Anna Livia 
Plurabelle (ALP), who either wrote or dictated the letter and who at one point 
retrieved it after it was lost. I.6 stages a quiz that is also a parade of the book’s 
main characters and motifs, following which I.7 gives us a slightly different 
background for the writing of ALP’s letter. In the mode of derogatory comments 
made by Shaun (the Postman), we learn about the literary output of his twin 
brother Shem (the Penman) who, throughout the book, is hinted to have had a 
hand in the production of the document in question. This chapter also firmly 
establishes the rivalry between the two twins (already hinted at in some of the 
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histories of I.1). Finally, I.8 closes Book I by returning to ALP, this time in her 
manifestation as Dublin’s river Liffey. 
Book II gives us a sense of what could be called the family life of these 
characters. II.1 shows Issy at play with her friends and her brothers Shem and 
Shaun. At the end of the chapter, they are called home by their parents, and II.2 
centres on the children doing their homework. II.3 tells us about the events taking 
place in the bar downstairs, where HCE the publican falls out with his customers 
over what appears to be yet another manifestation of his guilt. II.4 is a boat 
journey (reminiscent of Tristan and Isolde) that may or may not be a dream dreamt 
by HCE, who has downed all the alcohol left over by his guests and has collapsed 
drunkenly. 
The first three chapters of Book III hinge on Shaun, the first and third 
chapter once more being organised as investigations. Shaun is questioned by four 
old men in III.1 and gives a sermon in III.2 to an audience that includes Issy. In III.3, 
he again becomes the subject of an interrogation by the four, this time while he is 
asleep or in a trance, a state in which he responds to the questions addressed to 
him by channelling the voices of other characters. One of the characters who is 
given the floor in this manner is HCE, who talks about his past as a builder of cities 
(including, possibly, Dublin). The enquiry, however, is once again interrupted when 
III.4 takes us back to the family home, with Shaun, Shem, and Issy now in bed in 
their more childlike roles. 
The single chapter of Book IV, finally, is in many ways a mirroring of I.1. It 
conjures up more scenes from history, and ultimately matches up the many 
disgraces and falls that take place throughout the book with the possibility of a 
new beginning. This possibility is represented by ALP in her river form, flowing into 
Dublin Bay to merge with the sea and eventually return as a cloud of rain (one of 
Issy’s manifestations), whilst also returning us to the beginning of the text by way 
of the loop that famously connects the book’s last sentence to its first. 
If the strangeness of Joyce’s language and the protean mutability of his 
characters and narratives provide countless occasions to discuss problems of 
interpretation, I will focus in particular on chapters I.5, I.7, and III.3 – that is, on 
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the analysis of ALP’s letter, on Shaun’s comments about Shem’s writing, and on 
Shaun’s task of literally giving voice to the experience of other characters. I begin 
with ALP’s letter, whose location and content mystify characters throughout the 
book, and my argument is that, as readers of the Wake, we share this 
predicament. Regarding the version of the letter that actually appears in I.5 (see 
111.10-20), Tindall confidently asserts that here is “[t]he letter, before us at 
last” (102). By contrast, Bernard Benstock introduces an element of caution when 
he writes that “[i]t is difficult to resist the temptation to assume that the variation 
of the letter that appears here is the letter” (35). ALP’s letter, it would appear, is 
not presented to us in a straightforward way; to treat its text as known is 
effectively a temptation. And even though Benstock seems willing to some extent 
to give in to this temptation, he also notes: “Although this can safely be said to be 
the letter chapter, the actual text of that letter within chapter five does not give 
us either the first or the most complete version available in the Wake” (34). 
Capable of being authentic without being complete, and vice versa, ALP’s all-
important letter comes before us decentred and pluralised, with aspects of its 
reliability scattered through several, competing versions. In chapter one, I will 
argue that this raises the question of the essence of a signifying gesture. And I will 
show how I.5 delineates its exegete-figure’s futile attempt to bring ALP’s letter 
into agreement with an ideal of essential meaning. 
In chapter two, I focus on another interpretative process: Shaun’s reading 
of Shem’s writing in I.7. To quickly outline my own approach, I can again contrast 
it with Tindall’s assessment of the scene (in this case one that has found more 
lasting resonance in subsequent criticism). Tindall suggests that Shaun’s tell-tale 
rant against his brother is in part a parody of attacks by other writers on Joyce – 
what Tindall calls “Joyce’s indirect and jocular defense” (137). As part of this 
reading, he makes the problematic suggestion that “[Joyce’s] feeling counteracts 
Shaun’s tone” (132). Rather than reading the episode as one in which Joyce 
actually defends his own opinion, Tindall thus assumes that at the centre of the 
chapter stands not linguistic production as Joyce views it, but precisely a 
detraction from these views, in the form of Shaun. As we will see, this idea has 
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gained some acceptance; I would venture, however, that this approach passes 
over fascinating opportunities offered by the text. 
Shaun’s response to his brother’s writing incorporates both his 
understanding of that writing and his expression of that understanding: it is a 
production based on an interpretation of another production. We should take 
seriously Shaun’s tone as part of the point that Joyce is making, since the 
vehemence with which Shaun puts forward his position can tell us a lot about what 
is at stake in reading and writing as Joyce understands it, especially in terms of 
affect. In particular, Shaun’s aggressiveness (what I will analyse as his anxiety) 
resonates with Finnegans Wake’s insistence that language operates without 
taking recourse to stabilising concepts of centrality and essence. When we also 
take into consideration the multiple filtering of one voice through another (Joyce’s 
through Shem’s, Shem’s through Shaun’s, Shaun’s through Joyce’s), I.7 emerges 
as one of Joyce’s most complex statements about what it means to read or write. 
At the end of chapter two, I also bring to bear on these considerations Shaun’s role 
in III.3, which in its own way takes up the motif of one voice reproducing another. 
Chapter three continues to examine plurality in absence of essence, mainly 
focusing on a short passage from I.1 about the loss of univocal clarity, but also 
relating this section to others that consider how the loss potentially opens up a 
space for a plurality of meaning. These include some of Joyce’s implementations 
of the philosophy of Giambattista Vico and of the biblical tales of Babel and 
Pentecost. Finally, chapter four explores the Wake’s staging of linguistic and 
cultural plurality by returning to III.3 and examining HCE’s city-building as an 
example of the formation of public, discursive space. HCE’s account of his city is 
frequently poised between creation and violence, an ambiguity that I relate to 
Derrida’s understanding of hospitality, which similarly suspends the idea of co-
habitation between the beneficial and the problematic. I conclude that, for 
Finnegans Wake, questioning the (linguistic) grounds on which we acquire 
knowledge also entails asking about our (ethical) response to the other. 
The Wake’s insistence on the impossibility of separating creative gestures 
from destructive ones is a common denominator of many of the discussions I put 
forward in the following chapters. It is also where Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytical 
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theory comes into play. The aspect of Lacan’s teaching key to my argument is his 
thinking of the inseparability of the interpretative order from the distortive one. 
As we will see, this resonates with Joyce’s depiction of how expressive power 
complicates, even divides, itself. 
 
Lacan and language’s beleaguered subject 
It is no doubt one of those coincidences that we fetishize at our own peril that 
Derrida and Lacan met for the first time in Baltimore (see Derrida, “For the Love” 
49-51), once the home of Edgar Allan Poe and the city where Poe died and is 
buried. It is intriguing nonetheless – after all, the most tangible point at which their 
work intersects is their debate about Poe’s short story “The Purloined Letter.” 
Lacan uses his “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” to preface Écrits. “Le facteur de 
la vérité,” included in The Post Card, provides Derrida’s extensive critique of this 
seminar. Both authors would at times return to the subject – for instance, Derrida 
in “For the Love of Lacan” and Lacan in “Lituraterre” – but the first two texts 
constitute the primary archive on what it means to read Lacan with Derrida or 
Derrida with Lacan. 
I will not, however, spend too much time on the Poe debate in this thesis, 
although I will briefly touch on it in chapter one. For what I want to suggest is that 
in spite of this well-documented disagreement – examined in great detail in The 
Purloined Poe, edited by Muller and Richardson – Lacan’s and Derrida’s respective 
discussions of language are in fact compatible in important respects. In “For the 
Love of Lacan,” Derrida points out that his own contribution is “unreadable for 
readers in a rush to decide between the ‘pro and the con,’ in short, for those minds 
who believed I was opposing Lacan or showing him to be wrong” (63). Derrida is 
making some restorative gestures in this lecture (which seems appropriate in a 
colloquium commemorating Lacan), but his statement is by no means reducible to 
retrospective teleology or apologetic adjustment. As I will show in the first 
chapter, Derrida’s objections are from the start aimed at Lacan’s manipulation of 
such expressions as the letter, the phallus, or castration. I would therefore argue 
that it is chiefly Lacan’s rhetoric that is at stake in Derrida’s criticism. If Derrida 
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states that Lacan’s work makes “the most strenuous, and powerfully spectacular, 
use of […] the most deconstructible motifs of philosophy” (54), he maintains that, 
at the same time, this work is also “the closest” (55) to his own. 
To second this judgement – which I would be inclined to do – would first of 
all require an in-depth analysis of Lacan’s style. This I will not undertake here; 
suffice it to say that whereas Derrida’s critique of Lacan does advance some 
pertinent points regarding the latter’s unforthcoming idiom, it also construes a 
version of Lacan that, as I will argue in chapter one, runs counter to important 
aspects of Lacan’s thinking. This is not to say that deconstruction inverts Lacan’s 
meaning in order to disagree with him. Derrida does not sacrifice an apparent 
compatibility so as to emphasise hidden contradictions; on the contrary, Derrida’s 
reading of Lacan is arguably not altogether deconstructive enough, odd as this 
admittedly may seem. 
Derrida somewhat too readily adopts Lacan’s at times problematic manner 
of presenting his thought, without investigating how this manner masks a more 
differentiated argument that can be shown to subvert or deconstruct many of the 
superficial problems. My proposition, then, is to read Lacan in a way that draws 
on this deeper level of differentiation. And in attempting a re-evaluation of this 
kind, it is important to keep in mind that the first to plot such a trajectory was, in 
a certain sense, Lacan himself. Michael Lewis gives an informative account of this 
in his study Derrida and Lacan: Another Writing. Detailing the important transition 
from Lacan’s middle to his late period, Lewis shows that among the 
transformations Lacan’s system undergoes, one of the most crucial concerns the 
relation between the symbolic and the real. I will therefore briefly consider these 
two terms before turning to the shift Lewis describes in Lacan’s conceptualisation 
of them. 
Lacan’s symbolic encompasses the totality of interpretative codes, which 
is to say: all that serves intelligibility, including most of language – though not all 
of language, as we will presently see and as I will further examine in chapter one 
(and this difference between language and the symbolic is one of the things that 
make Lacan highly relevant to an examination of Joyce’s unreadability). All modes 
of symbolic codification express what Lacan calls the real – the excessively 
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immediate, uninterpretable presence from which our experiences derive – by 
cutting it down into identifiable units. The real is therefore only accessed in the 
distorted forms that the symbolic imposes on it, which is tantamount to saying 
that the real itself cannot be accessed at all. Bruce Fink, in his introduction to 
Lacan’s work, offers the following summary: 
The division of the real into separate zones, distinct features, and 
contrasting structures is a result of the symbolic order, which, in a 
manner of speaking, cuts into the smooth façade of the real, 
creating divisions, gaps, and distinguishable entities and laying the 
real to rest, that is, drawing or sucking it into the symbols used to 
describe it, and thereby annihilating it. (24) 
This opens up the question – crucial both to Lacan’s work and to my present 
investigation into Finnegans Wake – of the unintelligible. How are we to describe 
remainders of the real that cannot be annihilated? That is, how are we to 
represent to ourselves the points at which our capacity for representation breaks 
down, because we encounter something we cannot quite express? 
With regard to these cases, Lewis argues that Lacan, in his middle period, 
posits “a clear border between the symbolic and the real” (165), a “suture” (165) 
that both separates the two categories and holds them in place relative to each 
other. Simultaneously separation and link, this suture is what “institutes a 
deconstructible relation between the real and the symbolic” (73), for it puts in 
place an overly autonomous symbolic that remains separated from, and 
effectively undisturbed by, the real that it describes. Lewis relates this excessive 
autonomy to the Lacanian category of the name of the father (see 58, 158-9), but 
I would propose that its most problematic manifestations are the Lacanian images 
of the phallus and of castration. Both the name of the father and the phallus evoke 
paternal authority as the source of the symbolic, but it is the phallus that extends 
the field of the paternal metaphor to include breakdowns of the symbolic order as 
well. The phallus represents the ideal signifier: a symbolic unit that would grant 
access to a mode of expression that knows no failure. The absence of this signifier 
(which is of course what we experience, constantly lacking the terms to 
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domesticate the real) becomes in turn represented as castration. Castration thus 
gives to the inexpressibility of the real a specific location on the (imaginary) body. 
As we will see, it is this specificity in the description of what is also said to remain 
inexpressible that Derrida attacks. As Lewis puts it, “through this fantastic image, 
the real presents itself to the signifier in a manageable form” (167), because the 
very failure to manage becomes itself manageable. 
In his late period, however, Lacan classes the image of castration as 
precisely a fantastic one, as a fantasy or myth imposed after the fact, “always 
staged later” (167), as Lewis writes. That is, Lacan rejects the intrinsic privilege of 
castration/the phallus as the signifier of lack/what is lacking. Moreover, he more 
generally rejects the notion that the symbolic can in any way codify lack whilst 
remaining unaffected by it. The absolute suture between the symbolic and the 
real, Lewis argues, is replaced with a border that is “porous” (165). In the new 
formulation, the real is effectively said to act upon the symbolic; the symbolic 
order is now “itself full of holes. And it is in these holes that the real exists” (165). 
In Lacan’s late system, a possibility thus emerges of the real being 
experienced almost directly: namely, insofar as the real tears palpable gaps into 
the fabric of symbolic codification (whilst the symbolic still also cuts into the real). 
Yet this does not mean that the real becomes more identifiable. On the contrary, 
whereas middle Lacan reserves the right to name the real in a strangely descriptive 
manner, late Lacan states categorically: “The real can only be inscribed on the 
basis of an impasse of formalization” (S XX 93). The real is where meaning is not, 
though the real and the symbolic may invade each other in disconcerting ways, 
and the real produce meaning in the process. Lacan eventually terms this tangling 
of the symbolic and the real the sinthome. I will discuss this rewriting of the 
symptom, and its relation to Joyce, in the following chapter. For now, I want to 
note that this final formulation of the relation between the symbolic and the real 
is one of the key elements that render Lacan’s and Derrida’s thinking on language 
similar in decisive ways. Simply put, both authors see it as one of the fundamental 




Yet I disagree with the conclusion reached by Lewis, who proposes that 
between Derrida and late Lacan, the latter undertakes an even more radical break 
with transcendental models of knowledge. In chapter two, I will show that 
contrary to what some Lacanian critiques of Derrida assume (my example is Žižek), 
deconstruction does in fact posses an equivalent to Lacan’s objet petit a: the 
object that absolutely eludes symbolic codification and whose presence maims 
any knowledge-production. On the question of the compatibility of Derrida and 
Lacan, I thus side with van Boheemen-Saaf, who writes that “[i]f Lacan’s ‘real’ is 
that ‘which prevents one from saying the whole truth about it,’ there is more truth 
in combining Derrida and Lacan than in privileging one perspective to the 
other” (28). And if an out-and-out conflation of Lacan’s and Derrida’s work would 
risk suppressing considerable differences, an integrative approach can draw on 
their correspondences whilst also allowing each theory to remain distinct, thus 
achieving a variety of perspectives to bring to Joyce’s problematizing of alterity. 
In particular, the inclusion of Lacan in my argument will allow me to 
emphasise the effects that unreadability has on a reader. Derrida ascribes great 
significance to aporias and to exegetical impasses, but he does not relate them to 
the reader as a psychological subject in as illuminating a manner as Lacan does. At 
the height of his structuralism, Lacan famously declares that “the unconscious is 
structured like a language” (S XI 20), indicating a legibility in which even the 
unconscious remains subject to symbolic codification: “the unconscious is 
structured as a function of the symbolic” (S VII 12). This pervasive legibility is what 
late Lacan radically undoes when he describes the subject as the knotting together 
of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real in such a way that the symbolic and 
the real effectively permeate each other (their border becoming porous). 
Unreadability can be interpreted as a manifestation of this porousness: it is an 
encounter with the real tearing into the symbolic, and describing it as such an 
encounter can help us gain some purchase on the deeply paradoxical problem of 
the limits of understanding. 
The key aspect of Lacan’s work for my interpretation of Joyce’s 
unreadability is therefore the examination of the real in late Lacan. However, I will 
also draw on middle Lacan in instances where this can further my discussion of 
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issues raised by Finnegans Wake. As Lacan’s revisions of his position are 
considerable, I will indicate these choices and, where necessary, provide late 
Lacanian re-readings of middle Lacanian material. I should furthermore add that 
in applying a psychoanalytical framework, I do not aim to describe what exactly, 
as readers of Joyce, we must be thinking or feeling at any given point. I will rather 
examine the ways in which Joyce’s writing confronts us with intrusions of the real, 
and make propositions as to what is at stake in our reactions to those intrusions. 
My focus is thus on what could be called our own implication in the text. 
Lacan provides a helpful exemplification of this effect in his discussion of 
Hans Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors, which, although the terminology is 
middle Lacan, can serve to introduce the function of the real that I will be 
discussing throughout. In the foreground of The Ambassadors, there can be seen 
an elongated blot that, looked at from the correct angle, reveals itself to be an 
anamorphic distortion of a skull. Lacan suggests that through the distortion’s 
active manipulation of our act of looking, “we are literally called into the picture, 
and represented here as caught” (S XI 92, my emphasis). That is, we not only stare 
at the morbid blur; the circumstances of our staring – that we have to change our 
own position in order to do so – are already part of what the painting depicts. The 
skull thus functions as “the imaged embodiment of the minus-phi [(-ɸ)] of 
castration” (89, insertion in original), as a reminder of our limitations: not only 
mortality, but also the flawed nature of the symbolic order. 
The symbolic order into which we are inscribed (the representation into 
which we are called) is already distorted. It is imperfect, and this imperfection 
means that it is never fully at our disposal for the codification of our experience – 
itself distorted, it distorts us, too. Or, as Lacan puts it: “the subject as such is 
uncertain because he is divided by the effects of language. Through the effects of 
speech, the subject always realizes himself more in the Other, but he is already 
pursuing there more than half of himself” (188). As we are called into the symbolic 
order, we pursue in it a wholeness and definiteness of meaning that it does not 
provide. And although this particular description is found in Seminar XI , it can be 
re-read for the later shift in Lacan’s thinking towards the real’s infiltration of the 
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symbolic, towards the impossibility of complete legibility, and towards a 
subjectivity that remains irreducibly opaque to itself. 
All of this suggests that if Joyce challenges us to respond to alterity in 
language, this might not after all make his text categorically different from other 
systems of signification. The difference is one of intensity (rendering the Wake an 
example of self-deconstructive writing). Reading Finnegans Wake implicates us in 
a situation in which the limits of understanding are unusually palpable, yet this but 
radicalises the fact that any symbolic codification encounters cases of alterity it 
cannot assimilate. As we will see in the following chapter, the prominent place 
that Lacan’s views on signification ascribe to opacity thus has its parallel in Joyce’s 
own conceptualisation of reading as a search for closure that is inevitably 
frustrated. Moreover, if such Lacanian terms as the real or the objet petit a provide 
crucial articulations of these effects, I will argue that Derrida’s philosophy is no 
less committed, though in a more abstract register, to examining unreadability as 
a component of the interpretative process. 
Finally, a note on Joyce’s presence in the work of Lacan and Derrida. If to 
bring Lacan’s and Derrida’s thinking to Finnegans Wake is not necessarily to 
impose this thinking on Joyce, van Boheemen-Saaf goes so far as to argue that 
“their abstract concepts have a concretely embodied textual precursor in Joyce’s 
complex textuality. It was Joyce’s text which made their ideas possible, so to 
speak, by providing textual-material collateral” (9). I would posit that this 
statement can do without the qualifying “so to speak,” since Joyce’s influence on 
these two theorists is something both of them address in their own work. As far 
as Lacan is concerned, I will discuss in the following chapter how Joyce’s writing 
inspired him to make some highly significant changes to his system in the seminar 
Le Sinthome. However, I will not assess Joyce’s impact on Lacan’s theory in 
general, as this task has already been undertaken in a very thorough manner by 
Roberto Harari’s How James Joyce Made His Name (a study in psychoanalysis, 
despite the title). Nor will I take into consideration the entirety of Lacan’s 
interpretation of Joyce, which is discussed, for instance, in the chapter on Joyce in 
Jean-Michel Rabaté’s Jacques Lacan: Psychoanalysis and the Subject of Literature. 
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In Derrida’s case, the encounter with Joyce is less concentrated in one key 
moment, and Joyce’s influence on Derrida is less readily delineable. On the one 
hand, there are references to Joyce in Derrida’s writing that are developed to 
varying degrees. In several short pieces (“Two Words for Joyce,” “Ulysses 
Gramophone,” and “The Night Watch”), Derrida takes Joyce’s work as his chief 
subject – yet it would be difficult to identify in these discussions any specific 
inspiration that Derrida derives from this work. The reliance of Derrida’s thinking 
on Joyce is more palpable in remarks made in passing that are scattered 
throughout his oeuvre (surfacing as early as Edmund Husserl’s “Origin of 
Geometry” and notably in The Post Card and “This Strange Institution Called 
Literature”), indicating Derrida’s sustained interest in Joyce’s writing. I will 
comment on The Post Card in chapter two and on “Two Words for Joyce” in 
chapter three, but my focus will not be on tracing Joyce’s presence in Derrida – an 
enterprise that is carried out in some detail in Alan Roughley’s Reading Derrida 
Reading Joyce as well as, more recently, in some of the contributions to Derrida 
and Joyce, edited by Mitchell and Slote. 
On the other hand, there is an affinity with Joyce in Derrida’s philosophical 
project that goes beyond these explicit comments – as Derrida himself remarks 
when, in “Two Words for Joyce,” he insists that “every time I write, and even in 
academic things, Joyce’s ghost is always coming on board” (27). In Imagining Joyce 
and Derrida, Mahon elaborates on the range of this affinity, and concludes that 
we need to consider “an expanded zone of Joycean-Derridean intertextuality” that 
extends beyond cases “where Derrida either explicitly writes on Joyce or mentions 
him by name” (353). An expanded intertextuality of this kind is also what I propose 
to work in, both with regard to Derrida and with regard to Lacan. However, I stress 
again that drawing on their projects’ similarity to Joyce’s does not only further our 
understanding of the Wake as an object of theory, or illuminate the work of these 
two theorists. Instead, reading Joyce, Lacan, and Derrida in conjunction can 
highlight the extent to which Joyce truly anticipates certain theoretical 
conceptualisations of difficulty, and delivers his own analysis of it. Although many 
theoretical studies of the Wake have been undertaken, this aspect of the text has 
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gone largely unexamined: that Finnegans Wake is not only caught up in, but 




ALP’s Absent/Present Letter 
 
 
Referentiality and reference 
The imperfection of the symbolic – our searching in it for a wholeness it cannot 
provide – suggests that even where we refrain from totalising readings, a certain 
desire for essential (original, authoritative) meaning affects our interpretative 
efforts. The present chapter addresses the question of this desire by presenting 
theoretical explorations of it and relating these to the problem of reading ALP’s 
letter. One of the focal points here is the importance attributed to the letter by 
many of the Wake’s narratives, which variously cast it as a missing piece of 
evidence, as an object of study, or more generally as the one truthful account of 
something as yet unknown: the promised answer that may resolve any number of 
uncertainties the book’s characters are confronted with – particularly the mystery 
of HCE’s crime. However, a larger part of the present chapter than of the following 
ones will be dedicated to establishing my reading of Derrida’s and Lacan’s 
respective work on the subject of signification. 
An exemplary case of the letter’s role are the trial scenes that take up most 
of I.3 and I.4. There, the presiding judges hope that the evidence of a written 
document might, quite literally, illuminate the case under investigation: “Will 
whatever will be written in lappish language […] bright upon us, nightle, and we 
plunging to our plight? Well, it might now, mircle, so it light” (66.18-23). Yet this 
remains a hypothesis, for the trial ends before any consultation of the letter can 
be undertaken. This elusiveness of the vital piece of information is a recurring 
motif in Finnegans Wake. In view of this theme, I will discuss the authority 
bestowed on the letter as intrinsically linked to its absence from these and other 
scenes. The palpable effect that the letter has on characters who do not posses it 
introduces a certain division between essence and desire. If ALP’s letter is called 
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upon to do away with uncertainty – for instance in the case of the judges: “The 
letter! The litter! And the soother the bitther!” (93.24) – then the notions of 
interpretative authority and of desire in interpretation can be said to be co-
dependent in such a way that desire is the desire for an authority that absents 
itself. Far from entering the process as an umbrella term for what gives stability to 
interpretation, authority should be understood as an inherently unnerving notion. 
Amongst other things, authority constitutes a challenge, directing itself at the 
reader of any text, that cannot be met, but that precisely because of this gives rise 
to a desire that drives the reading process. 
The significance of desire also reveals itself in a striking manner with regard 
to what I will call Joyce’s non-words. Under this heading, I propose to collect a 
particular type of what, in the introduction, I refer to as the Wake’s obscurity or 
untranslatability: namely, the coinages in Finnegans Wake that are not actual 
words, that are different from any word in any given language. The category is 
thus unavoidably provisional (a non-word may turn out to be an expression in a 
language not previously considered), as well as deliberately makeshift (given the 
prolific vagueness of its terms “word” and “language”). Yet for reasons I hope to 
make clear over the course of this thesis, I hold that the non-word is crucial to any 
examination of signification in the Wake, precisely because this category is 
broader than any defined by more specific characteristics, such as the pun or the 
portmanteau. 
The sole defining feature of a non-word is the difference between Joyce’s 
creation and any conventional form, which is also to say that the perhaps 
somewhat binary distinction between words and non-words that I will implement 
throughout leaves room for many different varieties and degrees of distortion, 
fusion, punning, multilingualism, non-sense, and other effects. In particular, I 
propose to include in the category of the non-word those expressions in Finnegans 
Wake that differ only slightly from a word in standard spelling (especially in 
English) and that taunt us with their apparent recognisability. By insisting on this 
point, I do not mean to problematize the notion of the standard form. What 
interests me here – what is most curious and most momentous about non-words 
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– is the readiness with which we disregard the differences that separate them 
from standard forms (whatever these be). 
Consider, for instance, the first phrase of the section in the Wake that most 
extensively discusses ALP’s letter, chapter I.5: “In the name of Annah the 
Allmaziful” (104.1). It is inevitable – and this, I propose, is Joyce’s point – that we 
immediately perceive numerous possibilities of making this readable. In the non-
word “Allmaziful,” echoes can be found of “almighty” and “amazing,” perhaps also 
of “maze,” and of Latin “alma” as in “alma mater:” “nourishing mother.” Further 
non-English transformations include German “Almosen:” “alms,” “charity.” Open 
Roland McHugh’s Annotations to Finnegans Wake on page 104, and you find the 
Turkish word “mazi,” translated as: “olden times,” given as another suggestion. 
Further interpretations offer themselves when we consider the non-word in 
context. McHugh adds “Allah the Merciful” (104) as another reading – or rather, 
as another resource for the process of, in McHugh’s apt phrase, “mentally 
superimposing” (xiii) glosses over Joyce’s text. Yet all of these superimpositions 
are spawned by a string of letters that (to the best of my knowledge) forms no 
word at all, be it in Turkish, English, German, Arabic, or Latin. There is a gap 
between Joyce’s text and the interpretations we derive from it. Since these 
interpretations require a material transformation of the text, they will not reveal 
themselves in what may appear to be a passive encounter with the text: they 
demand an active motion towards the other side of the gap. Desire is the name I 
will give to what motivates this motion. It therefore designates not a possible 
effect that accompanies some readings of Joyce’s text, but a structural necessity 
without which no reading can be undertaken. 
To begin my discussion of Joyce’s strangely prolific non-words, it will prove 
helpful to – briefly – discuss another example from literature, one that will initially 
look out of place in a study of Finnegans Wake, but that aligns itself with certain 
qualities of the Wake’s non-words. The narrative in question is “Atrahasis,” an Old 
Babylonian version, dating to about 1700 BC (see Dalley 3), of the flood narrative 
now primarily familiar to us from the Abrahamic tradition. My purpose in referring 
to this text, apart from thematic resonances that will become clear in chapter 
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three, is to start off my analysis with a gesture of defamiliarisation that will 
hopefully distance us from Finnegans Wake and from certain competences in 
handling it that may otherwise lead us to treat illegibility as a negligible 
phenomenon. In other words, I use an out-of-the-way example in order to suggest 
anew the shock of a moment in which language does not quite do what it is 
supposed to do. 
“Atrahasis” stages the universal flood as part of an extended conflict 
between gods and men. Since humankind has become a source of nuisance to Ellil, 
one of the foremost within the divine hierarchy, he and a number of other gods 
decide to send natural catastrophes to diminish the number of people on earth 
(see 9, 18). The story is then told in repetitions of the same pattern: Ellil’s anger, 
the sending of a divine punishment (disease, drought, famine, and finally the 
flood), and the survival of people who just manage to cling to their lives. In 
particular, the narrative describes the experience of the Noah-figure Atrahasis, 
who perseveres with the help of the renegade god Enki, creator and protector of 
mankind (see 15, 18-9, 34). Let us consider, then, the following phrase from 
Stephanie Dalley’s translation of the myth – a sentence that, with slight variations, 
appears three times in the sections of the text that have been preserved: “They 
stayed alive by . . .   . . . life” (23); “People stayed alive by . . .   . . . life” (26); “The 
people stayed alive by . . .   . . . life” (27). The omission dots indicate that here, 
Dalley is (twice in each version) confronted with “an unknown word or 
phrase” (xiii). In other words, precisely that part of the text that would inform us 
about what the people in this narrative had to do in order to survive the natural 
catastrophes has been wiped away by the linguistic transformations of the past 
three and a half millennia. 
The curious result is that the significance of the passage is simultaneously 
limited and enhanced. The expert informs us that translation has not been able to 
go its usual, or at least intended, course. We acknowledge that, until new evidence 
is found, we cannot know what is hiding behind these dots, or behind the 
untranslatable cuneiform words. Still, this lack of knowledge does not defy the 
reading process. The perfectly positioned opening in the sentence is intriguing; in 
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a way, it no longer narrates, but puts into practice, the disruptions that threaten 
cultural stability and individual life. The levelling forces of time make a double 
impact on this passage. The text describes how a civilisation narrowly escapes its 
destruction; in addition, the text itself has faced partial obliteration, although in a 
slower manner, through cultural transition. What gives the phrase its poignancy is 
that both in its content and in the materiality of its signifiers, it brings us face to 
face with a force that opposes itself to meaning, information, heritage, civilisation, 
survival. One possible name of this force is “death,” understood to mean not only 
the narrow limits of biological beings but a universal finality: a gradual wearing-
away of all structures into the featureless white noise of entropy. This process can 
be found within the narrative as the catastrophe the people try to avert; it also 
makes its presence felt in the erosion of the language that transports the text. 
How, then, does this duplication shape our encounter with the narrative? 
I suggest that what should be a largely limiting aspect of the text (“here is a word 
we do not know, let us ignore it and replace it with a placeholder”) turns out to be 
an enhancement of our reading experience. It is because we are no longer able to 
learn how the people in this myth achieved their survival that we may shudder at 
the thought of what they might have had to do (and how intriguing it is that 
enough of this civilisation has survived to reach us, and yet the very thing we can 
no longer ascertain is their story of how survival is achieved). No doubt, this eerie 
deletion is perfectly coincidental; nevertheless, the coincidence exemplifies the 
productiveness of a disturbance, something that will become important to my 
interpretation of the Wake – and my remarks here are also made with a view to 
Finnegans Wake’s non-words. What the gap illustrates is that a ruined section 
does not escape the reading process. It would be a very unusual reader indeed 
who would not register the erasure, or would not include its occurrence into her 
or his reading. In fact, a reading that remains oblivious to the deletion would be 
inaccurate, for what we do know is that “The people stayed alive by life,” without 




This should not lead us to conclude that it is solely the signifier’s position 
within a text that bestows on it the capacity to take on new meaning. The situation 
is more accurately described by saying that it is only some remainder of the 
function of a signifier that enables this mark to interrupt the text. If “. . .   . . .” did 
not echo the original words’ capacity to signify something that remains hidden as 
long as the words are not translated, then “The people stayed alive by life” would 
be a correct rendition of the phrase. The section that cannot be translated remains 
significant, in the sense that it points to a mystery beyond its own presence. What 
I want to suggest is that we should take this mystery seriously as an attribute of 
the signifier that has faded away. If a signifier can be defined as something that 
refers to something else, my proposition is that the capacity of referring, which I 
will call referentiality, can be distinguished from all specific constellations that give 
rise to a reference. Referentiality is not tied to a particular meaning; it consists in 
the signifier’s potential to produce meaning. 
In the case of the untranslatable cuneiform words, referentiality can be 
identified with two attributes. At the most basic level, referentiality is synonymous 
with the status of these words as words. Here, we have to distinguish between 
different functions served by the context of the words. If it is in part the 
surrounding text that enables us to infer that the untranslatable inscriptions are 
indeed signifiers, it is solely in this inference that their referentiality is contained. 
Referentiality is not connected to the fact that the context can also tell us 
something about the meaning of the untranslatable words. In the present case, 
we can assume that the missing words describe an activity, that it is an activity 
that explains how part of a population survives a crisis, and so on. But as the 
assessment by the translator – expressed in “. . .   . . .” – tells us, none of these 
conjectures are sufficiently precise to allow for the words to be read in such a 
manner as to produce a specific reference. Referentiality, then, should be thought 
as that aspect of a signifier that remains even as meaning disappears. In principle, 
we can imagine a situation that does not allow for any assumptions about content, 
but that leaves in place signification itself, in the sense of sign-ness. Referentiality 
is precisely this sign-ness. It does not require the availability of reference, only (the 
assumption of) its past or future possibility. 
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The second way referentiality manifests itself in the untranslatable 
passage is by lending its support to the mystery – the double appearance of death 
– that attaches itself to the phrase. Several objections can be made against this 
second notion. Not every reader will accept an interpretation that considers the 
deletion a repetition of the theme of death (as opposed to a meaningless instance 
of noise interrupting the transmission of the message). And even if we accept the 
reading in this particular case, in which interruption is in fact what is thematically 
at stake, not every text develops a discourse on the themes of finality and death 
that can so readily be related to such an occurrence. Finally, not every text has had 
as adventurous a history as the Old Babylonian epic of the flood, which means that 
unlike referentiality itself, which adheres to all signifiers, the type of absence we 
encounter here is not universal. It is important, then, to differentiate between the 
potential enhancement of our reading experience, on the one hand, and 
referentiality, on the other hand. Referentiality is not the meaning that offers itself 
in this particular case, it is what makes this meaning possible: it is the remainder 
that turns the absence of reference into a palpable effect that can itself be 
subjected to interpretation – as can the distortions through which Joyce creates 
non-words. 
 
The production of meaning 
What the example of the Old Babylonian myth illustrates is that a signifier can be 
linked to a potentiality that withstands the erosion of all actual reference and that, 
as long as sign-ness itself is not removed, provides new opportunities for meaning. 
Moreover, if I say that referentiality is a remainder of the function of a signifier, 
we can attest a similar quality to the Wake’s non-words, seeing how they likewise 
interrupt a text that is incompletely rendered without their inclusion. However, 
unlike eroded parts of a natural language, these remainders should not be taken 
to indicate the faded presence of particular words. Since reducing them to one or 
several words they resemble invariably ignores the material difference that 
separates them from all of these readings, they should be conceived of as ruins, 
as it were, not of signifiers, but of signification more abstractly speaking. 
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In the absence of any reference, the non-words posses referentiality in the 
form of a potential for meaning precisely insofar as we take them to be at all 
meaningful. But as with the flood myth, a reading of their illegibility can in part 
rely on an interpretative movement leading from the inaccessibility of meaning to 
a production of meaning from that inaccessibility. As we will see, one of the things 
at work in this movement is the relation between the openness of the signifier and 
the reader’s desire for meaning. However, since the example of “Atrahasis” 
introduces too many exceptional features to illustrate the general importance of 
desire, I will now turn to theoretical considerations of the gap between 
referentiality and reference. Subsequently, I will show that, much like the 
untranslatable words of the flood myth, the non-words of the Wake render this 
gap palpable in a productive manner. 
In “Signature Event Context,” Derrida examines the signifier’s openness as 
what he terms its iterability. He argues that in order for a signifier to be usable at 
all, it must be usable in contexts that are different every time the signifier is used. 
In this very possibility to reappear under different guises, to “break with every 
given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is 
absolutely illimitable” (12), there is a drift away from the stable nature of the mark 
towards transformation and heterogeneity. In order for the signifier to function in 
contexts that can never be exhaustively anticipated, it cannot remain inert. There 
must be at work in it a “logic that ties repetition to alterity” (7), where alterity is 
not a force operating on the signifier from the outside, but a constitutive part of 
its legibility, and therefore of its identity. As every context draws on the signifier 
in a minimally different manner, the very notion of its being recognisable and 
repeatable as itself entails alterity; the otherness and unpredictability of each 
iteration constitutes a condition for language to function at all. 
Iterability thus opens up the gap between referentiality and reference, 
between the signifier’s abstract sign-ness – its functioning – and the variable 
meanings produced by its actual repetitions. In Joyce’s non-words and in the 
example of the Old Babylonian myth, we encounter radicalisations of this gap that 
interrupt the transition from referentiality to reference. Yet these interruptions 
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are anything but exemptions from the logic of iterability. In the case of the 
cuneiform words, we are confronted with a repetition in which alterity has run its 
full course, producing not non-sign-ness but a situation exemplifying a risk that 
Derrida describes as a necessary attribute of all signifiers: “What would a mark be 
that could not be cited? Or one whose origins would not get lost along the 
way?” (12). The untranslatable words convey precisely such a loss of origin. If we 
can be said to repeat or iterate them, it is because we take them to be indicators 
of a referentiality constituted by the past availability of references now palpably 
absent. In the Wake, by contrast, referentiality emerges as a promise of the future 
availability of reference. Insofar as we undertake to read these non-words at all 
(some critics declare Finnegans Wake illegible and leave it at that, but many 
readers will agree that this response falls short of the text’s challenge), we 
inevitably interfere with them at a material level, effectively iterating them with 
an amplified alterity that exemplifies both the disruptiveness and the inevitability 
of the less visible alterity of regular iteration (again, we see here the two-fold 
nature of the Wake as a text both exceptional and exemplary). 
These extreme cases of the gap between referentiality and reference can 
thus be seen to raise problems that also pertain to signifiers whose references may 
appear to be unproblematic. Derrida’s analysis of iterability shows that even for 
these signifiers, a certain gap has to be negotiated. Here, we should first of all 
consider a passage from Of Grammatology in which Derrida discusses reference 
as well as the referent in the sense of an object outside the text. Derrida states 
that reading “cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than 
it, toward a referent […] or toward a signified outside the text whose content could 
take place, could have taken place outside of language” (158). That is to say, to 
organise a reading with a view to a meaning assumed to be essential, but not 
tested within textuality, would be to introduce a conjecture that transgresses the 
boundaries of the text. If “our reading must be intrinsic and remain within the 
text” (159), it is precisely in order to avoid “the tranquil assurance that leaps over 
the text toward its presumed content, in the direction of the pure signified” (159). 
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The text’s pure/presumed content stands in strict contrast to the content 
produced by a reading of the text. If this production of meaning is unpredictable, 
it is therefore clear that, in Derrida’s view, this is not because meanings may be 
imposed in order for the text to serve a purpose external to it. On the contrary, it 
is the presumption of a pure signified outside textuality that risks imposition. The 
risk any actual reading takes is a different one: it must risk the production of 
meaning in an activation or iteration of the text that cannot but bring into play 
alterity. The production of meaning must be thought as inseparable from a certain 
kind of invention: invention not in the sense of addition to the signifier’s own 
opening up of meaning, but in the sense of the alterity without which no iteration 
of the signifier takes place at all. 
In The Singularity of Literature, Attridge gives a succinct formulation of 
what such a process might look like. The key to conceptualising a mode of reading 
that invents without transgressing the boundaries of the text, Attridge suggests, 
lies in the fact that “my response to a work is not to the work ‘itself’ but to the 
work as other in the event of its coming into being in my reading” (91). If the 
reading is to acknowledge the specificity of the text it investigates, then “[t]he 
uniqueness to which the response must do justice is not an unchanging essence 
[…], but the inventive otherness of the work as it emerges through my creative act 
of comprehension” (91). Due to the nature of iteration, every time the text comes 
into being, it comes into being as a different version of itself. Yet, if this coming-
into-being is to remain the coming-into-being of the text – if it is to be an iteration 
of the text – then it also remains indebted to  the text. 
The notion of this debt is an important one. It indicates that there must be 
something that guides a reading, that negotiates the gap between referentiality 
and reference. We can conceptualise the nature of this debt along the lines of 
what Derrida calls the trace. Up to this point, I have implicitly suggested that the 
signifier’s origin can be thought of as an essence that exists even though 
interpretation falls short of accessing it. In Of Grammatology, Derrida argues that, 
instead, we should conceive of the signifier’s origin as something that “was never 
constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the 
60 
 
origin of the origin” (61). The trace cannot refer to an origin or an entity that would 
stand outside a process of referencing to which it gives rise, for “[t]he field of the 
entity, before being determined as the field of presence, is structured according 
to the diverse possibilities – genetic and structural – of the trace” (47). The entity 
itself cannot be thought outside a differential framework that can identify it as the 
entity it is. 
Before it is any specific reference, the trace is the operation of this 
differential framework, of “a structure of reference where difference appears as 
such” (46-7), which is to say, appears as the most fundamental difference: not the 
difference between one particular entity and another particular entity, but the 
difference between that which is itself and that which is different. Therefore, 
“[t]he trace must be thought before the entity” (47), before the possibility of 
anything that can be conceived of as identical to itself. As this play of identity and 
difference, “[t]he (pure) trace is differance” (62). It is both difference and deferral, 
both spacing and temporalisation, both inscription within a differential system and 
inscription within a movement through which this system remains open to change 
and obscures its own origin: “the movement of the trace is necessarily occulted, it 
produces itself as self-occultation” (47). Most of all, the trace is the impossibility 
of separating the spatial from the temporal (differance from differance), of 
accessing an entity as an unchanging presence. “The outside, ‘spatial’ and 
‘objective’ exteriority which we believe we know as the most familiar thing in the 
world, as familiarity itself, would not appear without the grammè, without 
differance as temporalization” (70-1). 
The trace, then, establishes signification not by enabling the signifier’s 
pointing to an already self-identical origin, but rather by establishing the very 
notion of self-identity: “The trace is the differance which opens appearance 
[l’apparaître] and signification” (65). Yet, crucially, the trace also produces specific 
signifiers from this play of signification, by appearing as a placeholder for 
something that has never existed: the individual signifier’s absent origin. As 
Derrida puts it in Writing and Difference, the trace “replaces a presence which has 
never been present” (295). That is, the trace gives rise to a notion of identification, 
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signification, or substitution that dissimulates that there exists no predetermined 
presence that would be substituted as such – a notion, therefore, that dissimulates 
the fictional nature of the essence that the trace stands for (the trace occulting its 
own origin). 
It is this double nature of the trace that enables us to cross from 
referentiality to reference without violating the structures of textuality, grammè, 
differance. What the trace ultimately suggests is the importance, to any iteration 
of a signifier, of an imaginary essence. The trace gives rise to the possibility of 
signification by allowing us to project that which no signification can either access 
or produce. It is easy to see (and I would only have needed to discuss iterability to 
argue this) that where the process of reading attempts to close the gap between 
referentiality and reference, it directs itself towards something that cannot be 
obtained because it does not exist: essential, unchanging meaning. Yet the 
conclusion towards which we are now led (and this was the point of also 
considering the trace) is that essential meaning does not in fact exist, but that even 
if we are aware of this, we nevertheless let ourselves be taken in by the ideal of 
essence, insofar as this ideal marks the very possibility of identification and 
differentiation. Essential meaning is projected by the possibility of meaning in 
general, which is why even readings that dispense with the simplistic idea of a 
single correct answer incorporate essential meaning as the ideality against which 
we implicitly measure interpretations (when we ask whether they are coherent, 
relevant, and so on). Far from representing an interpretative outcome that we 
imagine as being given somewhere, and that we may or may not aim to access, 
essence is thus, from the outset, part of the reading process. Not as a presence, 
but as palpable absence – what I will also call a presence-in-absence or an absence 
made present – towards which reading directs itself. 
My proposition is to interpret the trace not only as referring to the past 
(the signifier’s imaginary origin) but also as pointing to the future. Contained in 
the trace is the effort, both extended into the future and continually cut short, to 
unearth essence – an effort that does not dissolve into ineffectualness, but 
structures our readings by both driving them and denying them closure, rendering 
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them points on a trajectory towards a solution that is forever arriving, never to 
arrive. In proposing this reading, I am aware that Derrida’s analysis of signification 
opposes itself to all notions of teleology, of a known future or predetermined 
outcome. What I wish to argue is that Derrida’s deconstruction of essential 
meaning reintroduces essence precisely in the shape of an open-ended searching 
for an essence for which to remain imaginable is the minimal condition of 
signification in general. If this reading appears to do violence to Derrida’s 
fundamental concern with overturning the idea of signification’s (stable) centre, 
consider that in the form of an (unstable) mirage or phantom, this centre, far from 
being excluded from Derrida’s account of the play of language, is on the contrary 
declared one of its un-deconstructible elements. Thus, Writing and Difference 
asks: “But is not the desire for a center, as a function of play itself, the 
indestructible itself? And in the repetition or return of play, how could the 
phantom of the center not call to us?” (297). 
By recalling something that cannot be obtained, the trace introduces into 
signification certain effects of absence, even loss. Yet the trace also enables us to 
step over the gap separating referentiality from reference. It gives a trajectory to 
this step – but not a definitive outcome – by inscribing it into a specific network of 
differences that is also an imaginary course towards an essence. Insofar as reading 
structures itself in response to this essence, it thus lets itself be affected by an 
absence: by something that does not exist. It is here that desire enters the 
interpretative process. Analogous to the way in which desire can be 
conceptualised as desire for what is not given, interpretation can be understood 
as sustaining itself by projecting an element it will never encounter. The creative 
act of interpretation produces meaning not by providing it from a pre-existing 
plenitude, or by newly generating it in a process that could nonetheless be 
imagined as mechanical insofar as it would be entirely pre-programmed by the 
text, but by calling upon the reader to turn an absence (essential meaning) into a 
presence (actual meaning, reference, interpretation). The reader is implied in the 
reading process precisely because at a structural level, before any individual 
readers and their states of mind appear on the scene, meaning must be desired in 




The missing missive 
Returning now to Finnegans Wake, the heuristic gain of the above examination of 
desire in interpretation is that it enables us to better describe the function of ALP’s 
letter. As I have indicated above and in the introduction, ALP’s letter is often 
associated with the missing and vital bit of information that would resolve some 
conundrum within the Wake’s narrative. The mysterious document is hinted at, 
talked about, studied, and searched for throughout the Wake – but most of all, it 
is simply not there. To clarify what I mean by this, let me outline some passages 
that provide sustained considerations of the letter as opposed to mere mentions 
of it. The first of these is found in the already mentioned trial scenes of Book I, 
chapters three and four. There, the letter is discussed by the four judges as the 
lost piece of evidence that might clear up the case of HCE’s misdemeanour and 
“bring the true truth to light” (96.27). Unsurprisingly, however, these scenes end 
without the letter ever having surfaced. 
Next, the document appears in chapter I.5. The whole of this chapter is 
comprised of an analysis of the letter by “a grave Brofèsor” (124.9); yet in all of 
the roughly twenty-one pages this account takes up, little about the letter’s actual 
contents transpires. Instead, the insistence on aspects such as the “many 
names” (104.5) that have been given to the document (see 104.4-107.7), its “outer 
husk” (109.8) or envelope (see 109.1-36), the circumstances of its discovery on a 
“fatal midden” (110.25), as well as the damage that such “residence in the heart 
of the orangeflavoured mudmound” (111.33-4) has done to it (see 110.22-
114.29), must raise doubt as to whether the letter’s contents are still legible, 
whether in fact there is any content at all, and whether the professor is even in 
possession of whatever it was the envelope contained. It is worth noting that Joyce 
originally drafted the version of the letter we now find in Book IV as a part of I.5, 
but eventually decided not to include it in that chapter (see Fuse 98-9). The 




The letter resurfaces in a similar capacity in book three, where it features 
in two scenes of the four old men interviewing Shaun. In chapter III.1, “Shaun in 
proper person” (405.9) is questioned by the four. Though they press him to “read 
the strangewrote anaglyptics of those shemletters” (419.19-20), Shaun evades the 
question by announcing that, instead of revealing anything about the letter’s 
content, he will describe “what pronounced opinion I might possibly orally have 
about them bagses of trash” (420.2-3), after which he proceeds to comment on 
the letter’s address (see 420.17-421.14) and its author, Shem (see 421.21-425.3). 
Similarly, when the “senators four” (474.21) question Shaun in his incarnation as 
“Yawn” (474.11) in chapter III.3, they return to the letter several times (see 478.1-
2; 483.1-6; 489.33-4) without eliciting any clear answers. 
It is true that the actual text of ALP’s letter appears to feature in Finnegans 
Wake several times, for instance as the “Boston” Letter in I.5 (see 111.10-20), as 
ALP’s “cushingloo” in I.8 (see 201.5-20), and, most prominently, as the “Reverend” 
letter in book four (see 615.12-619.19).1 Initially, this would seem to contradict 
the argument I am making about the inaccessibility of the missive. However, these 
manifestations of the letter are not to be taken as reliable renderings, as I have 
already indicated in the discussion of Bernard Benstock’s comments on the letter’s 
plurality. In an article about the letter’s different manifestations, McCarthy points 
out that “[n]o two version of the document are identical” (“Last Epistle” 725), and, 
on this basis, ventures that “no single account of the letter is more accurate than 
any other” (726). What I want to suggest is that this aspect of the letter’s 
functioning in Joyce’s text should alert us to the fact that in the Wake, the 
signifier’s presence, far from constituting an antidote to the absence of essence, 
is what makes this absence painfully palpable. 
In particular, McCarthy analyses the final and longest version of the letter, 
in Book IV, which could be argued to be the letter’s most complete and most 
authoritative representation. He shows that this incarnation of the document not 
only differs from other versions presented in the Wake (say, in “the omission of 
the four X’s that represent kisses” [727]), but that it actually constitutes a reaction 
                                                          
1 For a list that includes minor manifestations of the letter, see Hart 232-3. 
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to them. The seemingly authentic version, he states, “appears to have been 
altered by commentary on it” (730). For instance, it echoes the wording of a purely 
descriptive passage, found in the professor’s remarks about the letter in I.5, 
“About that original hen” (110.22), in the phrase: “About that coerogenal 
hun” (616.20). McCarthy concludes that ALP’s letter, despite being seemingly 
included within the text we are reading, “is free – that is, irreducible to a consistent 
level of meaning, or even to a definitive text. In this, as in other respects, it is a 
model of the mysterious, compelling, kaleidoscopic work of which it is a 
microcosm” (732). 
The idea of ALP’s present yet inaccessible missive as a model, microcosm, 
or synecdoche for Finnegans Wake has proven a highly successful avenue of 
interpretation. Examples of it can be found in Wake criticism ranging from 
attempts to isolate stable meaning in the text (Tindall, with regard to the 
professor’s comments in I.5, writes that here, “for several pages, the letter and 
the Wake are plainly one” [107]), to examinations of the Wake’s unstable 
multitude of meanings and styles (Slote, in his 2013 Joyce’s Nietzschean Ethics, 
posits that “statements apropos this mysterious “Letter” have a self-conscious 
aspect and could be said to characterize the conundrums of the Wake 
itself” [128]). In view of the letter’s conspicuous motions of absenting itself, it 
should be clear how this relation also ties in with the notion of desire in 
interpretation. To the approach that describes the letter as a mise en abyme, as a 
metonymy for Finnegans Wake itself, I propose to add a metaphorical dimension 
that relates ALP’s missive to the signifier in general. The same holds true of the 
letter’s mystery: the palpable yet unfailingly frustrated interest in the document 
demonstrated by both the Wake’s characters and its narrative. The impatient 
awaiting of this continually overdue and continually hoped for letter corresponds 
to nothing if not the desire in interpretation caused by the very thing that can 
never be present, essential meaning. 
One critic who takes a similar view is Mikio Fuse. In the section on I.5 in 
How Joyce Wrote Finnegans Wake, “The Letter and the Groaning,” Fuse argues 
with regard to the role of the letter: 
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While it is a synecdoche of the Wake in that it exemplifies the 
ineluctable betrayal of the Word by both readers and writers, the 
Letter is equally any document that was, is, and will be articulated 
in any language, inasmuch as any iteration inevitable falls short of 
the Word Itself. While “that ideal reader” can read the Word 
without stumbling over “paralyzed” language, we (the real) readers 
must sin when reading. This is typified in our readings of the Wake 
because to make any particular sense out of it we inevitably betray 
the Word-Letter by focusing on only one or at most some of the 
many available senses it opens up. (114) 
In the terminology I introduce above, this is to say that the distorted language of 
Finnegans Wake bars us from making the transition from referentiality to 
reference intuitively and almost unnoticeably, as we often do. It thus confronts us 
more explicitly than most texts with the desire that is necessary for the process of 
interpretation. In the case of the Wake, this desire expresses itself in our insistence 
on “sinning,” on continually subjecting to interpretation a text whose ambiguation 
is strictly speaking irreducible and whose non-words are strictly speaking illegible. 
I would therefore expand on the reading Fuse proposes here, by positing that the 
symbolic dimension of ALP’s letter registers not only the inevitable failure of 
language, but also the desire that teases us with this failure, the writing’s 
presence-in-absence that has us read the text against our better knowledge. 
The general significance of this desire is in turn the aspect in which my own 
approach differs most significantly from Mahon’s exploration of how Derrida’s 
thinking can be brought to Finnegans Wake. Mahon’s Imagining Joyce and Derrida 
highlights the role desire plays in Joyce’s text; it does so, however, without going 
beyond an interpretation of ALP’s letter as a synecdoche specifically for the 
elusiveness of the Wake. Mahon links the figures of Finnegan and HCE (see 20, 81) 
as well as the letter (see 84-5) to a “structural principle of ever-receding 
withdrawal and pursuit that shapes not only book I but also the paradigm for the 
pursuit of truth as presence across the entire text of the Wake” (21). In the case 
of the letter, this principle manifests itself in the fact that “[t]here is no pristine 
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Platonic eidos in the letter; there is only distortion” (85). This distortion gets 
underway a pursuit of “truth as presence” that can ultimately only demonstrate 
that no such presence exists. 
Up to this point, I subscribe to Mahon’s argument, however, he conceives 
of this desire-inducing distortion as of an attribute that is particular to the Wake. 
Mahon proposes that “the text of the Wake functions as a theatre of 
mimicry” (138), where the reader is invited to imitate exegetical procedures 
depicted in the text he or she is reading, and that “[i]n this theatre the object that 
the reader imitates withdraws” (138). But he does not explore the possibility of 
taking these dynamics of pursuit and withdrawal as a description of the process of 
reading in general. Instead, he singles out Joyce’s text as sharing these 
mechanisms with only a select few, commenting, for instance, on “the situation of 
the reader-writer in Vico, Joyce, or Derrida” (179). Mahon thus performs a 
detailed but hermeneutically restrictive examination of how a number of Joyce’s 
motifs can be read as a self-reflexive commentary that details the process of 
reading-writing Finnegans Wake. By contrast, my approach here will investigate 
the reading strategies that the Wake necessitates with a view to arguing that 
Joyce’s self-deconstruction is revealing the implications these strategies have for 
other texts as well – that far from belonging to certain specific modes of 
philosophy, myth, or fiction, the act of reading-writing is one under which all 
reading can be included. 
The connection between the Wake’s displacement of presence and more 
general problems of reading is particularly relevant with regard to Joyce’s non-
words, since the category of the non-word is closely connected to the manner in 
which I propose to read ALP’s letter. If the letter promises an answer that the 
Wake continually withholds, a non-word presents us with the prospect of a 
legibility that is never given. And if the letter’s failure to fulfil its promise is far from 
destroying interest in it, a non-word’s illegibility, similarly, will not put an end to 
our attempts to decipher it all the same. What makes a non-word so interesting is 
that it keeps asserting its presence, inducing the enduring suspicion that a gesture 
of signification may be taking place. Yet it leaves us without the possibility of 
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entering in a process of interpretation that would allow us to neatly isolate this 
gesture. And in this, crucially, a non-word constitutes not an exemption from the 
regular relation between referentiality and reference, but this relation’s 
exemplification and radicalisation. 
This is not to say that Finnegans Wake is anything less than unreadable. 
Read the non-word I discuss at the beginning of this chapter, “Allmaziful,” and you 
have not read Joyce’s text; you have transformed the text to make it say 
something you can read. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that the 
transformation of Finnegans Wake into a readable text has to be carried out 
before the book can be brought to bear on other, more conventional forms of 
writing. Rather, the transformations in which the Wake involves us shed light on 
the transition from referentiality to reference in general. As the tripartite structure 
I borrow from Fuse – Letter, Wake, word – also indicates, these transformations 
are relevant to how we wrest meaning from standard texts. I would thus expand 
on a suggestion Attridge makes in Peculiar Language, “that Finnegans Wake may 
be not an aberration of the literary but an unusually thoroughgoing 
exemplification of the literary” (232), by arguing that the Wake also presents us 
with a critique of language that is applicable beyond the realm of literary texts 
(and in making this claim, I reiterate Peculiar Language’s argument regarding the 
difficulty of distinguishing literary from non-literary language). 
One of our tasks in studying the complexity of Finnegans Wake, then, is to 
acknowledge that its very unreadability exemplifies something about all reading. 
This is what I call Joyce’s self-deconstruction: if a non-word raises in a very 
particular way the question of essential meaning (when transforming a non-word 
into a word, which word do we go for?), it reflects a conundrum that, due to 
iterability, all signifiers confront us with. The Wake draws our attention to the role 
of desire in signification; it reveals, as Norris puts it, “the desirous or libidinal 
aspect […] of intellectual activity” (“Joyce’s Heliotrope” 4), but it also drives home 
“the painful truth of desire, that it is constituted of a gap, a space, a lack, an 
absence, a distance at the heart of desire” (14). This lack, far from being abstract 
and merely inferred, is palpable in the very presence of words, in their stout 
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refusal to yield anything like essence. In radicalising this refusal, whilst also 
demonstrating our undiminished desire to overcome it, the non-words of 
Finnegans Wake exemplify the extent to which – in the words of another passage 
from I.5 – reading consists in “hoping against hope all the while that, by the light 
of philosophy, (and may she never folsage us!) things will begin to clear up a bit 
one way or another” (119.4-6). 
 
The shape of lack 
Joyce shares the image of a letter standing for the signifier with Derrida as well as 
with Lacan. In fact, both Derrida and Lacan relate the image of the letter/signifier 
to Finnegans Wake. Lacan alludes to Finnegans Wake in the “Seminar on ‘The 
Purloined Letter’,” where, in the French original, we read: “A Letter, a litter” (“Le 
séminaire” 25), misquoting the Wake’s: “The letter! The litter!” (93.24). 
Emphasising distortion (the crucial piece of evidence that looks like a valueless 
piece of scrap paper) this suggests that in Lacan’s conceptualisation of the signifier 
as denying purity or essence, the Wake may already be kept in mind. It is certainly 
kept in mind in Derrida’s discussion of letter-sending in The Post Card, which, as 
we will see in chapter two, makes explicit reference to Shaun the Postman. The 
letter/signifier, finally, is also the intersection of Lacan’s and Derrida’s work that 
spawned their debate about Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.” Nevertheless, I argue 
that their positions on this subject can be extensively and systematically aligned. 
Their exchange about Poe can in part be described as an instance of expression 
having gone awry – which in the context of the arguments I will now review would 
be a highly appropriate event to have taken place. 
In The Post Card, Derrida investigates signification in the mode of postal 
delivery. He argues that “a letter can always – and therefore must – never arrive 
at its destination” (121). To salvage this formulation from the trap of a non 
sequitur, he specifies: “in order to be able not to arrive, it must bear within itself a 
force and a structure, a straying of the destination, such that, in any case, it must 
also not arrive” (123, translation modified). Or, as he has it in a different section 
of The Post Card: “a letter does not always arrive at its destination, and from the 
70 
 
moment that this possibility belongs to its structure one can say that it never truly 
arrives, that when it does arrive its capacity not to arrive torments it with an 
internal drifting” (489). With regard to the signifier, this is to say that there is 
always the possibility of its not arriving (not achieving the result intended by the 
sender), and due to this possibility, it can never fully arrive (in the sense of fully 
assuring sender and receiver that the risk has been evaded). The straying of the 
letter is Derrida’s expression for what happens to a signifier between sender and 
receiver due to the logic of iterability. 
Initially, there appears to be a diametric opposition between this line of 
thought and the sentence that concludes Lacan’s “Seminar on ‘The Purloined 
Letter:’” “a letter always arrives at its destination” (30). However, if the 
incompatibility of this statement with Derrida’s understanding of meaning-
sending seems blatant, we should ask how Lacan is using the image. The letter, for 
Lacan as for Derrida, symbolises the signifier. Yet we cannot take Lacan’s use of 
“destination” to indicate what it would stand for in Derrida’s usage: the successful 
transmission of meaning as intended by the sender. To interpret Lacan’s “a letter 
always arrives at its destination” in this manner contradicts the text in which the 
phrase appears. I will now outline Lacan’s argument in that text in its own (middle 
Lacanian) terms, leaving for the following subsections the task of a late Lacanian 
reading of the link between the signifier and ALP’s letter. 
In order to discuss Lacan’s seminar, let me briefly outline the contents of 
Poe’s short story. Its plot can be reduced to the following: in Paris, a Minister steals 
a compromising letter that enables him to blackmail the Queen. Though it can be 
inferred that he keeps the letter on his premises, the police, employed by the 
Queen in secret, in multiple searches proves unable to retrieve the document. 
Only Poe’s detective Dupin succeeds in exposing the Minister’s ruse: he has made 
no effort at all to conceal the letter, openly displaying it in a card rack where it 
escaped the attention of the police who were looking for a hidden object. Note 
that not unlike ALP’s absent letter, which inspires several of the Wake’s 
investigations and interrogations, the Queen’s letter propels the narrative forward 
by absenting itself but making this absence present. It is most productive of 
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hypotheses, schemes, and actions when it is inaccessible but, at the same time, 
this inaccessibility is felt by the story’s characters. Lacan’s reading of Poe’s text 
uses this productiveness to cast the letter as the signifier in general and to 
illustrate the extent to which, as Lacan puts it, “the signifier’s displacement 
determines subjects’ acts” (21). 
If Lacan speaks of the letter reaching its destination, we must therefore 
read this as a signifier unfailingly producing its effect on the writing/speaking 
subject. This effect is described in the “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” as being 
above all a manipulation of desire: “Such is the signifier’s answer, beyond all 
significations: ‘You believe you are taking action when I am the one making you 
stir at the bidding of the bonds with which I weave your desires’” (29). This effect 
is not based on an ideal of lucid communication, with letters always showing up 
where we intended them to be – a state that would leave us without any want or 
doubt. At this stage of his teaching, Lacan rather sees the symbolic order as a force 
of radical alterity, and therefore as a force that renders the subject enigmatic to 
herself or himself (a view that arguably only becomes more pronounced as Lacan’s 
system develops to include intrusions into the symbolic of the real itself). 
The “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” takes up this theme of distortion 
in signification when it states the formula that the unconscious is structured like a 
language as: “the unconscious is the fact that man is inhabited by the 
signifier” (25). In middle Lacan’s terminology, this statement is virtually 
synonymous with one he makes earlier in the text, where he says that “the 
unconscious is the Other’s discourse” (10). For as we have seen in the introduction, 
to middle Lacan, the symbolic is a structure that imposes itself on us without ever 
properly belonging to us or rendering us transparent to ourselves: rather it distorts 
us, like the distorted skull in Holbein’s The Ambassadors. The symbolic is 
effectively an alien structure; as Lacan puts it elsewhere in Écrits, the Other itself 
can be conceived of as “the locus of speech” (“Direction” 524), and speech, in turn, 
as the locus of the Other. 
I therefore agree with Žižek’s assessment that Derrida’s critique “misreads 
the Lacanian thesis, reducing it to the traditional teleological circular movement, 
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i.e., to what is precisely called in question and subverted by Lacan” (Enjoy 11). 
Even in the middle phase of Lacan’s teaching, his questioning of the traditional 
view already anticipates Derrida’s analysis of language. If Derrida speaks of the 
letter’s loss of destination, and Lacan of its trajectory, we can read this as a loss 
that constitutes a trajectory, insofar as the trajectory consists in nothing else than 
the uncertainty that the straying of the signifier causes. And although Lacan’s 
elucidations on the discourse of the Other in the “Seminar on ‘The Purloined 
Letter’” makes use of the middle Lacanian theme of the subject’s traumatic 
inscription in the symbolic, it can easily be re-read for the late position that sees 
the symbolic as saturated with fragments of the real. Throughout Lacan’s various 
conceptualisations of it, the symbolic inevitably opens up the gaps it is called upon 
to close – as Thurston remarks, in the symbolic, there is “never enough meaning 
to cover the enigmatic space opened by the Other” (James Joyce 27). 
Similarly, Rabaté, in an account of the Derrida/Lacan debate in his 
Cambridge Introduction to Literature and Psychoanalysis, writes: “The agency of 
the letter at work in Poe’s tale is not limited to the ideality of a closed economy, 
as Derrida contended, but guarantees that the workings of language displaces 
identities thanks to the constant sliding away of the signifier” (140). I would 
suggest that we can add ALP’s letter to the list of letters that exemplify this sliding. 
Like Derrida’s straying message, ALP’s ever-changing letter is caught in a mutability 
in which no essential meaning can manifest itself. And like the Queen’s purloined 
letter, ALP’s elusive, absent/present missive also indicates that lack is not an inert 
attribute. The letter’s absence has a trajectory: it gives rise to a desire that is 
productive of meaning. 
In reading this absence/presence, Lacan’s approach, which conceives of 
the signifier’s effect on its user as its defining characteristic, can thus serve as a 
helpful complement to what Derrida’s analysis invites us to think as a desire that 
attaches itself to the trace. The notion of an effect resulting from an absence, 
however, also raises a question I have so far avoided in order to better prepare a 
synthesis of Derrida and Lacan. Before turning to late Lacan’s thinking about the 
effects of absence made present, I need to address the role played in middle 
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Lacan’s argument by symbolic castration. For although the term “castration” does 
not appear in the “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter,’” Lacan makes it clear that 
the chief example of the transformative power signifiers have over subjects – the 
example of the Minister – is an instance of symbolic castration. 
Here is how Lacan describes the scene that greets Dupin when he enters 
the Minister’s room: “Between the jambs of the fireplace, there is the object 
already in reach of the hand the ravisher has but to extend” (26). In the original, 
this reads: “entre les jambages de la cheminée, voici l’objet à portée de la main 
que le ravisseur n’a plus qu’à tendre” (“Le séminaire” 36). By punning on the 
fireplace’s posts (“jambages”) as legs (French: “jambes”), between which the card 
rack containing the letter is spotted, Lacan likens to castration the appropriation 
of said letter by Dupin, an appropriation that turns the Minister from robber into 
robbed, including a number of castrating effects this entails. In tracing the 
trajectory of language, manifested by the letter’s effects on those around it, 
Lacan’s discussion thus insists that one key effect is the powerlessness – the 
castration – to which we are reduced as a result of not truly possessing the 
signifier. In Derrida’s view, this approach evades the failure of language, since it 
offers the place of castration, the place from which the phallic master-signifier is 
missing, as the locus of this failure. In doing so, it imposes limits on the lack to be 
described, maintaining that although the full truth cannot be spoken, it can be 
located in an absence, and that in this sense it is identified as a knowable effect. 
As Derrida puts it in The Post Card: “that which is missing from its place has in 
castration a fixed, central place, freed from all substitution. Something is missing 
from its place, but the lack is never missing from it” (441). 
The phallus is indeed Lacan’s name for the hypothesised, impossible 
signifier that would render the Other transparent to us. In “The Signification of the 
Phallus,” Lacan offers a number of observations from clinical practice on which his 
choice of this term is based. I will not discuss these reasons, however, because I 
hold that the most pertinent criticism to be made of Lacan’s terminology is the 
one offered by Butler in Bodies That Matter: that precisely insofar as the phallus 
is said to signify (as opposed to coincide with or correspond to) power, essence, 
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authority, and so on, it must be open to “signifying in ways and in places that 
exceed its proper structural place within the Lacanian symbolic and contest the 
necessity of that place” (55). The gendered framework that prompts Lacan’s 
nomenclature raises serious problems, and the manner in which Lacan passes over 
these problems deserves to be subjected to rigorous analysis, since the term 
cannot but risk re-asserting a phallocentrism it claims to be merely observing in a 
specific cultural setting. At the same time, the universal applicability of “phallus” 
means that it is possible, by Lacan’s own admission, to completely dissociate the 
term from that original framework, and use it as the name of the missing signifier 
in virtually any constellation. 
In the evaluation of the disconcerting mismatch between the term’s 
derivation and its application, I cannot agree with Derrida’s argument that the 
specificity of the image entails an undue specificity of the meaning. Derrida 
maintains that castration introduces two consequences into the thinking about 
language, to which he refers as logocentrism (logos as the carrier of essence) and 
phallocentrism (the phallus as a marker of the possession of essence, power, 
knowledge). In “This Strange Institution Called Literature,” Derrida states that 
“although phallocentrism and logocentrism are indissociable, the stresses can lie 
more here or there according to the case;” yet, “in the last instance, a radical 
dissociation between the two motifs cannot be made in all rigor” (59-60). 
My contention is that the synthesis, in Derrida’s critique of Lacan, of these 
aspects into phallogocentrism underestimates the extent to which the phallus is 
meant to refer not to a presence but an absence. Gilbert Chaitin makes this point 
when he writes that in the Lacanian system, “the phallus is designed to guarantee 
a ‘beyond’ of representation – real presence – but that beyond is in fact an illusion, 
and the phallic function is nothing in itself” (111). The phallus is not a name that 
can master the real: it is the name of the illusory signifier that could (just as it is 
not the actual object of the Other’s desire, but the hypothetical object construed 
as a stand-in for that desire’s assumed focal point). I would thus compare the 
phallus to what Derrida, in the passage from Writing and Difference cited above, 
calls the “phantom of the centre” – an expression that gives us no reason to 
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believe that providing this name, “centre,” interferes with the spectrality of what 
is being named. 
It is true that in choosing the term “phallus,” Lacan attempts to gather 
under a single name the experiences of lack with which we are confronted in the 
symbolic order. The form this attempt takes is that of phallocentrism. Yet the 
range of the term’s application immediately undercuts this essentialism, and 
subjects it to an internal critique. In the end, the term can always be turned against 
itself and be made to function in ways more rich and varied than Lacan’s position 
would at times allow for, while still drawing on the crucial insights that inform this 
position: insights that work to undermine logocentrism. I therefore suggest that 
the correlation between logocentrism and phallocentrism is, in this case, inverted: 
if anything, the straying of Lacan’s term confirms both iterability and, ironically, 
castration in the sense of a lack of linguistic control. Butler, whose reading of Lacan 
I draw on here, cites Gallop’s apt remark that the “inability to control the meaning 
of the word phallus is evidence of what Lacan calls symbolic castration” (126, qtd 
in Butler, Bodies 28). 
Lacan, too, indicates the possibility of separating the highly specific, 
imaginary dimension of the phallus (where the phallus represents the loss 
experienced by the child in the oedipal triangle of the family, a problematic 
assertion for all kinds of reasons) from its more general symbolic dimension, 
constituted by the alterity of the symbolic – or, in late Lacan, by the scars left in 
the symbolic by the real. Some clarification on this point is provided by the recent 
publication (2004) and English translation (2014) of Lacan’s tenth seminar, the 
seminar on anxiety. There, the object of anxiety, objet petit a, is defined in middle 
Lacanian terminology as “the remainder left over from the constitution of the 
subject in the locus of the Other” (284) – that is to say, from the subject’s 
inscription in the symbolic. The phallus, instead of serving as the one signifier that 
covers the effects of this alienated constitution, is presented as only one 
manifestation of the objet petit a among others. Lacan states that “one of the 
possible forms in which lack appears is the (-ϕ), the imaginary support of 
castration. But this is just one of the possible translations of the original 
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lack” (136). And he adds: “The term that Freud gives us as the final term, the 
castration complex in men and Penisneid in women, may be called into question. 
It is not necessary for this to be the final term” (136). 
Then, in a transition from the structuralist emphasis on language dominant 
in middle Lacan to the topological thinking that informs late Lacan’s work, Lacan 
argues the ultimate irrelevance of terminological choices. He offers the image of 
an insect crawling along a Möbius strip, trapped by the way the strip is bent back 
on itself so as to lack a border, a piece that would allow us to distinguish between 
one side and another. “Is the matter settled because we are describing this little 
missing piece, the a on this occasion, with this paradigmatic shape? Absolutely 
not, because the very fact that it is missing is what forms the reality of the world 
the insect is walking about in” (136). We may give a name to what is missing from 
our world, but this cannot make up for its topology, for the distortion itself and for 
the fact that we are caught in a world that is defined by this distortion and that 
cannot be returned to an ideal state through the mere act of describing the 
distortion. 
Here, we encounter a fundamental difference in the epistemologies of 
Lacan and Derrida. For Derrida, the play of differences and identities constitutes 
simultaneously the possibility of language and the condition of experience. This 
does not mean that Derrida does not believe in a world outside language. As 
Geoffrey Bennington suggests, Derrida’s position is rather one that complicates 
the clear-cut distinction between language and world. Bennington argues that “in 
the ‘first’ distinction between anything and anything, in the minimal referral (not 
yet a reference in the normal sense of the term) that the trace involves, the 
possibility of what we come to think of as language is already given.” (94). Thus, 
the perceived world comes into being precisely insofar as differance already 
structures self-sameness and perception. 
Lacan, by contrast, comes gradually to insist on the possibility of our being 
affected by a real beyond symbolisation – by something that is constitutively 
beyond perception, but that impacts our experience (sometimes massively, 
traumatically). Yet note that both of these systems conceive of the un-
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representable as having a formative impact on representation. In Derrida, this 
effect is found in the movement of the trace that produces the signifier by 
displacing the absence of essence. In late Lacan, it manifests itself as the 
uninterpretable remainder of the real that distorts perception by tearing holes in 
the symbolic. Though coming from opposite directions, as it were, Lacan’s and 
Derrida’s respective systems can be seen to meet in this primacy of the 
inexpressible. If the trace means that essence is never present, but always 
indicated, the objet petit a means presence is always desired, but never given. 
I expand on this because I want to argue that in Finnegans Wake, there is 
a similar twist at work whereby the limits of representation become something to 
be represented. The inherent imperfection of any language, of any system of 
signification, is given expression in the Wake in the form of ALP’s letter, which we 
can understand as an instance of both of the above terms. ALP’s letter stages the 
trace’s dynamics of occulted origination: it draws attention to itself by 
withdrawing from our grasp. And ALP’s letter figures as that positivation of lack 
that is termed objet petit a: part desire’s absent object and part the very 
movement of absenting that causes desire and that projects an object of desire, in 
order to give desire a focal point. 
Indeed, the letter can be seen to resemble objet petit a as the paradoxical 
object-cause of desire, about which Žižek writes that desire “produces its own 
object-cause” in such a manner that “the process of searching itself produces the 
object which causes it” (“Why Lacan” 39). The letter, too, is caught up in such a 
circular formative process. It is a stand-in for Finnegans Wake itself, into whose 
materials Joyce was more than happy to feed responses to his own work (including 
reactions to the serialisation of the Wake as “Work in Progress”), in one of the 
Wake’s many gestures that make meaning-production itself part of the book’s 
content. The letter repeats this procedure on a smaller scale. In the interaction 
between I.5 and Book IV mentioned above, one manifestation of the document is 
impacted by the discussion of another manifestation. Thus, the letter is not only 
the subject of a search. It continues or mirrors certain elements of this search: a 
search that can therefore be seen to shape the very thing it is looking for. As Shari 
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Benstock writes, “desire” constitutes both “[t]he missing ‘content’ of the 
dreamletter” and “the urge to its own production (to dream, to write)” (“Letter” 
169). What is at stake in ALP’s letter is the productivity of that which eludes our 
grasp, a productivity that, in generating meaning, also reproduces in meaning the 
impact of a certain desire or absence, thus rendering absence present. Before 
discussing this aspect of ALP’s letter, I will first turn to Lacan’s examination of the 
productivity in question as what, in his late teaching, he terms the sinthome. 
 
Affirming the unreadable 
The problems posed by Joyce’s text cannot be resolved through the simply act of 
gathering them under the heading of unreadability. Just as it will not do to ignore 
how Joyce destabilises meaning-production through the use of non-words, we 
cannot be content either to state that in Finnegans Wake, we encounter the 
altogether meaningless. Referentiality persists: the suspicion of meaning remains 
(if only in the form of the much cited argument that Joyce would hardly have 
invested the better part of sixteen years to play a joke on the literary world). In 
short, we have to read unreadability. 
Unreadability plays a key role in late Lacan’s teaching. The Lacan of the 
1970s, and in particular of the 1975-6 seminar Le sinthome – Lacan’s most 
sustained effort at coming to terms with Joyce’s work – no longer upholds the 
structuralist view according to which subjectivity, including the unconscious, is 
reducible to language. Instead, as Thurston writes, “by the mid-1970s Lacan has 
come to conceive of the human subject as precisely a knot or chain in which real, 
symbolic and imaginary are linked together” (James Joyce 94). That is, Lacan still 
describes the subject in terms of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real, but the 
centrality of these terms is now displaced by their combination into what Lacan 
calls the Borromean knot. The braiding of this knot is effectively a fourth order in 
itself. Again Thurston: “the writing of the knot cannot be situated in symbolic 
structure, psychological meaning or the mute insistence of the drive; in other 
words, the knot itself is irreducible to the registers it inscribes” (195). 
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In this irreducibility, we see the movement of late Lacan’s thinking away 
from legibility, towards a topology arranged around the centre of a certain 
illegibility. The fourth order, that which knots together the other three, is precisely 
the sinthome. Thurston’s article on the sinthome in Evans’s Introductory 
Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis describes this term as a shift away “from 
conceiving of the symptom as a message which can be deciphered by reference to 
the unconscious ‘structured like a language’,” and towards thinking the symptom 
as “a signifying formulation beyond analysis, a kernel of enjoyment immune to the 
efficacy of the symbolic” (Evans 189). In this formulation, the gaps in the symbolic 
order that afflict subjectivity are found to be gaps in subjectivity itself. Instead of 
encountering the illegible elsewhere, in the alterity of a symbolic imposed on the 
subject, the subject itself is already punctuated by illegibility; yet these sinthome-
atic gaps are also what holds together subjectivity’s Borromean knot. 
In developing this position, Lacan’s views on psychoanalytical treatment 
necessarily break with the notion of rendering the subject transparent. Roberto 
Harari, in his book-length exegesis of Le sinthome, argues that the sinthome is  
“the incidence or effect of an irreducible ‘psychotic’ kernel in every 
individual” (145). Similarly, Rabaté comments that “the symptom seen as 
sinthome provides a fine cusp between psychosis and normality” (Jacques Lacan 
180). Positing an irreducible and illegible (psychotic) kernel at the very heart of 
subjectivity, Lacan’s thinking on the sinthome suggests that normality itself, taken 
to mean functional implication in the symbolic order, cannot be thought without 
the sinthome, but actually consists in the subject’s formulation of a sinthome that 
successfully ties the knot of this implication. At this point, writes Rabaté, the goal 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis is no longer to undo the symptom but “to reconnect 
the symptom with the symbolic order” (165). Although I will not take up the 
question of clinical application, it is interesting to note that in the first volume of 
Against Understanding, Bruce Fink argues that “[t]he primary goal of 
psychoanalysis with neurotics [as opposed to psychotics] is not understanding but 
change” (5). Fink goes on to suggest that where re-formulating the sinthome is 
within the subject’s compass (i.e. where psychotic material is not the absolutely 
dominant force), therapy is still all too often preoccupied with interpreting the 
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subject when its aim should be to give the subject the opportunity to re-knot the 
orders of her or his experience. 
What attracts Lacan to Joyce’s writing is that, for Lacan, this writing 
constitutes an act of such re-knotting. In the introduction to Re-inventing the 
Symptom, Thurston writes that 
turning to those texts offered [Lacan] a way to show forth, not a 
confirmation of some preestablished doctrine or interpretative 
method, but an exemplary resistance to interpretation. And Lacan 
saw this resistance not as merely a baffling theoretical dead-end, 
but rather as a provocation to reconceive, to reinvent his 
psychoanalytic thinking. (xvi-xvii) 
If Joyce’s texts provide Lacan with an occasion to reinvent his psychoanalytic 
teaching, it is because Lacan reads these texts as part of the formation of Joyce’s 
subjectivity. Therefore, the moments at which Joyce’s writing interrupts 
codification, to let emerge something that eludes all semantic appropriation, are 
seen by Lacan as opportunities to engage such elements in the formation of 
subjectivity as remain unreadable. 
It is in this sense that Sheldon Brivic can write, in Joyce Through Lacan and 
Žižek, that “Joyce should not be seen as, say, psychotic in the bizarre distortions 
of the Wake, but as someone working with the exploration of psychotic patterns 
for a liberating purpose” (13). The precise nature of this purpose would lead into 
biographical considerations that I will not retrace here – although it is important 
to note that if Lacan insists on the voluntary nature and the success of Joyce’s 
procedures sufficiently to balance any simplistic suggestion of pathology, Rabaté 
argues that “[h]is caution was of little use, since Joyce would subsequently be used 
by Lacanian psychoanalysts as an important ‘case’” (Jacques Lacan 179). Suffice it 
to say that, according to Lacan, at certain points in Joyce’s artistic fashioning of his 
self, only a brazen interruption of legibility would do. Eventually, Joyce “n’ait pu 
trouver que cette solution, écrire Finnegans Wake” (S XXIII 125).2 
                                                          
2 “has been able to find only this solution, to write Finnegans Wake” (my translation). 
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Yet Finnegans Wake is not at the centre of Le sinthome, which spends more 
time on discussions of Joyce’s early texts. Thurston underlines Lacan’s interest in 
what Joyce calls an epiphany: that early Joycean vignette that “cannot be 
translated into another meaningful proposition, but is wholly identical with its 
own contingent, accidental utterance” (Thurston, James Joyce 167). Insofar as an 
epiphany is thus “framed as a discrete literary ‘thing’” (167), it is unreadable, it 
resists semantic transmission. At the same time, as a literary thing, it is also a 
presence; it constitutes an unreadability that asserts itself. Since the Lacanian 
examination casts this mode of assertion as a model for the operation of the 
unreadable in subjectivity, the uninterpretable aspect of the literary thing raises 
the question of the sinthome, the question of how an unreadability can “become 
the key to the topological coherence – that is, the singular identification – of a 
particular subject” (161-2). 
The answer Thurston proposes is that “when Joyce countersigns the 
epiphany as an act of signification, he identifies with its anonymous semiotic gift 
by affirming it […] For Lacan, it is the subject’s meaningless choice of writing that 
constitutes the sinthome” (166). What matters most is not the epiphany’s 
meaning, but its being affirmed in its entirety, including its contingent and 
meaningless aspects, its transgression of symbolic codification – what Thurston 
also calls the epiphany as the revelation of “the void of creative jouissance-in-
language” (197). This void is no longer part of the symbolic (or the imaginary), yet 
neither can it be identified as the real, since it constitutes a response to the real 
that implies an agency extending into meaning-production. To grasp this response, 
which weaves together the real and the symbolic in a seeming violation of their 
distinction, we should turn to Harari’s analysis of Le sinthome. 
Harari points out what appears to be an inconsistency in the argument of 
Lacan’s seminar. In the first session, “Σ [the sinthome] is the product of a division 
at the heart of the Symbolic” (298). However, “by the tenth session, Σ is, clearly, 
equivalent to the Real” (299). Rather than finding fault with Lacan’s system, or 
reconstituting consistency by deciding between these usages, we have to read this 
transformation as a rethinking of the border between the symbolic and the real. 
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The newly emerging formulation changes nothing about the fact that these two 
orders are irreconcilably different, but it urges us to consider that at the heart of 
the symbolic, there are found instances of the real. A signifier contains bits of the 
real; they are that in language that is more than language’s making legible. If, in 
the Derridean trace-structure, the absolutely inaccessible can be seen to shape 
the production of meaning, I now propose to conceive of the sinthome along the 
lines of a similar logic. We cannot identify the fragments of the real that we 
encounter in a signifier (they would not be of the real if we could). Yet the signifier 
lends to their impact a certain particularity. 
What the sinthome means, therefore, is that “there is a degree of freedom 
in the way that each speaker organizes the marks of the Other” (300), in the way 
he or she shapes the encounter with the alterity of the real that takes place in and 
through their manipulation of the symbolic. This entails a fundamental revision of 
the middle Lacanian doctrine of linguistically constituted subjectivity, seeing how 
“it marks a radical shift from the firmly held position about language holding us, 
rather than our holding language” (301). Whereas in a 1958 paper, Lacan can still 
say that we are “at the mercy of language” (“Direction” 525) and in a paper from 
1960 maintain that “the subject constitutes himself on the basis of the message, 
such that he receives from the Other even the message he himself 
sends” (“Subversion” 683), in the very last session of Le sinthome, he states: “Par 
cet artifice d’écriture, se restitue, dirai-je, le nœud borroméen” (152) – the artifice 
of writing in question being Joyce’s active implementation of the sinthome.3 
Joyce’s achievement, from his earliest texts onwards, in taking language 
beyond the realm of semantic transmitability suggests to Lacan a reconsideration 
of the agency at work in the symptom. Middle Lacan largely conceives of 
symptoms as necessary by-products of the symbolic order (you cannot inhabit the 
symbolic without also encountering its symptomatic gaps). This changes when 
Lacan describes the sinthome as the centrepiece of human subjectivity, as the 
element that knots together the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. From this 
                                                          




perspective, as far as the interaction between the symbolic and the real is 
concerned, the sinthome is neither legible, fully situated in the symbolic, nor 
meaningless, fully situated in the real. It is the subject’s idiosyncratic articulation 
of a relation between these orders: an articulation that opens onto symbolic 
structures without being reducible to them. 
Lacan thus moves away from his middle phase’s confidence in the 
possibility of reading the unreadable towards a position that could be described 
as reading unreadability itself. In Le sinthome’s session of 16 March 1976, he says 
of the Joyce of Finnegans Wake that “ce qu’il avance, […] c’est le sinthome, et 
sinthome tel qu’il n’y ait rien à faire pour l’analyser” (125).4 Yet in Lacan’s address 
to the previous year’s International James Joyce Symposium, he states: “Lisez des 
pages de Finnegans Wake, sans chercher à comprendre. Ça se lit” (“Joyce” 165).5 
Finnegans Wake “se lit:” it makes for good reading, it compels us to read – yet at 
the same time, nothing can be done to analyze it. In view of the qualification Lacan 
includes that we should read without trying to understand, I would argue that 
what we observe in the tension between these two statements is not a 
contradiction, nor a change of opinion. Rather, this tension reveals the use that 
Joyce makes of language’s intrinsic fault-lines. 
In the presentation to the 1975 symposium, Lacan goes on to state that 
Joyce is “le symptôme pur de ce qu’il en est du rapport au langage” (166).6 What 
keeps us reading Finnegans Wake is not a readability, a possibility of appropriation 
through analysis, but Joyce’s affirmation of what, with Thurston, I would term the 
creative void at the heart of language. Joyce finds in the absence of essence a 
certain presence of the real, a presence of that in language which is more than 
language’s making readable, but which also imbues language with its creative 
excess, with its striving for meaning (referentiality) that is a power beyond all 
actual meaning (reference). The problem of Finnegans Wake’s unreadability is the 
                                                          
4 “what he confronts us with […] is the sinthome, and a sinthome of such a kind that 
nothing can be done to analyse it” (my translation). 
5 “Read some pages of Finnegans Wake, without seeking to understand. That makes for 
[good] reading” (my translation). 
6 “the pure symptom of what our relation to language is” (my translation). 
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problem of this affirmation, which transgresses the limits of an interpretable 
symptom to become a sinthome. 
The unreadability of Finnegans Wake affirms the presence in language of 
that which is outside meaning, of the real kernel that is also a symbolic and 
imaginary void. Yet, at the same time, it celebrates the possibility of responding to 
this kernel in a re-invention of the symbolic that will open up new possibilities of 
meaning even though this re-invention is itself incalculable: irreducible to 
symbolic codification. Thus, what Lacan’s thinking on the sinthome suggests is that 
in turning unreadability into an opportunity for the production of meaning, 
Finnegans Wake is not operating outside the normal modes of meaning 
production. Much like Derrida, who sees the abyss of the trace as the fundamental 
reference point without which language could not function, Lacan holds the 
unreadable kernel of language to be the very source of language’s productivity. 
In this view, the Wake once again emerges as an intensification of 
signification, as a work operating at the outer limits of processes that invariably 
derive the presence of actual meaning from a presence/absence to which we can 
only respond in ways that are beyond calculation. Radicalizing this underlying logic 
of all meaning production, Joyce presents us with moments that truly encapsulate 
the breakdown of codification; yet he also demonstrates the liminal possibility of 
inhabiting this breakdown, of opening it up to the production of meaning. This, I 
propose, is why we insist on reading Finnegans Wake: the Wake is a text dedicated 
to nothing if not a demonstration of the desire and the productivity spawned by 
unreadability. If certain aspects of it remain radically unreadable, we can choose 
to be affected by this unreadability, to accept this sinthome as a symptom of the 
reading process, and of our participation in it. Moreover, if the demand the Wake’s 
unreadability makes on us is that we formulate a response to the making-present 
of absence, this demand is itself a subject of the Wake’s meta-textual reflections. 
As we will see, it is precisely this demand that is depicted in ALP’s letter where it 
most resembles the objet petit a. 
In Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma of History, van Boheemen-Saaf 
formulates a similar Lacanian reading, which in its terminological choices 
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furthermore sketches a possible passage from middle to late Lacan. Van 
Boheemen-Saaf suggests that from the point of view of their material textuality, 
“Ulysses and Finnegans Wake are best understood as attempts to encrypt 
‘castration,’ or the ontological void, into textual structure” (98). The question, 
then, is what view van Boheemen-Saaf takes of this void, and my contention is 
that her argument comes down on the side of examining this void’s encryption as 
a palpable, but crucially open-ended, effect on the reader. Regarding what she 
calls “the reader’s implication” in Joyce’s text, van Boheemen-Saaf writes: “We 
can no longer maintain our illusion of transcendent objectivity; we must either 
engage the crack in the looking-glass or repress and ignore it” (46). She goes on to 
argue that the former possibility, that of engaging and affirming the fracture in the 
symbolic, is what “is implicitly demanded by the anxiety of Joyce’s tantalizing 
signifying texture” (68). 
The distortions to which Joyce subjects his writing may well contain a 
dimension of illegibility, but this illegibility also tantalises us, teases us, and calls 
us into the text. At this point, the distortions really become our symptom. Or, as 
van Boheemen-Saaf puts it, “part of the meaning of Joyce may reside in his 
Wirkung on the reader” (18). This effect (German: “Wirkung”) I would argue, is 
also an affect. Even as it has us partake in the sinthome-atic production of 
meaning, Finnegans Wake confronts us with language’s central void, and with the 
anxiety that results from this confrontation – results from the making-present of 
the absence of essence. What I want to argue now is that this affective dimension 
is what we find expressed in ALP’s letter when we read it for its resemblance to 
the objet petit a as the object of anxiety: that is, as the lack whose becoming 
presence we desperately try to hold at bay. 
 
Revealing absence 
A key moment in I.5 relates ALP’s letter both to the classic phallocentric topos of 
truth as female and to the related topos of femininity as difference, absence, and 
lack. If I argue that phallocentrism can be separated from logocentrism in Lacan’s 
terminology, we will see that, similarly, Joyce employs phallocentric images in such 
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a way that not only is his use of them not logocentric, he twists them into a critique 
of logocentrism. 
The Wake casts ALP both as a patron-saint of the truth encapsulated in her 
“mamafesta” (104.4), the absent letter, and as a river-mother who personifies the 
generative principle and the flow of creativity. The book thus establishes a code in 
which femininity stands for enigma, otherness, and signification itself. It also links 
truth to nudity. At the beginning of the next chapter, I will discuss the geometry 
problem from II.2 that is one example of this link. Another instance of the 
connection between nudity and truth is found in the following description of ALP 
from I.8: “Anna was, Livia is, Plurabelle's to be” (215.24; echoed in 226.14-5). Here, 
Joyce may be seen to be alluding to Plutarch’s account of the Isis-cult in Ancient 
Egypt, in which Plutarch states that the shrines of this religion carried reminders 
of the hidden nature of truth: “In Saïs the statue of Athena, whom they believe to 
be Isis, bore the inscription: ‘I am all that has been, and is, and shall be, and my 
robe no mortal has yet uncovered’” (25, my emphasis). 
The allusion situates ALP in a logic that equates truth with female nudity 
(the disrobing of the goddess). In this context, we may also note that in a list of 
titles for ALP’s letter, ALP is referred to as “a Woman of the World who only can 
Tell Naked Truths” (107.3-4). However, the gesture of clothing nudity in a robe 
that hides truth from the impudent gaze of mortals introduces into the 
phallocentric logic a somewhat contradictory element: the failure to actually 
perceive truth. The same contradiction is at work in a crucial passage of I.5’s 
discussion of ALP’s letter. There, the professor states with regard to the letter’s 
envelope: 
Admittedly it is an outer husk: […] Yet to concentrate solely on the 
literal sense or even the psychological content of any document to 
the sore neglect of the enveloping facts themselves 
circumstantiating it is just as hurtful to sound sense […] as were 
some fellow in the act of perhaps getting an intro […] to a lady […] 




If ALP’s letter can be interpreted as an image for the signifier, then the letter’s 
envelope, which contains and helps transport the document, takes on the 
meaning of a signifier’s material inscription. At first, this may imply a cautionary 
reminder to base reading on material evidence. Yet in spite of the professor’s 
protestations, which may seem to initiate a movement away from the image of 
denuding, the link between feminine clothing and a message’s material carrier can 
only confirm an underlying topos in which the letter’s meaning (its “literal sense” 
or “psychological content”) corresponds to female nudity. 
The reading I propose of this passage is that the professor is speaking from 
a phallogocentric perspective (I will presently give my reasons for this 
assumption), but that his account is complicated by anti-logocentric elements 
through which it comes to destabilise itself. This is to say that even though, in 
order to create the symbol of ALP’s letter, Joyce draws heavily on the 
phallogocentric image of femininity as the figure of transcendental truth, we can 
perceive deliberate fault-lines in the text where this image is subjected to scrutiny 
and, I would argue, its logocentric element rejected. One of these fault-lines is 
precisely the fact that the professor advocates a “decent” examination of the 
letter. Within the phallocentric logic of this passage, to introduce the indecency of 
nudity means to introduce the indecency of meaning itself. 
In order to understand this change of register, we should take into 
consideration another Lacanian reading of ALP’s letter, one carried out by Hanjo 
Berressem in “The Letter! The Litter! The Defilements of the Signifier in Finnegans 
Wake.” Berressem also proposes that “Lacan’s reading of Poe suggests that the 
letter in Finnegans Wake might be read as a similar ‘allegory of the 
signifier’” (145). However, in order to produce this allegorical correlation, 
Berressem accentuates not the letter’s absence (with the letter consequently 
exemplifying desire), but its ragged appearance (representing the imperfection of 
the symbolic order itself). According to Berressem’s reading, the linguistic subject 
“becomes a victim to the inevitable distortions and anamorphoses of language, 
which the outer appearance of the letter symbolizes” (146). The many partial 
destructions and defilements that ALP’s letter undergoes are made to stand for 
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the violence that language inevitably does to what it expresses. Thus, we return 
to the Lacanian conundrum of producing the symbolic at the cost of obliterating 
the real. 
Commenting on the passage from the Wake I have just cited, Berressem 
writes: “The spirit cannot exist without and outside of the letter” (150), and yet, 
“[i]n describing its envelope Joyce stresses, within a complex modulation from 
questions of language (signifier/signified) to questions of sexuality 
(nudity/clothing), the impossibility of an ideal signified or meaning as well as 
naturality” (149). In other words: no spirit/thought without culture, but no culture 
without loss of spontaneity. In culture, the naked body cannot therefore truly 
function as the last vestige of purity, but takes on a significance that is opposed to 
naturality and purity. As Lacan has it: “Is nudity purely and simply a natural 
phenomenon? The whole of psychoanalytic thought is designed to prove it 
isn’t” (S VII 227). It is this reversal that troubles the professor’s alignment of nudity 
and meaning: just as clothes hide not nature (there is no need for clothing in 
nature) but the absence of nature, the presence of the letter hides the absence of 
ideal meaning – hides the fact that meaning is not “natural,” but constructed. 
I would give to this line of thought the additional twist of arguing that the 
absent ideality or spontaneity can only be thought as an absence: it cannot exist 
as a presence, at least not outside of mythologies that imagine some form of 
utopian culture without culture. In this view, the opposition between nature and 
culture that Berressem puts forward corresponds to the classic Judeo-Christian 
account that relates both clothing and imperfect language to original sin. If Adam 
and Eve’s existence in Eden is associated both with nudity and with transparency 
in expression (I will discuss the ideal nature of Adamic language in chapter three), 
the postlapsarian condition is characterised by clothing and by a linguistic 
experience in which ideas are obstructed by the signifiers that try to express them. 
What is important, then, is that the wearing of clothes after the fall implies an 
understanding of nudity that cannot be thought at the same time as the absolutely 




In chapter three, we will see that Joyce indeed implements certain biblical 
texts, as well as the philosophy of Giambattista Vico, in a manner that inscribes 
Finnegans Wake in a tradition of connecting cultural advance to a decrease in 
spontaneity and purity – what Derrida, in The Animal That Therefore I Am, calls an 
“insistence upon nudity, fault, and default at the origin of human history” (44). In 
the perspective opened up by this insistence, we “have to think shame and 
technicity together” (5). Historical, postlapsarian, non-utopian culture, with its 
indecent knowledge and its imperfect technics of signification, taints both 
language and the body. It does not cover up a nudity/meaning that beneath the 
cover provided by clothing/signification continues to exist in its prelapsarian state. 
Rather, it replaces that which it hides: with nudity ashamed of itself and with 
meaning that shamefully fails to capture essence. 
It is shame as an inevitable symptom of cultural imperfection that the 
professor is struggling with in chapter I.5, and struggling with from a 
phallogocentric perspective. The theme of shame puts considerable pressure on 
the alignment of meaning and nudity. Consider how, in middle Lacan, the absence 
of essence from the symbolic is doubled by the absence of the phallus from the 
(imaginary) body, male or female. This body’s bareness – without ceasing to serve 
the phallocentrism that does its best to classify and control the absence in 
question – is therefore also feared/shamed to the extent to which the castrated 
body, locus of truth as an enigma (truth as absent but potentially accessible), 
threatens at all points to become a locus of enigma as failure (truth as absent 
because inexistent). 
In the professor’s concern for decency, phallogocentrism can be seen to 
undermine itself insofar as it makes appeals to an essence that it nevertheless 
carefully stipulates should not be approached too boldly – fearful that the ultimate 
point of reference should reveal itself to be not a presence at all but, on the 
contrary, a making-present of absence. Phallogocentrism thus follows the 
procedures of a fetishism that, equating truth and presence with the phallus, 
settles upon femininity as the image of mystery, only to immediately take this 
mystery as an indicator of a hidden presence, thus carrying out the curious 
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reversal that is fetishist disavowal. Disavowal, writes Evans, “is the failure to 
accept that lack causes desire, the belief that desire is caused by a presence” (44) 
– a presence inferred from an absence, as it were, and used to cover up that 
absence (the very opposite of absence made present). In Spurs, Derrida examines 
the same logic when he writes about the image of truth as female nudity veiled 
that “only through such a veil which thus falls over it could « truth » become truth, 
profound, indecent, desirable. But should that veil be suspended, or even fall a bit 
differently, there would no longer be any truth, only « truth » – written in 
quotation marks” (59). 
Here, we should also note the correspondences between the professor’s 
warnings and the chain of association that Derrida posits as a part of 
phallogocentric reasoning: “truth-unveiled-woman-castration-shame” (Post Card 
416). The discord between the first term of this series, truth, and its last term, 
shame, is precisely what is produced by the self-contradictory aspect of 
phallogocentrism. Woman is revered as the symbol of essential meaning, yet the 
shame that results from the actual impossibility of obtaining an uncastrated or 
prelapsarian essence is likewise attributed to her (biblically, the fall that leads from 
Eden to postlapsarian history is primarily associated with Eve, not Adam). This 
shaming forms part of a stigmatisation of the feminine that traverses 
phallogocentrism for all its declared idealisation of femininity; it is part of an 
obsessive praising and scolding, unveiling and veiling. Such phallogocentric 
aggression is also found in other eruptions, in I.5, of violence and of dubious 
notions of control. What is arguably the same narrative voice (seeing how the 
entire chapter appears to be made up of the professor’s account) also indulges in 
a fantasy of male domination, rendered as the question: “who thus at all this 
marvelling but will press on hotly to see the vaulting feminine libido of those 
interbranching ogham sex upandinsweeps sternly controlled and easily 
repersuaded by the uniform matteroffactness of a meandering male fist?” (123.7-
10). 
This is the violence and essentialism that I argue Joyce is dismantling when 
he counters phallogocentric procedures of sense-making with a language that 
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frustrates the search for matter-of-fact clarity and with a narrative that flaunts the 
letter’s refusal to be sternly controlled. Seeing how the professor’s response to 
this refusal equates meaning with nudity only to posit that meaning should not be 
directly looked at, the following reading is made possible: the professor’s 
phallogocentric rhetoric engages in manipulations of materiality, reprimanding 
the neglect of the envelope, in order to cover up the unbearable elusiveness of 
essence. Like the wearing of “definite articles of evolutionary clothing” (109.23), 
the covering up of actual meaning, in all its imperfection, is “suggestive, too, of so 
very much more and capable of being stretched, filled out, if need or wish 
were” (109.26-8). It is suggestive of the fetishist idealisations of a 
phallogocentrism always impatient with actual meaning and with real-life nudity. 
And it is capable of stretching so as to accommodate the fiction of essence – an 
essence that is not in fact there. When the professor proceeds to ask who would 
doubt “that the feminine fiction, stranger than the facts, is there also at the same 
time, only a little to the rere?” (109.31-3), my suggestion is therefore that we 
should not take at face value the claim contained in this rhetorical question. In 
view of the above-cited eruption of misogynist violence, we should consider the 
possibility that the professor’s exegesis is far from doing justice to its subject 
matter: that in asserting that essence is waiting just behind the veil, it runs counter 
to the significance of ALP’s letter, trying to pin down something whose 
productivity lies in its absenting itself. 
Indeed, Joyce’s text signals the failure of the professor’s strategy in two 
ways. First, for all the professor’s cautioning, he is clearly drawn in by the lure of 
the letter. Throughout I.5, he veers from one aspect of the document to the next, 
in search of an insight that would finally be safe and sound. It is thus not certainty 
that ultimately proves productive of meaning, but precisely a desperate attempt 
to create stability where there is none (what in the next chapter I will examine as 
the anxiety of language). Secondly, in spite of considerable interpretative exertion, 
the professor’s account of the letter’s outward attributes does not succeed in 
providing clarity. As with the other elements examined in I.5, the consideration of 
the “enveloping facts” only serves to raise more questions. What is more, the 
materiality of Joyce’s text undercuts the professor’s discussion, demonstrating 
92 
 
how the very quality this figure urges us to focus on can further subvert his project 
of keeping the enigma of language at a safe distance. Consider the following 
passage, from the chapter’s closing section, which describes the origin of several 
holes that perforate the letter: “they ad bîn “provoked” ay Λ fork, of a grave 
Brofèsor; àth é's Brèak — fast — table; ; acùtely profèššionally piquéd, to = 
introdùce a notion of time [ùpon à plane (?) sù’ ’fàc’e’] by pùnct! ingh oles (sic) in 
iSpace?!” (124.8-12). Here, as with non-words in general, Joyce stages the 
instability of the signifier by insisting on the possibility of distorting it at the level 
of its material carrier: precisely the level that, in the professor’s view, should 
protect us from any disturbance to sound sense. Where the self-identity of words 
should be most evident – in the factuality of their material inscription – both the 
surface of the letter and the typography of Joyce’s text have been distorted by 
violent lashes of the fork/pen that give us only the enigmatic materiality of a 
ruined inscription, of non-words. 
Even as we try to grasp it by means of only the most sound method, 
focusing on the undeniable facts of materiality, ALP’s letter slips away. Its 
materiality itself is shaped in such a way as to suggest that what is hidden beneath 
it is not – and never has been – the pure essence of meaning. The letter thus 
potentially provokes our frustration; yet its elusiveness becomes important 
precisely at the point at which we give in to the desire to read nonetheless. Insofar 
as ALP’s letter can be seen as standing for Finnegans Wake as well as for the 
signifier in general, both the letter’s perforation described in this passage and the 
distorted inscription of the passage itself point towards the perilous nature of the 
act of reading, insisting on how this act fills in the gaps and holes that constantly 
threaten to derail it. As van Boheemen-Saaf puts it, Finnegans Wake 
“litters” the letter of representation, smearing the signifier with the 
darkness of non-meaning, non-differentiation and obscenity (an 
intention staged in the text as the pricking of holes in the letter, 
burying it in a dungheap, staining it with tea, etc.), as if to give a 
location and presence to the non-figurability of discursive trauma. 
But Joyce’s text also possesses and owns this location. The text not 
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only attempts to stage the impasse from which it originates, it 
claims to inhabit its point of trauma; and it is marked by a jubilant 
self-consciousness. (158) 
Barring us from travelling smoothly over silences and breakdowns of meaning – 
from intuitively proceeding from referentiality to reference without paying heed 
to that process’s abysses of undecidability – Joyce’s text undermines signification, 
yet preserves it, too, subjects it to scrutiny, and makes it into a temptation. 
This simultaneity of effects is irreconcilable with the professor’s project of 
covering up language’s shameful impurity. The professor’s pedantry and 
condescension, moreover, make him a likely candidate for an incarnation of 
Shaun, who arguably reprises this role when, in I.6, he lectures on “The Mookse 
and The Gripes” (152.15). There, a speaker designated as “Jones” (149.10), which 
in the pairing of the twins suggests John/Shaun (as opposed to 
James/Seamus/Shem), haughtily ventures that “my explanations here are 
probably above your understandings” (152.4-5). Upon delivering the tale of the 
Mookse and the Gripes, he then delights in the fact “that I am a mouth’s more 
deserving case by genius” (159.26). In the next chapter, I will discuss the problems 
posed by Shaun’s rhetoric, by his taste for superiority and control, and by his 
disdain for his brother Shem’s less disciplined conduct. On the basis of these 
attributes, I propose to read Shaun as an expounder of phallogocentrism. If 
Shaun’s/the professor’s investigation in I.5 aligns him with the phallocentric view 
of femininity as truth, we will see that his discourse on Shem’s writing shows a 
logocentric belief in the availability of essential meaning. 
The challenge of Finnegans Wake is to a significant extent based on its 
rejection of the phallogocentric striving for decency and clarity. Whereas the 
Shaun-type professor would cover up the indecent way in which essence absents 
itself, the text in which the professor’s discourse is presented openly draws 
attention to the sinthome-atic void at the heart of language. More radically than 
most other texts, the Wake challenges us to confront and affirm this absence: to 
keep in mind that actual meaning is not the given, self-evident alternative to what 
is not there. The latter line of thought would return meaning to the logic of 
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essential meaning, reappearing in the guise of pragmatism. Actual meaning, 
instead, is produced by the act of interpretation. And in the case of the Wake, 
actual meaning includes the impossible meaning of a signification that should not 
even be taking place: the signification of non-words. 
This impossible and yet persistent signification urges us to accept actual 
meaning as non-essential. It urges us to do so even if this means tolerating 
considerable anxiety. And this demand, in turn, can be associated with Shem. 
Joyce opposes Shem’s role as the Wake’s Penman to Shaun’s fetishizing of clarity, 
visibility, and the materiality of the signifier’s surface. In the following chapter, I 
will show that in his creative production, Shem readily embraces the very origins 
of anxiety. I will furthermore argue that in outlining Shem’s precarious method, 
Joyce is in part commenting on his own writing, and on the attitude that Finnegans 
Wake adopts regarding the anxiety of language. In Shem the Penman and in the 
chapter known as “Shem the Penman,” the Wake can be seen to give us the 
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Shaun: the anxiety of language 
In the closing section of the previous chapter, I argue that Finnegans Wake 
identifies anxiety as a key factor in signification. The text combines meaning and 
shame in such a way as to suggest that reading is in part a constant struggle against 
an inevitable yet shameful failure. In the present chapter, I will widen the scope of 
my examination to include the position of the writer, represented in the Wake by 
Shaun’s counterpart Shem. I will argue that Shem’s presence in Finnegans Wake 
subverts what I identify as Shaun’s phallogocentric perspective. This subversion, 
however, does not contrast Shaun’s position with a “proper” agenda on the part 
of Shem – an endeavour that could only reduplicate logocentrism. Rather, Joyce 
allows anxiety to inform the role of both reader and writer, in a manner that 
undercuts their distinction. 
In the first half of the present chapter, I examine section I.7. of Finnegans 
Wake, known as “Shem the Penman.” I.7 is a curious and somewhat disturbing 
entry in the corpus of Joyce’s writing about literary creation and, by extension, 
about his own task as an author. The entirety of “Shem the Penman,” bar a 
dialogue at the end, comprises a marathon tirade in which a Shaun-type narrator 
vilifies Shem. There is a transgressive quality to the fierceness of the attack. Take 
the chapter’s most infamous image, that of Shem making “synthetic ink and 
sensitive paper for his own end out of his wit’s waste” (185.7-8) and writing “over 
every square inch of the only foolscap available, his own body” (185.35-6). 
Whether or not we take this to be a factual representation (whatever this may 
mean in the context of the Wake) of the Penman’s creative process, the 
description opens up a space of scatological imagery that is troubling even by this 
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text’s standards. Yet this passage is but the capstone of an assault suspiciously 
relentless and markedly repellent throughout. 
It is this constitutive excess that I want to examine here. Shaun’s attack is 
an exercise in wilful superfluity that, from the start, raises questions about its own 
purpose and validity. From the first paragraph on, the narrator admits to what may 
well be libel – he openly acknowledges that he is “[p]utting truth and untruth 
together” (169.8-9) – and flaunts a self-congratulatory elitism that does not recoil 
from sneering at Shem’s diet, largely based on canned goods (“So low was he that 
he preferred Gibsen’s teatime salmon tinned, as inexpensive as pleasing” [170.26-
7]), or from poking fun at his status as a social pariah (“he had been toed out of all 
the schicker families” [181.3-4]). Derisive remarks about Shem’s appearance, 
manners, and views are thrown in everywhere for good measure. 
All of this must raise the question why Shaun’s attack on Shem is given 
prominence in the text – that is to say, what this chapter conveys other than the 
twins’ enmity, which is arguably presented in more intricate fashion in other parts 
of the book. To explore this aspect of Shaun’s outburst, it will not suffice to gloss 
the various insults. A different approach is needed if we are to pay due attention 
to the chapter’s inquiry into the position of the writer. More than anything else, 
this approach needs to take into consideration the distress that manifests itself in 
the conspicuous vehemence with which Shaun is making, or indeed not making, 
his point. For it is through his forcefulness that Shaun becomes himself drawn into 
a mode of expression that is governed by irrationality and chaos. 
I will read Shaun’s distress with a view to what I have introduced as the 
anxiety of language, though we will presently see that I am taking some liberty in 
the use of that term, “anxiety.” In the previous chapter, I relate anxiety to the 
indecent, non-essential character of meaning. Here, I will expand on it as a sense 
of being stuck, a certain paralysis arising from the fact that there is no 
differentiated way of using language, no application of language that proceeds 
cautiously and reflects on its own effects, that would not, in this very gesture, 
introduce more obstacles between itself and the goal of precision. As I have 
already indicated, the defining contrast between Shem and Shaun that emerges 
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through the anxiety of language is not a conflict between such categories as 
Shem’s madness or weakness and Shaun’s rationality or severity. Instead, the 
chasm that divides them in this respect is Shem’s acceptance and Shaun’s denial 
of an affective dimension neither of them can evade. 
Take the scene in chapter II.2 in which the brothers attempt to solve a 
geometry problem that forms part of their homework. If Joyce’s punning on 
Shem’s name throughout the Wake indicates that he can be identified with shame 
and non-essential meaning (sham), this section demonstrates Shem’s own 
acceptance of that which he cannot understand and which therefore constitutes 
a shameful distortion of phallogocentric certainty. Here is the task the twins have 
to solve: “Problem ye ferst, construct ann aquilittoral dryankle Probe 
loom!” (286.19-20). The equilateral triangle being the Wake’s siglum for ALP, this 
geometrical construction is yet another case of the phallocentric logic that aligns 
ALP’s nudity with truth. Shaun, who here appears as Kev, is unable to solve the 
problem: “Oikkont, ken you, ninny? asks Kev” (286.26-7). He subsequently appeals 
to Shem: “Oc, tell it to oui, do, Sem!” (286.30). In the process of explaining the 
solution to him (the diagram on page 293), Shem, appearing as Dolph, also draws 
ALP’s genitalia, or illustrates how Shaun could get a look at ALP naked: “we 
carefully, if she pleats, lift by her seam […] the maidsapron of our A.L.P. […] And 
this is what you'll say. […] plain for you now, […] the no niggard spot of her safety 
vulve, first of all usquiluteral threeingles” (297.7-27). When Shem unveils ALP’s 
nudity, what he reveals is the site of symbolic castration. It is a locus of Shaun’s 
lack of knowledge (of anatomical knowledge / of the answer to the geometry 
problem), and thus a locus that even as it formalises and apparently controls 
Shaun’s defeat also confirms this defeat. 
As the upholder of the phallogocentric view, Shaun promptly reacts to this 
revelation with the appropriate Freudian anxiety, which he enacts in the form of 
aggressiveness against Shem. In a phrase that echoes Cain’s murder of Abel in 
Genesis (“And Cain was very wroth” [Gen. 4.5]), we read: “And Kev was wreathed 
with his pother” (303.15). Shem, by contrast, does not appear the least bit 
agitated by ALP’s otherness from himself and from Shaun. This does not change 
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the fact that the scene is conveyed from an exclusively male perspective that 
conceives of femininity as difference. But within this phallocentric framework, 
Shem’s reaction does not follow the lines of logocentric reasoning. What is 
unveiled to the twins is – to them – otherness. Shem, however, shows no desire 
to veil or censure the presence of the unknown. Hence, in this instance, his 
untypical role (Shem being more often identified with the wrongdoing of Cain) as 
both Abel and the more able of the two brothers, the one who can solve the task 
at hand. 
Shem’s success with the geometry problem can be read as an example of 
his ability to endorse alterity, an ability that separates him from his brother’s 
anxious need for knowledge and control. In I.7, this need reveals itself to be 
connected to language. That is, the accusations Shaun levels against his brother 
can tell us something about Shaun’s own ideas regarding what language should 
do. If Shem’s discourse does not meet Shaun’s standards, then, from the content 
of Shaun’s criticism, we can surmise that these standards revolve around decency, 
discipline, purity, and hard-edged clarity. By, contrast, Shem’s output is disparaged 
as being intrusive (“unsolicited testimony” [173.30]), full of mistakes (“all the 
different foreign parts of speech he misused” [173.35-6]), unintelligible (“his 
usylessly unreadable Blue Book of Eccles” [179.26-7]), sloppy (“every splurge on 
the vellum he blundered” [179.30-1]), offensive (“nameless 
shamelessness” [182.14]), chaotic (“messes of mottage” [183.22-3]), or plain 
repellent (“obscene matter” [185.30]). 
Throughout, this general lowness of discourse is linked to Shem’s social 
and material situation – the position of the outsider who lives in a ruined house, 
eats poor food, works surrounded by litter, and writes on his own skin for lack of 
paper. Perhaps the most significant fusion of the motifs of littering and impure 
writing occurs when Shaun describes Shem’s house, “known as the haunted 
inkbottle” (182.30-1). In Shem’s workshop, “[t]he warped flooring of the lair and 
soundconducting walls thereof, to say nothing of the uprights and imposts, were 
persianly literatured” (183.8-10). The very surfaces of the house are littered with 
literature; they are written all over in an intricate manner reminiscent of a Persian 
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carpet. It is in the context of this description that we also encounter the chapter’s 
central image, that of Shem’s own body serving as “the only foolscap 
available” (185.35-6), on which he writes with ink made from his own excrement. 
These descriptions suggest that, as far as Shaun is concerned, Shem’s 
artistic production can be deemed categorically unsound. Not only does his writing 
take place in filth and chaos, Shem’s habits also betray a disorder in the sense of a 
mania or “pseudostylic shamiana” (181.36-182.1). There is some psychological 
realism to this conflation of exteriority and interiority. In “An Obsession with 
Plenitude,” Patrick Moran points out that “Shem’s living area, which has become 
unlivable because of his failure to discard seemingly valueless objects, closely 
resembles the spaces created by compulsive hoarders” (285). That Shaun’s 
narration aligns Shem’s compulsive behaviour with the latter’s writing therefore 
suggests a permeability at multiple levels: an interaction between Shem’s mental 
space, his surroundings, and his literary output. With regard to Shaun’s statement 
that Shem is “writing the mystery of himsel in furniture” (184.9-10), that Shem’s 
surroundings are formed or altered by his writing of his self, Moran comments 
that, in turn, “Shem’s selfhood is inscribed in or understood through the 
associative networks of the hoarded objects that surround him” (299). This 
reciprocity, the notion that Shem not only expresses himself through the creative 
process in which he engages, but is also defined by this process, is important to 
my discussion. I will argue that the writing Shem produces indeed leaves its mark 
on him, both physically and psychologically. 
Yet if Shaun wishes to dismiss Shem’s practice on the basis of its 
transgressive character, Shaun’s discourse gets caught up in its own form of manic 
behaviour. There is an illogical and self-defeating side to his performance, which 
begins by stating in the very first paragraph that its target’s “back life will not stand 
being written about in black and white” (169.7-8), and which then proceeds to 
engage with that life for what adds up to the better part of twenty pages. Shaun 
appears to repeatedly postpone the moment when his point will finally have been 
made. He propels himself forward with exclamations such as “Aint that swell, 
hey?” (171.29), “Be that as it may” (182.4), and “O, by the way, yes, another thing 
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occurs to me” (190.10). Although he arguably wishes to defend a discursive ideal 
based on clarity and control, his own outburst thus has him frantically pile up 
accusations in a manner that betrays nothing if not his own irrationality. The more 
this excessiveness fashions Shaun’s condemnation of Shem for not being the 
polite, coherent, and comprehensible writer Shaun implicitly posits as the ideal 
manifestation of that role, the more it becomes apparent that Shaun’s own 
narrative falls massively short of these attributes. 
My contention is that this contradiction is not incidental, but should be 
read as crucial to Joyce’s portrayal of what I refer to as the anxiety of language. 
Before continuing my reading of “Shem the Penman,” I will therefore specify how 
I use this term. I should begin by clarifying that, in the way I employ it, “anxiety” is 
an expression borrowed from Lacan, but intended more to tap into Lacan’s 
topology of intelligibility and distortion than to convey the actual extremes of 
phobia and other states of anxiety in the precise psychoanalytic sense (without 
abandoning, however, the thought that Lacan’s approach can tell us a lot about 
why a confrontation with certain texts – including Joyce’s and, at a different level, 
Shem’s – appears to be quite an unnerving experience for some readers). 
Anxiety indicates an impasse and an increase in intensity: an incessant and 
increasingly frantic circling around something the subject can neither grasp nor 
turn their back on, something they have as little power to resolve as to abandon. 
In some ways, this is how Freud already defines the term. In Inhibitions, Symptoms 
and Anxiety, he revises his earlier analysis of anxiety as pent-up libido, suggesting 
instead that anxiety is an expectation of helplessness. What brings about the shift 
from realistic anxiety to neurotic anxiety (the latter being what psychoanalysis 
concerns itself with) is a “displacement of the anxiety-reaction from its origin in 
the situation of helplessness to an expectation of that situation” (167). That is, 
anxiety is less a confrontation with something that renders the subject helpless 
than it is an unspecified but intense dread of such a confrontation: neurotic 
anxiety, writes Freud “is anxiety about an unknown danger” (165). In other words, 
anxiety “has a quality of indefiniteness and lack of object” (165). 
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Lacan’s account is a reworking of this theory that inverts its main point. 
Emphasising the failure to control the object through codification, as early as the 
second instalment of his seminar, Lacan links anxiety to “the essential object which 
isn’t an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and 
all categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence” (164). Yet the non-object 
of anxiety, although it cannot be perceived as such, nonetheless makes its 
presence felt. This heralds a difference between Freud and Lacan that is more fully 
developed in Lacan’s pivotal seminar on anxiety. Whereas Freud stipulates that 
fear has an object but anxiety does not, Lacan unequivocally asserts that “anxiety 
is not without an object” (S X 131). Anxiety, in Lacan, is the experience of the real’s 
imperviousness not as an inertia, but as a force that makes itself present: that 
intrudes into our codification of objects and confronts us with “the function of 
lack” (131). Anxiety’s non-object is an object: objet petit a. 
The example Lacan uses to discuss the function of lack in this context (see 
136) is the topology of the Möbius strip that I mention in chapter one. Crucially, 
the distortion that bends this strip into its paradoxical shape is not an effect 
brought about by the insufficiencies of the symbolic order. It is the other way 
around; the distortion is a real formation of the world constituted by the Möbius 
strip, and it is this formation that interferes with its inhabitants’ capacity for 
symbolically codifying the surface along which they travel. Anxiety, then, is the 
result of our becoming aware of this interference: a sudden confrontation with 
the insufficiency of our means of codification. As Lacan puts it, the “sudden 
emergence of lack in a positive form is the source of anxiety” (61, my emphasis). 
In other words, anxiety is generated when the objet petit a actually asserts itself, 
when, as Evans writes, “something appears in the place of this object” (12), so that 
the objet petit a is no longer a placeholder but becomes a presence palpably 
interrupting symbolic codification. 
There is a parallel between, on the one hand, the late Lacanian perspective 
on anxiety that is emerging in the topology of the tenth seminar and, on the other 
hand, Derrida’s Writing and Difference, where a similar symbolic insufficiency 
constitutes a recurring motif from the first page on. Derrida speaks of “an anxiety 
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about language – which can only be an anxiety of language, within language 
itself” (3). He is not using the term in a systematic manner, and certainly not in the 
specific psychoanalytical sense that Lacan gives it. What I want to argue, however, 
is that it is hermeneutically productive – and far from doing violence to Derrida’s 
project – to carry out a Lacanian reading of this motif of Writing and Difference. 
Such a reading takes its cue from the superficial similarity to demonstrate the 
congruence of the underlying arguments, showing that both Lacan and Derrida are 
concerned with the affective dimension of an interruption of codification that 
effectively asserts its own, disconcerting presence. 
Derrida describes the straying of meaning as “the anxiety and the 
wandering of the language always richer than knowledge, the language always 
capable of the movement which takes it further than peaceful and sedentary 
certitude” (73). This movement beyond certitude should not be taken to indicate 
that language is without bounds. The statement needs to be read alongside the 
problem of the desire for certitude. As I demonstrate in chapter one, the logic of 
the trace makes signification possible by projecting essential meaning. Therefore, 
the complete erasure of essential meaning cannot constitute the content of any 
signifying gesture, but only the limit at which signification itself breaks down. 
Within language, the emergence of an ideal of essence is inevitable. What a 
Lacanian reading of this implication of Derrida’s argument brings out is that, if 
essence itself is never present, the ideal of essence should itself be understood as 
a presence, but as a presence that can ultimately only function as the making 
present of the absence of essence. 
What gives rise to what Derrida terms the anxiety of language is not 
language’s free play, but the organisation of this play around a liminal notion of 
stability. This is why Derrida can speak of a “hesitation between writing as 
decentering and writing as an affirmation of play” (297). If there is a hesitation 
here, there must be a difference: decentring and play are not the same thing, for 
the play of language is not without effects of centring. There would be no anxiety 
of language if one could simply “affirm the nonreferral to the center” (297) – which 
is exactly what Derrida is so often taken to be saying. Nor would there be any 
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anxiety if there was a centre outside play, a centre that “closes off the play which 
it opens up and makes possible” (279). What causes anxiety is the necessity of 
negotiating some stability within play: “anxiety is invariably the result of a certain 
mode of being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of being as it 
were at stake in the game from the outset” (279). This mode of being implicated 
is what Derrida calls the trace, and what is crucial here is that the trace does 
double duty as both the signifier’s fictional origin and as the trace structure that 
actually produces the signifier. The trace thus obscures its own origin; yet the very 
process through which it does so – the temporalisation that is differance – strictly 
speaking already reveals the fictional nature of the projected origin, even as it 
situates signification within a certain obligation towards this origin. 
In this, the trace resembles nothing so much as Lacan’s objet petit a, of 
which Žižek writes that it “stands simultaneously for the imaginary fantasmatic 
lure/screen and for that which this lure is obfuscating, for the Void behind the 
lure” (Parallax 304). The trace is a projection, both in the sense of the image that 
is being projected and in the sense of the process of projecting that, when 
examined, reveals the image’s fictionality and the void that the image is covering 
up. And we can now say that, as in Lacan, what Derrida calls the anxiety of 
language results from a transition from the projection’s former aspect to the 
latter, from essence absenting itself to the making-present of this absence, from 
objet petit a as a placeholder to objet petit a as a presence, from the obfuscation 
of the void to a contemplation of the trace structure that confronts us with this 
void and tells us that essence does not exist. 
In reading Derrida in this manner, my objective is not a merely perverse 
alignment of different methodologies. I hold that this approach deviates in a 
meaningful manner from a great number of interpretations that assume Derrida 
denies the possibility of essence in such a way that his position is untroubled by 
the very notion of essence, positing the signifier as simply overflowing with 
meaning. One interpretation that proceeds along these lines is put forward by 
Žižek, for instance in The Sublime Object of Ideology, where he writes that the 
“fundamental gesture” of deconstruction is “to dissolve the substantial identity 
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into a network of non-substantial, differential relations”, and that “the notion of 
symptom is the necessary counterpoint to it, the substance of enjoyment, the real 
kernel around which this signifying interplay is structured” (78). Here and 
elsewhere, Žižek takes Derrida’s approach to be a sort of isotropic networking or 
free-floating relativism. This is certainly a view on Derrida’s work shared by many, 
it is not, however, what is in fact entailed by Derrida’s speaking of the play of 
language. 
As Derrida conceptualises it, the play of language is organised around 
effects of centring, where the centre is that which is not given within language 
itself. Yet the fact that no actual centre can ever be located (that no essential 
meaning can be identified) does not undo this organisation. What it does is to 
indefinitely extend the play, and render it anxiety-inducing, precisely because it 
constitutes a search for a kernel. This dynamic can be approximated, ironically 
enough, through the description Žižek gives of Lacan’s position in “Why Lacan Is 
Not a ‘Post-Structuralist’.” Namely, that the “movement of the signifier is not that 
of a closed circle, but an elliptical movement around a certain void. And the objet 
petit a as the ‘originally lost object,’ as the object which in a way coincides with its 
own loss, is precisely the positivation of this void.” (36, my emphasis). The play or 
movement of language is infinite not because it is all-powerful, but on the contrary 
because it cannot produce its own end. Where the end should be, there is instead 
a confrontation with a void that continues to throw us back onto the trajectory of 
the trace structure: a trajectory both open-ended and tortured by an ideal of 
essence. Žižek is therefore wrong when he states that Derrida’s views on 
signification pass over the difficulties that Lacan formalises in the objet petit a. 
These difficulties are captured in the trace, which is the trace of a centre: a fictional 
echo of essence that, because it is fictional, is poised right between obfuscating 
the absence of essence and making present this absence. 
It is this presence-of-absence that makes Derrida as well as Lacan highly 
relevant to Joyce’s manipulation of desire in Finnegans Wake. They provide us 
with ways of making sense of the tension between the continual frustration of our 
impossible desire for stable meaning and this desire’s undiminished urgency by 
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allowing us to formalise this tension as an anxiety of language. Broadly 
corresponding to the double role of castration as the site of (absent) truth and the 
site of (present) failure, and to the double role of the trace as that which promises 
and that which abolishes essence, there is a double movement of anxiety that 
recoils from any instances of language’s instability and yet is tempted to conduct 
an analysis of them – namely, as of incidental, surmountable shortcomings, as 
opposed to inherent, insurmountable ones. The disclosure, critique, and to some 
extent undoing of this anxious response is what both Lacan and Derrida undertake, 
although they do so according to two very different epistemologies (as we have 
seen in the previous chapter). 
For late Lacan, the task consists in rendering palpable the intrusions of the 
real into the symbolic. For Derrida, it consists in doing justice to the trace. Yet even 
though the trace is the very process of codification and thus seems to correspond 
to the Lacanian symbolic order, Derrida’s insistence that the trace relies on a 
spectral centre is a gesture of making present the impact of something that itself 
absolutely eludes codification. This is to say that even though the thinking of 
differance by definition cannot include the category of the real, it includes much 
of what Lacan analyses as the real’s effects on language. If in Lacan, codification is 
interrupted by its own outside, in Derrida, codification contains its own outside. 
Which is precisely what is also at stake in Joyce’s strategy of bringing us face to 
face with distortion itself, of having us confront the anxiety-inducing manner in 
which, as I argue in chapter one, essence indecently absents itself. 
It should be clear that, in the use it makes of anxiety, my line of argument 
favours structural analogy over a literal application of psychoanalysis – after all, 
few readers respond to the distortions of Joyce’s writing with the full force of a 
phobic reaction or with an actual nervous breakdown. Yet I propose that the 
analogy is sufficiently useful to legitimise such usage: it helps us understand that, 
if language can never access essential meaning, then neither can language go the 
other way and expel from itself the notion of essential meaning altogether. The 
fiction of essence asserts its presence, and what the objet petit a (and the trace) 
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can tell us is that such a fiction is precariously suspended between providing and 
absenting a point of reference for interpretation. 
As I will argue in the following, this is as true of writing as of reading. Our 
search for ever more careful formulations and specific expressions, for instance, 
performs the potentially unending back-and-forth of an anxious deadlock that 
cannot escape the fact that the more we say, the more we open ourselves up to 
the possibility of being misunderstood. Nor can this effect be evaded by means of 
writing less or writing more boldly. Any simplification, where it reserves the right 
to retain some core meaning seemingly stripped of misleading complexity, already 
constitutes a return to the anxious striving for minimal precision. Yet this is not to 
say that our reading and writing are exclusively anxiety-inducing activities; that 
this is not the case is evident from our capacity to enjoy texts. 
Lacan’s and Derrida’s – and as we will see, Joyce’s – analyses of language 
find in it a certain irreducible element of anxiety that is important since it makes 
sense of language’s refusal to be controlled. A certain unpredictability tends to 
wrench even highly inspired writing and highly devoted reading away from their 
intentions, subjecting them to development. That it is effectively in doing so that 
language’s instability proves productive is not a contrast to its being anxiety-
inducing. On the contrary, it is how I would apply to language Lacan’s statement 
that “it may well be from anxiety that action borrows its certainty” (S X 77). In 
flights of creativity, in sudden leaps of exegetical insight, we do not so much 
conquer or neutralise language’s unpredictability as tap into it. Again Lacan: “To 
act is to snatch from anxiety its certainty. To act is to bring about a transfer of 
anxiety” (77). As we have seen in the previous chapter, to partake in signification 
is to find yourself in the presence of something you cannot completely grasp, and 
then to act by nevertheless articulating a response to this presence. 
It is such a presence and such a response that we see at work in the case 
of Shaun’s attack on Shem. Shem’s writing, to Shaun, is an unbearable distortion: 
it is the making-present of everything about language that Shaun’s phallogocentric 
position holds in abjection. In other words, Shem’s literary output serves for Shaun 
the function of something appearing in the place of objet petit a, as Evans puts it. 
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And by circling around this appearance with morbid fascination, Shaun’s attack 
stages for us the logic of an anxiety that, in reacting to the stain or gash where the 
symbolic breaks down, proves unable to quite get past this blemish and can only 
respond to it in a manner that, in some way or other, re-inscribes the breakdown 
onto the very response. 
In Shaun’s case, the re-inscription takes on an extreme form; if Shaun 
demands control, clarity, precision, and so on, his own production may not only 
discredit what he puts forward, it can be read as demonstrating the opposite of 
his claims to be the case. This is to say that in “Shem the Penman,” Shaun serves 
not only as the creative figure’s counterpart; in generating a (spoken or written) 
discourse about Shem, Shaun himself takes on the role of an author. The 
precipitation to which he falls prey in this role contributes key insights to the 
chapter’s investigation into the creative process. In particular, Shaun’s 
ferociousness can be read as enacting the curious logic whereby the attempt to 
impose stability on language is the very thing that reproduces the anxiety of 
language. 
In a different form, this logic may also contribute to our own reactions to 
“Shem the Penman.” When we read the chapter as one prolonged instance of 
irony in which Joyce, although he speaks through Shaun, also speaks against him 
and thus remains at a distance from him, we effectively give in to the temptation 
to preserve an ideal of authority: in this case personified in the figure of Joyce who 
remains authoritative precisely by being dissociated from Shaun’s flawed 
discourse. However, we can do so only at the cost of not taking said discourse 
seriously. This problem is tangible, for example, in interpretations that focus on 
identifying I.7’s sources, since among these, hostile reactions to Joyce’s work 
(which the initiated reader of Joyce can be expected to disagree with) figure large. 
With regard to Joyce’s use of this material, there is a tradition of biographical 
contextualisation that takes its cue from Tindall’s categorical declaration that 
“Shaun embodies all disapproval of Joyce” (132). The fascinating notion of Joyce 
speaking through Shaun and against Shaun is thus narrowed to an approach that 
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engages only the latter half of this dynamic and that radically separates Joyce from 
Shaun. 
Let me give just two brief examples of this approach. In Joyce’s Web, Norris 
puts forward an interpretation that is intriguing, and indeed strongly points in the 
direction of the kind of reading I want to attempt here, but that also encounters 
some of the limitations resulting from reading I.7 as ironical. Norris ventures that 
“[th]e writing of the chapter – in its abandonment of modernistic scrupulosity and 
clarity – becomes itself tenemental, full of junk, filth, brokenness, and 
squalor” (83). However, rather than examining the profusion of these elements in 
what is simultaneously Shaun’s discourse and Joyce’s, Norris reads them as 
undermining a position from which Joyce is distancing himself: “the relationship 
between modernism’s obsession with form and modernist notions of class” (70). 
Even though she identifies the chapter’s language as one of its salient features, 
and even though she posits that “’Shem the Penman’ greatly exceeds any personal 
counterattack against Joyce’s critics, or any purely local exercise of 
ressentiment” (93), the interpretative focus she adopts on Joyce’s mocking of 
classist attitudes leads Norris to read the chapter as an attack whose scope, 
though not personal, is essentially defined by the attitudes to be mocked. 
For a more recent example, consider Ingeborg Landuyt’s “Cain-Ham-
(Shem)-Esau-Jim the Penman,” the section on I.7 in How Joyce Wrote Finnegans 
Wake. Having commented on various parodies of his critics that Joyce 
incorporates into the text, Landuyt proposes: 
The result of Joyce’s accumulations is a quite recognizable 
description and condemnation of his person and his methods as 
seen through the eyes of his critics that simultaneously should be 
read as his defense. (159) 
I fully subscribe to the idea that “Shem the Penman” is a portrayal of Joyce, and 
that it constitutes a defence of his art as well as his refutation of his critics. I would 
go so far as to say that no reading could make much sense of Shaun’s spouting 
rage without these assumptions. Yet the phrase “as seen through the eyes of his 
critics” puts a problematic spin on things. For it posits that in defending Joyce’s 
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method, “Shem the Penman” portrays this method from what amounts to a 
second-hand and second-rate perspective. We are thus transported from an 
intriguing problem – that Joyce’ own voice and the voice of Shaun appear to 
coexist in the same narration – to a position that is content to posit that Shaun’s 
outburst has little to offer beyond historical trivia about Joyce and his detractors. 
In thus dismissing Shaun’s aggressiveness, we get ahead of ourselves and 
abandon, before having accounted for it, the complex mode of Joyce’s defence: 
the intersection of multiple points of view through which “Shem the Penman” 
depicts the writer at work. We effectively keep Shaun’s failure at a distance, and 
thus we reproduce his anxious mode of criticism which bars him (and us) from 
perceiving that Shem’s (and Shaun’s) writing may enact for us something about 
the inevitability of writing’s failure. At the level of this enactment, Shaun’s 
viciousness and eagerness are no longer opposed to Joyce’s own position; they 
can be seen to put this position into practice. 
 
Shem: the peril of writing 
In order to argue that what is at stake in “Shem the Penman” is indeed Joyce’s 
staging of the anxiety of language, I will now turn to what provokes Shaun’s anger 
in the first place: Shem’s writing. By its very nature, Shem’s text appears to be a 
manifestation of complete introversion. It remains with him and around him, 
surrounding him as an inscription on the walls of his house, on his furniture, and 
on his own body. It forms what would appear to be the private archive of a private 
mania. And the fact that this literary output does not reach the public sphere – 
does not, in fact, reach a single reader except for Shem himself – must again raise 
the question of why Shem’s writing should provoke as much of Shaun’s venom as 
it does. 
Shaun’s account undergoes a tell-tale moment of self-contradiction when 
he accuses Shem of the intention to “study with stolen fruit how cutely to copy all 
their various styles of signature so as one day to utter an epical forged cheque on 
the public for his own private profit” (181.14-17). One page further on, Shaun adds 
110 
 
the question: “how very many piously forged palimpsests slipped in the first place 
by this morbid process from his pelagiarist pen?” (182.2-3). What is striking is that 
the mode of these two misdemeanours, forgery and plagiarism, is necessarily 
public. Neither plagiarism nor forgery are of any consequence unless the 
perpetrator convinces a sufficient number of people of his or her authority either 
to claim the rights to an object’s production (plagiarism) or to assert its 
authenticity (forgery). On the one hand, we are thus given a depiction of Shem’s 
manner of writing in which he remains within his own four walls to scribble over 
every available surface, including parts of his own body. On the other hand, we 
are presented with the image of him forging cheques and other documents in 
order to get them into circulation. And although these are not mutually exclusive 
activities, as descriptions of the sort of literary output Shem produces, they do 
appear to be conflicting. 
The crucial move in aligning these two images is to relate them to Shaun’s 
phallogocentric outlook. In both descriptions, Shem can be seen to violate the 
ideas of essentiality and authority that Shaun is propagating. Shaun’s 
understanding of a writer’s authority, to which he unfavourably compares his 
brother, seems to cast the artist as the sole origin of a work that at no point of the 
creative process is outside its maker’s express command. When referred to such 
an understanding of the artist, the two accusations made against Shem, 
plagiarism/forgery and introspective obsession, cease to conflict and take on the 
form of complementary images for Shem’s readiness to be transformed both by 
the discourses that surround him and by those he produces himself – which is to 
say: his readiness to surrender mastery over these discourses. As Attridge remarks 
in Peculiar Language, Shaun “mistrusts Shem’s writing on the grounds of its 
dispersal of meaning through ruses and plagiarism” (214). 
Shem’s thefts, ruses, and borderline insanity amount to a reinvention of 
the position of the artist as a position not of sublime expression of selfhood, nor 
of an approximation of objective truth, but as a position of ongoing, productive, 
and dangerous negotiation. In defiance of logocentric notions of stability, Shem is 
not the origin of his own discourse. Yet if Shem’s words are never truly his own, it 
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is not because he derives them from some store of already perfected expression 
either. He is the place of the formation of a discourse that is but a forgery: already 
borrowed, already inauthentic, and thus already stained with the paradoxes of re-
appropriation and re-authentication that are the paradoxes of language. What 
Shem’s out-of-control writing method exemplifies is that the act of writing brings 
forth what it sets down in a process of invention and negotiation that exceeds any 
settled knowledge because it inevitably has to confront the unavailability of 
essence and therefore language’s division from stability. Compare, for instance, 
the passage that describes Shem using “his own individual person” (186.3) in order 
to describe life in general, forging his personal experience “into a dividual 
chaos” (186.4-5). In the movement that leads from the undividable self of the 
writer as subject or “individual” to the expression of his or her views, this 
expression becomes “dividual:” divisible, divided from itself. Being expressed, it 
enters iterability, it is divided from its ideal essence. 
In this view, Shem’s mode of production closely corresponds to another 
remark of Derrida’s in Writing and Difference: 
To write is to know that what has not yet been produced within 
literality has no other dwelling place, does not await us as 
prescription in some topos ouranios or some divine understanding. 
Meaning must await being said or written in order to inhabit 
itself (11). 
In the process of writing, as in the process of reading, there is straying from 
purpose, a structurally necessary element of this process’s inadequacy to itself. 
Meaning is not produced through evocation of some already given understanding, 
but through a confrontation with what in chapter one I describe as the real kernel 
of language’s productivity. Shem’s work can be seen to exemplify this 
confrontation: like the Derridean or Lacanian subject, Shem is not so much a 
wielder of language – a language expressing an already settled meaning – as he is 
wielded by it. 
This destabilises not only his literary output, but also his own self. For 
discourse, as Thurston writes, belongs “to the Other: in other words, it is  
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drastically at odds with the ego’s urge to achieve final semantic self-
appropriation” (James Joyce 94). Indeed, Shem is deeply and dangerously involved 
in his literary production, to the extent of being himself transformed by it as out-
of-control bits of language come to be inscribed on his own self. He writes and he 
is written upon, which is to say that his schizophrenic split between active and 
passive attitudes is also represented by the fact that his own body provides his 
paper and his ink. He is both the writer and the written, as his physical self extends 
into writing both in the sense of the inscription that applies ink and in the sense of 
the document that receives ink. 
Insofar as Shem can be identified with Joyce, Shem’s active/passive 
enmeshment in borrowed language corresponds in particular to Joyce’s use of 
non-words, through which his own writing undergoes a demonstrative break with 
the notion of setting down undistorted meaning. In Imagining Joyce and Derrida, 
Mahon argues that the rampant borrowing that takes place in Joyce’s networks of 
allusions “destroys the traditional oppositions of true/false, owned/stolen, and so 
on, and dislocates the eidetic model where a text’s meaning would be guaranteed 
through an author’s animating intention or will” (349). By writing in a manner that 
does not try to limit the straying of language, to evade it or find a reasonably 
secure spot within it, but that instead puts the straying to artistic use, Joyce 
undercuts notions of the author as an active figure: a figure of absolute control. 
Finnegans Wake would thus appear to perform the only way out of the 
deadlock of anxiety; namely, to acknowledge the non-existence of essential 
meaning and to enter the Shem-type wager that writing can be at its most 
powerful and most productive where it most embraces risk and instability. Yet 
what is crucial is that not even this solution can evade the anxiety of language. It 
can merely decide to inhabit anxiety. I argue, above and in chapter one, that no 
negotiation, no analysis, no signifying gesture of any kind can get underway 
without entrusting itself to the imaginary ideal of essential meaning. Therefore, in 
order to produce any text at all, a Shem-type sacrifice of mastery must be 
breached by a Shaun-type desire for expression. Which is to say that in Shem’s 
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mode of literary production, the anxiety displayed by Shaun must already be at 
work. 
The binary opposition between Shem and Shaun is thus complicated by an 
element of correspondence and interdependence. Here, I take my impetus from 
Finn Fordham’s Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake, where Fordham suggests that 
“Joyce’s characters can be seen to embody principles of the various processes of 
writing and rewriting” (217), and that 
Shaun’s attack on Shem is partly Joyce’s self-critique, objectifying 
the self that criticizes and reformulates his very writing, according 
to opposing principles. Artists are the first critics of their own work. 
Self-judgement which predicts criticism may be a painful part of the 
creative process. The opposition of Shem and Shaun is a means for 
producing the identity of opposites in the work, something 
produced by revision, and a correlative for auto-critique. (221) 
However, I would emphasise that we cannot imagine this process of dialectical 
opposition as one freely at the writer’s disposal. Auto-critique (what I describe as 
Shem taking on attributes of Shaun, being drawn into the task of communication), 
does not come into being solely on the basis of a sovereign decision to anticipate 
one’s future critics. Nor does auto-critique end when all objections the critical self 
predicts have been taken into account by the creative self. For it is precisely in 
attempting to exhaust this kind of prediction that auto-critique indefinitely 
rekindles itself (in the terms introduced above: Shaun’s anxious rage reproducing 
Shem’s lack of control). 
Auto-critique necessarily accompanies writing. It cannot end before 
writing ends. If writing cannot take place outside a framework that projects the 
ideal of absolute precision, and if absolute precision can never be achieved, then 
the respective positions of Shem (mutability, production) and Shaun (essentiality) 
must be thought as each being in part defined and brought into existence by the 
presence of the other, in a manner that renders impossible their complete 
separation or merging. Just as anxiety introduces itself, in the form of Shem-type 
mania, into Shaun-type evasions of language’s paradoxes, so it insinuates itself 
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into Shem-type scepticism, in the form of a Shaun-type longing for clarity. The 
process of writing, although it is necessarily interrupted at some point by external 
means, cannot therefore be interrupted by that which would put an end to the 
need for revision: by finding an identity between Shem and Shaun that would lay 
to rest the productiveness of their difference. Short of this possibility, writing 
remains, as the Wake puts it: “That letter selfpenned to one’s other, that 
neverperfect everplanned” (489.33-4) – an on-going work that continues to fall 
short of its perfect form, and that therefore continues to divide the one who 
produces it, pitching them against their other. 
Correspondingly, the motif of the twins’ inseparability balances that of 
their conflict throughout the Wake, though not in the mode of a neat fusion. 
Instead, they are continually mixed up or amalgamated in ways that preserve 
some contrast between them, for instance in the combination of a tree or 
“stem” (216.3; Shem) and a “stone” (216.4; Shaun) into Tristan: “a Treestone with 
one Ysold” (113.19). In “Shem the Penman,” the dialogue at the end of the chapter 
hints in a different manner at the impossibility of thinking the twins in the singular. 
It introduces them as “JUSTIUS (to himother)” (187.24) and “MERCIUS (of 
hisself)” (193.31), creating a tension between a sense of speaking to the other and 
one of speaking to oneself (and also performing a substitution and distribution 
that splits the word “himself” in half). However, their blending is not a complete 
synthesis, as the pronouns’ suspension between identity, exchangeability, and 
separation indicates. There remains, as we read directly below the introduction of 
Mercius, “a convulsionary sense of not having been or being all that I might have 
been or you meant to becoming” (193.35-6). As the writer is divided, he or she is 
also transformed by a restless striving to restore unity. Thus, regarding another 
reiteration of the biblical fratricide motif, “And each was wrought with his 
other” (252.14), Roy Benjamin points out that, “[b]y combining the murderous 
rage of Cain towards Abel (and Cain was wroth with his brother) with the synthesis 
of each with the other, Joyce suggest a never-ending oscillation between conflict 
and resolution” (218). 
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The true peril of Shem’s position expresses itself in the fact that he cannot 
be imagined on his own, diametrically opposed to, or indeed absolutely identical 
with, his brother Shaun. He is caught in the Lacanian “paradoxical topology of self 
and other” (Thurston, James Joyce 119). The one always depends on the other, 
and this co-dependence also means that neither of the twins’ identities is ever 
truly settled. I would argue that this is also how we should understand Derrida’s 
proposition, regarding a footnote in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” that he can be taken to 
refer to his own essay when, in this footnote, he speaks of “the whole of that 
essay, as will quickly become apparent, being itself nothing but a reading of 
Finnegans Wake“ (88 n.20). 
In “Two Words For Joyce,” the text in which Derrida makes this suggestion 
– the suggestion that “that essay” may be taken to mean “Plato’s Pharmacy” itself 
– he also specifies, in a remark not always noted in discussions of this claim, that 
it is “between Shem and Shaun, between the penman and the postman,” that 
Finnegans Wake stages “the whole scene of the pharmakos, the pharmakon” (28). 
Derrida is not speaking, then, of reading Finnegans Wake in any general sense; it 
is specifically to the twins’ paradoxical interdependence that he relates the scene 
of the impossibility of deciding between opposites inhabiting the same gesture (as 
with the meanings of Greek “pharmakon”): that is, the impossibility of separating 
“the medicine from the poison, the good from the evil, the true from the false, the 
inside from the outside, the vital from the mortal, the first from the second, 
etc.” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 169). 
This is a relevant interpretation to bring to Finnegans Wake. Joyce’s text 
insists that it is impossible to strictly separate Shem from Shaun. It moreover 
unambiguously identifies Shem and Shaun as penman and postman, making clear 
that what is at stake in this inseparability is indeed the relation between the writer 
and the reader. When we engage the numerous moments in the Wake at which 
the twins exchange places, come to overlap, or collapse into a split identity, we 
should not lose sight of the fact that they are assigned these roles: creator and 
carrier, writer and reader. These characterisations mean that the twins’ perilous 
co-dependence, which is never quite a synthesis, is the Wake’s explicit 
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representation of a mutability and reciprocity of the activities of reading and 
writing. 
 
Shem and Shaun: negotiations 
The position of the writer as Joyce depicts it in Shem and Shaun is one that cannot 
keep the anxiety of language at a distance, nor respond to it as to something that 
assails language from the outside. This has crucial consequences for interpretative 
authority. If the task of the writer necessitates the writer’s division from himself 
or herself, then the process of writing will always complicate the ideal of the 
author as masterfully orchestrating her or his work. To make one more reference 
to Writing and Difference: “The ‘subject’ of writing does not exist if we mean by 
that some sovereign solitude of the author. […] Within that scene, on that stage, 
the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found” (226-7). Instead, 
writing is from the outset caught up in the struggle between “the author who 
reads” (227), who reads what she writes in an attempt to turn herself into her first 
reader and anticipate interpretation, and “the first reader who dictates” (227), this 
being, I would suggest, an anticipated reader, a construct inhabited by the author, 
yet possessing the power to dictate, to interfere with what should have been the 
straightforwardness of the writing process. In this interference, the ideal writer, 
solitary and sovereign, disappears from sight together with the ideal written. What 
we are left with is a process of pre-emptive negotiation that always remains 
dangerous, in the sense that this process will tend to wrench the writer from 
whatever they originally thought their purpose was (before they thought about it 
by actually writing about it). As soon as writing is begun, it turns from the setting 
down of a single subject’s thoughts into a negotiation between several 
perspectives: a negotiation fraught with all the risks that iterability introduces into 
transitions between different positions. The writer is already a reader, and writing 
is thus a process that takes place in the absence of essence, insofar as the writer, 




We need to ask what happens to our reading of any text – but particularly 
a text like Finnegans Wake, which makes many of these mechanisms into its own 
subject matter – if the position of the writer is already divided in such a way as to 
suggest that not even a text’s author has complete mastery over its meaning. 
Here, we can turn to Derrida’s examination of a related constellation of 
reversibility and dictation. In The Post Card, Derrida explores the positions of 
writer and reader through the image reproduced on the eponymous postcard, 
which shows a thirteenth-century illumination, by Matthew Paris, of Plato and 
Socrates. What interests Derrida about this depiction is that it presents the 
philosophers in what appears to be a reversal of their customary roles. In Paris’s 
illustration, Socrates is portrayed as “the one who writes – seated, bent over, a 
scribe or docile copyist,” and thus appearing as “Plato’s secretary” (9). Plato, on 
the other hand, is shown standing behind Socrates, with his finger raised in a 
manner that makes him look “like he is indicating something, designating, showing 
the way or giving an order – or dictating, authoritarian, masterly, imperious” (10). 
Derrida suggests that this inversion, which threatens to undo chronology and 
hierarchy in one fell swoop, can be seen as a paradoxical illustration of the fact 
that we know Socrates’s philosophy chiefly from the writings of Plato. For this 
means precisely that Plato is not the scribe, but the one who dictates. Plato “has 
made him [Socrates] write whatever he [Plato] wanted while pretending to receive 
it from him” (12, and see 146). 
Plato can effectively be understood to ventriloquize his teacher. I take this 
term from Derrida’s “Literature in Secret,” where he comments on a section in 
Franz Kafka’s Letter to His Father in which Kafka himself formulates his father’s 
possible response. Derrida asks: 
What does this spectral father say to Franz Kafka, to his son who 
makes him speak like this, as a ventriloquist, at the end of his Letter 
to His Father, lending him his voice or allowing him to speak but at 
the same time dictating what he says, making him write a letter to 
his son in response to his own, as a sort of fiction within the 
fiction? (134, my emphasis) 
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The point here is not that the Socrates we know from Plato’s writings may be a 
fiction. It is rather to investigate the attributes such a fiction would possess – 
attributes that are of interest because Plato’s (imagined and perhaps imaginary) 
method is a model for any number of interactions with the past, including the acts 
of reading and of writing an interpretation. In creating his dialogues, Plato would 
appear to set down what he wants, and bestow authority on it by claiming to have 
received it from an authoritative source. Yet this manoeuvre changes nothing 
about the fact that the authority in question remains with Socrates. 
If Plato’s writing can partake in this authority, it is because, nominally, Plato 
receives the text from Socrates – a claim that destabilises identities on both sides. 
In this scenario, Plato’s dialogues would give their author a certain freedom to re-
invent Socrates, to efface him and take his place. Yet this freedom comes at the 
price of Plato being in turn effaced by his invention, of being supplanted by the 
fiction whose voice we hear in the dialogues. Plato, Derrida writes, “has 
succeeded, moreover, by inventing Socrates for his own glory, in permitting 
himself to be somewhat eclipsed by his character” (49). The inventor is eclipsed 
by her or his invention, her fiction, her character. For this character, once 
invented, makes demands that must be fulfilled if the creation is to have any 
credibility. Far from possessing unrestricted control over the ensuing dialogue, the 
ventriloquist has to speak in character if the act of ventriloquism is to make its 
proper impression. 
I propose to relate this problem of finding an appropriate voice to the point 
about reading as an act of invention discussed in chapter one. Interpretation must 
not abandon the text, but due to iterability, it cannot hope to pronounce the text’s 
essential meaning. The only option left, then, is to speak in character: to speak in 
a manner that aims to do justice to the text even as one is aware that what is said 
nevertheless originates with the interpretation. If the ventriloquism performed in 
interpretation is successful (which is ultimately decided by the interpretation’s 
reader, but which also depends on the achievement of its writer), it results not in 
arbitrary dictation, but in a destabilisation of identities on both sides such that it 
will become genuinely difficult to locate where the voice in question is coming 
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from. It will become difficult even for the one producing the interpretation. For 
interpretation, like any creative process, can produce unexpected results and 
divide itself from what its originator intended it to be. In the attempt to remain in 
character, the writer of an interpretation will therefore scan her or his output from 
the reverse angle, as it were. This writer, too, is already his or her first reader – 
and subject to the effects of ventriloquism, hearing the voice of the interpreted 
author in what is in fact the writing of the interpreting author (and never the 
essence of the interpreted text), and hearing this voice in the very reading that 
would test the authenticity of what is being said. Authenticity is displaced by the 
interpretative activity that would access it and communicate it in a new form. 
Like Joyce’s Shem and Shaun, Derrida’s Socrates and Plato exemplify that 
the roles of writer and reader cannot be neatly detached from one another. “S. is 
part of p. who is but a piece in S.” (132). Each one a necessary element of the 
identity of the other, the figures in these pairs become impossible to separate, yet 
they are neither indistinguishable nor interchangeable. Least of all are they parts 
of the monotony of a synthesis. “They are each a part of the other but not of the 
whole” (132), interdependent in a manner that precludes wholeness and closure: 
“p + S does not make any whole” (132). They are also as impossible to put in any 
kind of order (chronological, hierarchical, etc.) as the two sides of a postcard: 
“What I prefer, about post cards, is that one does not know what is in front or 
what is in back, […] the Plato or the Socrates, recto or verso. Nor what is the most 
important, the picture or the text, […] reversibility unleashes itself, goes 
mad” (13). Each already contains the other, which means that we cannot simply 
reverse the conventional positions of reader and writer. 
Reversibility is not activated once, or any precise number of times, either 
rotating the reader into the place previously occupied by the writer, and vice 
versa, or else returning everything to the original state. Instead, reversibility goes 
mad, afflicting the very roles of reader and writer as they are troubled by an 
abyssal interdependence. In an article on Finnegans Wake and The Post Card, 
Murray McArthur notes that “[t]hrough the reversal of positions, […] [t]he self-
present voice of consciousness is revealed as another’s voice, the voice of the 
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other” (230) – a voice that, in a Lacanian manner, already inhabits the self. In the 
iterability and the postality of language that, as will see, can also be called its 
spectrality, identity is already haunted by difference. 
As it presents itself in the reversibility of Socrates and Plato, the problem 
of authoritative interpretation is thus transported away from the accessing of an 
authority already given somewhere (Socrates unilaterally dictating to Plato, having 
complete mastery over the situation, or Plato unilaterally dictating to Socrates, 
completely usurping the father-figure) towards a negotiation of authority (Plato 
dictating to Socrates, but already taking Socrates’s voice into consideration and 
thus also taking dictation from Socrates in turn). This returns us to Shaun the 
reader with a new view on his plight as the one who would preserve purity and 
clarity, but cannot avoid being drawn into creative processes himself. The focus is 
shifting to an ever more initial moment in Shaun’s relation to Shem. Before Shaun 
can formulate any reaction to his brother, already at the point at which he reads 
him, he partakes in the act of invention that is reading. He thus becomes an 
inventor, a creator, a ventriloquist, someone who hears his own speech and reads 
his own writing, in disbelief of its perverse mode of fidelity to the text, of its 
infidelity to his own maxim of absolute fidelity. 
In The Post Card’s imagery of card and letter sending, the Wake’s figure of 
one who would deliver a message is already at stake – “Jean le facteur (Shaun, 
John the postman) was not very far off” (142), writes Derrida. Shaun’s function, 
moreover, is already connected to the rethinking of the roles of writer and reader 
through Socrates and Plato. Derrida indicates this in the abbreviated expression: 
“Shem/Shaun, S/p” (142), which, although highly condensed, is in my opinion the 
decisive clue to The Post Card’s thinking about the Wake. Here, we can follow a 
suggestion by Andrew J. Mitchell, who in “Meaning Postponed: The Post Card and 
Finnegans Wake” uses Shaun’s appearance in Derrida’s text to problematize the 
postman’s task of transporting messages. Mitchell links the role of Shaun the Post 
to that of quotation marks, understood as a packaging or safeguarding that would 
allow the meaning they enclose to be transported without being altered in the 
process. He writes: 
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To bear a message and establish order: these are the roles of Shaun 
the Post, and he is those quotation marks. Their problem is his 
problem. Each attempts to contain postality and yet maintain 
separation, to envelope it and limit the extent of its effect. (149) 
If “[t]hroughout the text and especially in book III, Shaun is a mediator” (149), 
serving, for instance, as the postman who carries ALP’s letter (see 420.17-9), this 
position is thus ultimately an impossible one, for any attempt to bridge a distance 
brings into play iterability, and puts into question the idea of absolute fidelity, of 
noise-free transmission, of transporting meaning without affecting it. Mitchell 
argues that, to the extent to which Shaun can be identified with this impossible 
task, the message he carries “is a rift in his being that divides him from himself, 
and it distances him from himself by interrupting his identity with himself” (149). 
Thus, in chapter III.1 of the Wake, Shaun complains about his task, saying: 
“I am now becoming about fed up be going circulating about” (410.7). The 
circulation of the letter appears to be connected to Shaun’s identity – “to isolate i 
from my multiple Mes” (410.12) – and its overall impact is clearly a destabilising 
one: “since it came into my hands I am hopeless off course” (410.17-8). Yet, in the 
end, nothing would be delivered – and Shaun would not inhabit the role of a 
carrier of messages at all – if such a division did not successfully wrench him from 
his own message and his own project, a project that in the radical form he 
envisions for it could only mean immobility, inertia, the ceasing of transportation. 
In Mitchell’s reading, Shaun’s inevitable failure interrupts not only postal 
delivery, and communication more generally speaking, but also self-identity and 
thus essence itself. My own interpretation aligns itself with this approach. Shaun’s 
necessary conflation with Shem does more than afflict the means of 
communication by which one attempts to access essential meaning. The blurring 
of the distinction between the twins threatens the concept of authoritative 
meaning itself. It is worth noting, at this point, that ALP’s letter, which as we have 
seen can be taken to symbolise essence and the ipseity of the signifier, is 
repeatedly described as having been dictated to Shem. For instance, we read of 
the “Letter, carried of Shaun, son of Hek, written of Shem, brother of Shaun, 
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uttered for Alp, mother of Shem, for Hek, father of Shaun” (420.17-9), as well as 
that “[t]he gist is the gist of Shaum but the hand is the hand of Sameas” (483.3-4). 
The letter, then, is not the work of ALP alone. Its writing appears to have 
required Shem’s/Seamus’s assistance, with contributions to its gist from either 
Shaun or Shem – “Shaum” being another example of the difficulty of distinguishing 
between the two, seeing how one is nearly (but not quite) the same as (“Sameas”) 
the other. In view of the above argument that the one who takes dictation is 
simultaneously the one who can dictate, this means that Shem’s creative process, 
with all its flaws and dangers, potentially afflicts this symbol of essential meaning 
– not at the level of its being read, but at the more constitutive level of its writing. 
Another reference to such a complication is made in the discussion put forward in 
I.5, where the author of the letter is found to be “possibly ambidextrous” (107.10-
1). The presence of two hands might indicate two writers or two sides of the same 
writer; either possibility entails a split that distances the letter from its pure self. 
On the multiplicity of influences that divide and destroy this purity, Shari 
Benstock comments: 
The letter’s content is not only influenced by the woman who 
dictates it, but by the son who pens it and the son who posts it; its 
message is full of gaps and uncertainties, at times is partially or 
wholly obliterated, is badly transcribed, is written in foreign 
languages, and is addressed to someone other than its recipient. 
The letter’s route from writer to reader is circuitous, ambiguous 
uncharted (“Letter of the Law” 196). 
Uncertainties flow into one another. Just as Shaun cannot be neatly distinguished 
from Shem, the question of a message’s transportation is entangled with that of 
its doubtful nature and with the question of its creation. In the Wake, the 
problems of interpretation, of interpretative authority, and of writing are all 
bound up in such a way as to suggest that, like essence, authority is not something 
pre-existing that waits to be accessed, but is negotiated in an interaction between 
reader and writer. 
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To further examine this interaction, I will now turn to a scene that stages 
the link between Shaun’s task as a messenger and the nature of symbolic 
authority. This is the scene found at the beginning of chapter III.3. It presents 
Shaun acting in the role of “a medium at a séance channelling the voice of 
HCE” (Mitchell 149) – that is, the voice of the father and, as we will see, of 
authority itself. The un-deadness of HCE is, of course, a central motif of Finnegans 
Wake. Already the book’s title brings to mind Tim Finnegan’s return from the dead 
as described in the “Finnegan’s Wake” ballad. In the first chapter of Joyce’s text, 
HCE turns into a version of Finnegan when he refuses repeated demands to stay 
dead. We read, for instance: “Now be aisy, good Mr Finnimore, sir. And take your 
laysure like a god on pension and don't be walking abroad” (24.16-7); “Drop in 
your tracks, babe! Be not unrested!” (26.16-7); and “Repose you now! Finn no 
more!” (28.33-4). 
The rise of the repressed, of the lost or lacking and even of the dead is a 
theme present in the Wake from the outset (detectable also in the “wake (up)” of 
its title, read as a verb). It is important to note, however, that in the séance 
conducted by the four old men in III.3, HCE does not fully return. His presence is 
conjured up, but it remains phantasmatic, and like the “spectral father” of Kafka’s 
letter, he is allowed to speak only by merging his voice with that of his son. It is 
worth pointing out, then, that one of the titles I.5 gives to ALP’s letter, and thus to 
the Wake and to all signification, is: “Suppotes a Ventriliquorst Merries a 
Corpse” (105.20). In the next subsection, I will argue that giving a ventriloquized 
voice to that which is not a living presence is the basic condition not only of 
language, but also of manifestations of authority, and I will discuss paternal 
authority as a key example of such inauthentic authority. 
 
The name of the father 
The séance that is conducted throughout III.3 and that brings forth a number of 
different voices begins with Shaun being either asleep, unconscious, or in a trance: 
“Yawn in a semiswoon lay awailing” (474.11). While he is in this state, the “four 
claymen clomb together to hold their sworn starchamber quiry on him” (475.18-
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9). The main thing to note about the ensuing exchange, the conversation with the 
first of many ghostly voices Shaun channels in this chapter, is that it features HCE 
as “this Totem Fulcrum Est Ancestor” (481.4-5). That is to say, HCE appears as the 
prehistoric father from Sigmund Freud’s Totem and Taboo. And whereas the 
presence of Freud’s book in Finnegans Wake has been commented on, for 
instance by Brivic (see Joyce Between 207, and Joyce Through 165) and Rabaté (see 
“A Clown’s Inquest” 98), emphasis is typically given to the motif of patricide, and 
not to another gruesome act featuring in Freud’s narrative. Here is the passage 
from Totem and Taboo: 
One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, 
killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the 
patriarchal horde. United, they had the courage to do and succeed 
in doing what would have been impossible for them individually. 
(Some cultural advance, perhaps, command over some new 
weapon, had given them a sense of superior strength). Cannibal 
savages as they were, it goes without saying that they devoured 
their victim as well as killing him. The violent primal father had 
doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the 
company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they 
accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them 
acquired a portion of his strength. (141-2) 
As Thomas Jackson Rice points out in Cannibal Joyce, there are numerous 
references in Finnegans Wake to HCE being eaten that can be linked to “the 
Freudian patricidal paradigm” (24). A darkly humorous one occurs in chapter I.1, 
where it appears that the mourners at HCE’s/ Tim Finnegan’s/Humpty Dumpty’s 
wake are served Humpty Dumpty (that is, eggs) for breakfast, sunny side up: “And 
even if Humpty shell fall frumpty times as awkward again in the beardsboosoloom 
of all our grand remonstrancers there'll be iggs for the brekkers come to 
mournhim, sunny side up with care” (12.12-5). The trial scene in I.3 similarly 
conflates HCE as foodstuff with HCE as man (French: “homme”) in the remark that 
if “you wish to ave some homelette, […] Your hegg he must break himself” (59.30-
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2). And the question in I.6 that is looking for the answer “Finn MacCool!” (139.14) 
includes among the characteristics of this avatar of HCE his representing a whole 
set of meals: “is Breakfates, Lunger, Diener and Souper” (131.4). When the 
customers leave HCE’s pub towards the end of II.3, they similarly tell him: “We 
could ate you, par Buccas, and imbabe through you” (378.2-3). 
These references to cannibalism are significant because they transport 
Joyce’s evocation of Totem and Taboo away from a straightforward motif of 
violence, towards Freud’s more complex concern with the sons’ assimilation of the 
father’s power. Freud’s narrative is designed to accommodate a highly ambiguous 
attitude towards the father on the part of the murdering horde. Freud writes: 
“After they had got rid of him, had satisfied their hatred and had put into effect 
their wish to identify themselves with him, the affection which had all this time 
been pushed under was bound to make itself felt” (143). If the killing itself results 
from hatred, its subsequent interpretation as an act that must never be repeated 
– a codification Freud holds to be a founding moment of culture itself (see 159) – 
is the result of a surfacing of more positive feelings. The retroactive judgment that 
declares the killing a crime and that bestows guilt on those who committed it is 
based on an impulse of wishing the deed undone: an impulse tied to a shift in the 
perception of the father.1 As Freud has it: “their longing for him increased; and it 
became possible for an ideal to emerge which embodied the unlimited power of 
the primal father” (148). Freud ventures that it is for this reason that “[t]he dead 
father became stronger than the living one had been” (143). 
If we now turn to HCE’s summoning in III.3, we find hints at a similar 
appropriation of the father’s strength: an appropriation that, even as it destroys 
the father, establishes his all-powerful phantom – and we will see in the next 
subsection that this bilateral movement is precisely what relates III.3’s depiction 
of paternal authority to the authority of the writer as it emerges from the 
reversibility of ventriloquism. References to the killing can be found from the 
                                                          
1 In “Before the Law,” Derrida points out that as a myth of origin of moral law, Freud’s 
account nonetheless cannot explain how the deed takes on the hue of a moral wrong, that is to 
say, how regret lends its authority to the law in the form of guilt and guiltiness, the very concepts 
whose formation Freud’s narrative is supposed to describe, but that it effectively presupposes as 
a deeper meaning of the crime (see 198-9). 
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beginning of the scene onwards, for instance in the exclamation: “The cubs are 
after me, it zeebs, the whole totem pack” (480.30-1). It is with a view to this 
hostility, and to the history Freud imposes on it, that I would read the question: 
“His producers are they not his consumers?” (497.1-2). This is sometimes taken as 
a self-aware comment on Joyce’s part about the co-operative relationship 
between him and his audience. Although I would not want to deny the pertinence 
of this reading (and note the intriguing phrase “The author, in fact, was 
mardred” [517.11] that follows later on in the same chapter), it also puts strain on 
the text by having it proceed from what is arguably the less obvious term (the 
producers: the readers as active participants) to the more intuitive, seemingly 
tautological term (the readers as consumers). As a question asked of Totem and 
Taboo, by contrast, it would run: “those who have created the idol or totem of the 
father, are they not those who ate the father in the first place?” This reading, in 
turn, gives a different inflection to a phrase that appears on the facing page: “you 
may identify yourself with the him in you” (496.25-6). If the “in” points to the 
psychological inside of internalisation and identification, it also points to the 
physical inside of imbibing. 
Freud’s hypotheses about an elevation through assimilation of the father 
should thus be kept in mind when we read the séance’s discussion of HCE. For 
instance, HCE’s development “from the human historic brute, Finnsen Faynean, 
occeanyclived, to this same vulganized hillsir from yours” (481.12-4) resonates 
with the transformation of Freud’s father-figure. Finn’s/HCE’s trajectory from 
human bully to natural phenomenon (volcano, hill) or god (Vulcan) owes a debt to 
the idolisation and naturalisation that take place in Totem and Taboo and that cast 
the dead father in the role of a god, of a totem animal, and so on. A few lines 
further down, we encounter a statement that engages in a similar dialogue with 
Freud’s text: “That is a tiptip tim oldy faher now the man I go in fear of, Tommy 
Terracotta, and he could be all your and my das” (481.31-3). Here, the figure who 
can appear in such sublime manifestations as a mountain, a god of fire, or King 
Midas (“my das”), the larger-than-life father one goes in fear of and who stands in 
a paternal function to everyone (“all your and my das”), is precisely the HCE who 
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is no longer there, who has perhaps been killed and consumed and who at any 
rate is speaking at this point only through the medium of his son Shaun. 
We can relate this rendering of Freud’s myth in Joyce to Lacan’s 
interpretation of Totem and Taboo. Here, I will take recourse to middle Lacan; it is 
important to keep in mind, however, that the making-legible achieved by the 
name of the father is superseded by Lacan’s later suspicion of legibility. As 
Thurston notes, “[i]t becomes clear in Lacan’s very late work (by contrast with 
some of his better-known earlier declarations) that the Name of the Father is not 
the only way of organising or knotting together the psychical orders of the real, 
the symbolic and the imaginary” (James Joyce 161). If it is the sinthome, not the 
symbolic authority established by the name of the father, that is ultimately said to 
support this organisation, what I am interested in here is the somewhat different 
question of the fictional nature of authority. Lacan’s reflections on this issue, I 
would argue, can be treated separately from authority’s role in the knotting of 
subjectivity – and they strongly reverberate with certain points Finnegans Wake 
makes about paternity, authority, and fiction. 
In Écrits, Lacan writes that Freud’s investigation of paternal authority 
led him to tie the appearance of the signifier of the Father, as 
author of the Law, to death – indeed, to the killing of the Father – 
thus showing that, if this murder is the fertile moment of the debt 
by which the subject binds himself for life to the Law, the symbolic 
Father, insofar as he signifies this Law, is truly the dead Father. (“On 
a Question” 464) 
The father elevated to the position of absolute authority is the father no longer 
present. Here, however, Lacan adds a twist: inverting the Freudian logic that 
proceeds from death to signification, Lacan ventures that in order for the absence 
of the father to allow for his return as the personification of the law, he need not 
actually be killed; it suffices that he be named. This, too, amounts to an absolute 
removal, since, as Lacan notes elsewhere in Écrits, “the being of language is the 
nonbeing of objects” (“Direction” 524). 
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“It is in the name of the father that we must recognize the basis of the 
symbolic function which, since the dawn of historical time, has identified his 
person with the figure of the law” (“Function and Field” 230). In a no doubt unduly 
literal, but nevertheless illustrative reading of Lacan, we could imagine the 
occurrence of one of the first words in human language as the naming of the father 
in a prehistoric group or horde. If one of the members of this group sees the father 
and makes a sound, the sound is not a name, but an undifferentiated call attracting 
everyone’s attention to the same degree. It is a name only if another member, or 
the same member at another time, repeats the sound (repeats it in memory of 
one of them having seen the father and having made the sound) – or anticipates 
the possibility of repeating the sound in this function. What gives a name, then, is 
not the presence of the father but the possibility of a sound becoming a name by 
recalling itself, which is to say precisely by imagining not a presence (here and now 
is the father) but an absence (let me preserve the father in a name). 
Here, I again trail the line of Lacan’s overlap with Derrida, for whom, 
similarly, the proper name is by no means excluded from the dynamics of 
iterability and differance. In Of Grammatology, Derrida writes that “the proper 
name was never possible except through its functioning within a classification and 
therefore within a system of differences” (109). A few pages further on, he glosses 
“the so-called proper name” as “the originary violence which has severed the 
proper from its property and its self-sameness” (112). It is on the basis of this 
violence, severance, and dispossession that Derrida, like Lacan, associates the 
name with death. If your proper name, because it is an iterable signifier, is never 
your proper name, then, as Derrida puts it in The Post Card, “[t]he name is made 
to do without the life of the bearer, and is therefore always somewhat the name 
of someone dead” (39). 
Writing about Lacan, Rabaté argues along the same Lacanian/Derridean 
lines when he states that “the father is not, for all that, a presence embodying the 
legitimate succession. Language is a system of differences, a power of death and 
absence in which he too is caught up” (“A Clown’s Inquest” 83). In Lacan’s account, 
the mortification of the father, then, is not literal patricide; it consists in the 
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father’s entering a symbolic order in which he will inevitably fall short of the ideal 
that can now be signified. Inherent to the name of the father is the notion that no-
one quite succeeds in being its legitimate bearer. This ideality of the name is what 
makes Lacan’s analysis of paternal authority interesting to a discussion of the 
Wake. Drawing on Lacan’s name of the father, MacCabe points out that “the split 
between bearer and name is made absolute in Finnegans Wake as the father 
becomes the simple permutation of a set of letters” (142) – HCE. 
This is not to say that Joyce anticipates Lacan’s reading of Totem and 
Taboo. It is to argue that Finnegans Wake stages a general disparity between 
naming and identity, and that both this disparity and HCE’s Freudian appearance 
in III.3 are among the aspects of the text that indicate that for Joyce, the status of 
paternal authority is far from unproblematic, insofar as the very presence of the 
father is in question in various ways. Evoked through linguistic patterns, symbolic 
functions, and various substitutable avatars, the Wake’s father-figure is less a 
fictional character than a manifestation of fictionality itself, of what it means to be 
structured by fictions: “entiringly as he continues highly-fictional” (261.17-8). 
More symbolic constellation than actual character and “more mob than 
man” (261.21-2), HCE is the abstract, over-individual concept of the father. Yet he 
also is each of the Wake’s individual father-figures who fall short of that concept 
– that is to say, he is each instance in which the fictionality of the correspondence 
between concept and individual reveals itself. 
This last aspect can be read in correlation with the theme of HCE’s guilt. 
Chapter I.2 first introduces us to the mysterious events in Phoenix Park or “the 
people’s park” (33.27), different versions of which are found all through the Wake. 
The descriptions vary in the precise circumstances of the events, but one recurrent 
motif is the accusation, levelled against HCE, “of annoying Welsh fusiliers” (33.26-
7) and/or “of having behaved with ongentilmensky immodus opposite a pair of 
dainty maidservants” (34.18-9) Since these are key motifs of Finnegans Wake, 
much could be said about the nature of HCE’s deed, its repercussions throughout 
the text, and the conflicting information we are given about it. I will touch on the 
significance of HCE’s culpability in chapter four; for the time being, I will simply 
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suggest that this narrative serves to undermine his symbolic role. Whether it 
constitutes an account of HCE’s crime or represents the slanderous mode of his 
being made a scapegoat, in either case it shatters his identification with symbolic 
authority. This, too, aligns him in significant ways with the fictional nature of 
paternal authority as Freud and Lacan conceptualise it. In Joyce as well as in Freud 
and Lacan, we find that the father’s presence, far from lending to authority the full 
weight of unquestionable immediacy, effectively interferes with the ideality in 
whose image the father would like to appear. Ideality is more closely allied with 
absence, with potentiality as opposed to actuality. 
HCE exemplifies the problematic relation that a father-figure has to the 
paternal authority of which individuals are stand-ins, but never fully authentic 
bearers. We can read this as the Wake’s variation on a theme first sounded in 
Ulysses, namely as an extension of Stephen’s remark in the “Scylla and Charybdis” 
chapter that “Paternity may be a legal fiction” (9.844). If, as Stephen suggests, 
“[f]atherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man” (9.837-8), 
then there is no intrinsic and necessary truth to the role of the father. As Maud 
Ellmann comments, “[i]t is only through the ‘legal fiction’ of the name that he can 
reclaim his dubious paternity” (92, my emphasis). HCE, announced by his name 
but not extant as a self-identical presence, can be read as just such a legal fiction. 
He is a name from which a certain symbolic role and authority are derived, but at 
the same time, he personifies the fact that such authority is always more than the 
individual bearer of the name authentically embodies. In the individual, we only 
ever meet an imperfect representative of the authority that ultimately resides in 
the name. 
In the following, I will argue that this tension between authenticity and 
authority can be brought to bear on the role of the author as well. Here, I should 
immediately address a possible misunderstanding. If manifestations of authority 
can be found to be problematic, inauthentic, less than ideal, this should by no 
means lead us to believe that they have no significance. If the law resides in a 
name – if paternity may be a legal fiction, as Stephen phrases the same motif – 
then what is crucial is the tension between the expressions “legal” and “fiction” 
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(and the equivocating nature of that “may”). The fictional nature of paternal 
authority challenges us to consider the potentially binding nature of something 
that may be fictional/construed. Fictions, in this view, are not there for us to 
unmask them so as to penetrate to the level of truth. There is in a crucial sense 
nothing beneath the kind of fiction we are concerned with here, nothing 
supporting the authority of fiction and the fiction of authority but fiction itself. Do 
away with all that is constructed, and you do away with the symbolic order itself. 
Which is decidedly not to say, therefore, that fictions are unimportant: we would 
do well to keep in mind Freud’s proposition that a construct can become much 
more powerful than a simple and self-sufficient presence could ever be. 
 
Spectres of authority 
In “Ulysses Gramophone,” Derrida suggests a similar connection between paternal 
authority and authority in interpretation. He calls this the filiation mechanism of 
Ulysses (but the proposition is applicable to Finnegans Wake as well): “The filiation 
machine – legitimate or illegitimate – is functioning well, is ready for anything, to 
domesticate, to circumscribe or circumvent everything” (70). Domesticating 
anything and everything: this is not to argue the banal possibility of declaring 
legitimate even filiations/interpretations known to be anything but that. It is to 
maintain the more fundamental difficulty, also remarked upon in Stephen’s radical 
scepticism, of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate filiation in the 
first place. 
Derrida echoes something of this scepticism when, in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 
he writes: “The father is always father to a speaking/living being. In other words, 
it is precisely logos that enables us to perceive and investigate something like 
paternity” (80). On this, Michael Naas comments, in Derrida From Now On: “it 
would be from the son, from logos, that the father would be able to be called a 
father, that the father would come to be identified as a father” (46), and that, 
consequently, “the son always risks replacing the father, usurping his sovereign 
position” (46). Crucially, the risk in question here results not only from the 
problems that plague attempts of consulting authority. Rather, the difficulty of 
132 
 
distinguishing between legitimacy and illegitimacy in interpretation reveals the 
problematic nature of interpretative authority itself. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will argue that such authority is fictional in much the same way as the 
forms of paternity we encounter in Joyce, Derrida, Freud, and Lacan, where the 
father “has never been the father except in the mythology of the son” (Lacan, S VII 
177). 
We may undertake the Shaun-type gesture of trying to preserve original 
meaning, of trying to consult the authoritative position. Yet in doing so, we find 
that a direct comparison to the authoritative position is impossible. There is no 
mode of pronouncing authority in a manner undistorted by iterability and 
ventriloquism. Whenever it is consulted, authority emerges as the result of a 
negotiation that already mixes and confuses positions. Still, even beneath this 
dynamic of displacement, there is a mechanism at work that divides the author 
herself or himself from interpretative authority in the sense of total mastery over 
what they produce. This is crucial, for if there exists no absolutely authoritative 
position for interpretation to displace, if writing itself is afflicted by iterability, 
uncertainty, and anxiety as much as reading is, then the inauthenticity introduced 
by interpretation is not sharply identifiable as such. If Shem and Shaun merge to 
the extent of becoming difficult to separate, then not only can a reader not access 
essential meaning, but neither can he or she approximate essential meaning by 
identifying authorial meaning and thus producing what amounts to a non-
essential but indubitably legitimate filiation. 
Authorial meaning is not present in a text as a solid stratum, concealed by 
effects of illegitimate meaning from which it can be told with any certainty. Rather, 
from the outset, an excess of effects is at work. If I have suggested that a writer 
cannot exhaustively anticipate what her or his writing means, it is precisely 
because language refuses to codify a single, authentic intention without, in the 
process, dividing it up, wrenching it from itself, and transforming it in multiple, 
uncountable, and unpredictable ways. As the anxiety-inducing process of writing 
oscillates between Shem-type and Shaun-type impulses, it creates possibilities of 
meaning in such a manner that the writer can only ever control a subset of them. 
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And even if we grant that, once this process is interrupted, the author can adopt 
the role of reader and have a personal understanding of the finished product 
(which might then be termed authorial meaning, although any formalisation or 
communication of this understanding would again be subject to the same 
mechanisms), what the lack of control during the process means is that in the 
resulting text, effects intended or noticed by the author are not – not necessarily 
– distinguishable from effects not intended or noticed. As there is by definition no 
control that would govern both types of effect, there can also be no guarantee 
that they will be fashioned in such a way as to be different from each other, 
distinguishable in a manner that could be picked up by a careful enough reader. 
The reader cannot therefore unearth an unquestionably authentic 
meaning, however deeply hidden or subtly discriminated. Derrida elaborates on 
this in Specters of Marx, where he argues that what he calls an inheritance or 
legacy – that is, any interaction with the past, including reading – does not consist 
in an encounter with an exhaustively defined potential. In order to inherit, one 
must iterate, that is, “one must filter, sift, criticize, one must sort out several 
different possibles that inhabit the same injunction. And inhabit it in a 
contradictory fashion [my emphasis] around a secret” (18). The argument Derrida 
is making here is that the possibility of inheritance, as an act of drawing on the 
past, lies precisely in iterability’s difference from a natural and inevitable 
programme. That is to say, he is approaching the question from the perspective of 
the receiver of an inheritance. Yet I propose that Derrida’s formulation is equally 
valid – and not fortuitously so – as a description of the only kind of inheritance 
that a producer can put forward. Before it becomes a question of accessing the 
past, iterability already creates contradictions within any gesture that forms or 
may form an inheritance. Therefore, the plurality of possibilities that a reader 
faces is constituted by an excess of elements. It is not a well-defined set of 
elements awaiting something like creative re-arrangement; its contradictory 
nature undoes the very concept of the identifiable and organised set. The task of 
the reader, then, cannot consist in the recognition of a pattern given in the text. 
The reader produces a pattern in an act of invention, as the very processes of 
identifying meanings, attributes, or commands in the text cut into its wholeness. 
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If the structure thus produced is not neatly divisible into elements that 
partake and elements that do not partake in the authority bestowed by an 
authorial blessing, this does not mean that the idea of authority is abandoned. 
What divides our readings from authority is the uncertainty of their relation to it, 
and this uncertainty cuts both ways. This is to say that the impossibility of 
identifying and accessing authorial meaning without a potentially perilous 
negotiation is neither the end of authority as such, nor of a reader’s responsibility 
towards it. Rather, any such negotiation is caught up in a reversibility that 
perpetuates sovereignty in the very act of rewriting it. Like Derrida’s Plato, who in 
inventing Socrates takes on a debt and responsibility towards the fictional father-
figure, the reader who is at a constant risk of usurping the position to be consulted 
is also tied to this position as the one he or she has to iterate and to interact with. 
It is with regard to this suspension of authority between guiding reading 
and arising from reading that Specters of Marx introduces spectrality. Derrida 
urges us to consider the necessity, “beyond the opposition between presence and 
non-presence, actuality and inactuality, life and non-life, of thinking the possibility 
of the specter, the specter as possibility” (13). That is, he encourages us to 
acknowledge effects of signification that are not calculable on the basis of the text 
alone, because they arise from the text through our attempt to make sense of its 
constitutive excess. To engage with the spectre of the author thus requires our 
ability to think outside the automatisms of a process of reading that might as well 
happen without any intervention on our part. Since it is an interaction, reading 
requires that we learn how to think the author as an interlocutor, “how to talk 
with him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech, even 
if it is in oneself, in the other, in the other in oneself” (221). The spectre of the 
author is not a solid presence. It is a modulation of the voice: an attempt at 
ventriloquism, at internalising the other and speaking from the elusive point that 
is the position of the other – an attempt whose success no formula or strategy can 
guarantee. 
However, Derrida does not only speak of the possibility of the spectre, but 
also of the spectre as possibility, as the possibility of possibility per se. There is no 
135 
 
inheritance without iterability, and no iterability without the bilateral inhabiting 
of voices. If inheritance is to be possible at all, then we cannot avoid the risk 
intrinsic to conversing with spectres. Or, to put it differently, without spectres, we 
would never even begin to read. Try to declare a reading legitimate without 
engaging in any construction, and you will have to refrain from all iteration, thus 
confining yourself to silence. The spectre, therefore, embodies authority in the 
same paradoxical manner in which the trace preserves essential meaning. In “The 
Mother, of All the Phantasms…,” Michael Naas states that, “while always 
legitimated by a performative context that precedes and exceeds it, the phantasm 
always attempts to elide or conceal these origins, to present itself as self-
generated, as naturally and purely given” (167). Or, conversely, one can say that 
the trace already contains the logic of the spectre, as Bennington suggests when 
he writes: “In terms of [Derrida’s] later work, we can say that the trace entails a 
general ‘spectrality’” (93). What I call the absence of essential meaning amounts 
to the fact that the essence projected by the trace is not anything we encounter, 
but a suspicion, and that all attributes with which we fill in this structural void, in 
order to produce the concreteness of a reading, are already spectral, are 
negotiated within a systematic play of differences. Without spectrality, no 
concrete manifestation would be produced at all. 
In view of these considerations, let us return to the example of the séance 
in III.3. The voice that Shaun and the four conjure up is precisely the spectral 
appearance of HCE, who moreover appears as a Freudian father-figure in this 
scene: as the idealised ancestor called upon to do away with present uncertainties. 
HCE speaks through Shaun, thus it is Shaun who can say: “I have something inside 
of me talking to myself” (522.26). He has assimilated or internalised the other and 
is now engaging in an exchange that is no longer limited to his own voice. Yet, 
crucially, the origin of the phrase “I swear my gots how that I’m not meself at 
all” (487.17-8) cannot be decided with equal certainty. It may be Shaun informing 
the four that he is speaking from the position of the other, that he is channelling 
the voice of HCE. However, it may also be the manifestation of HCE that is 
produced through this channelling, pronouncing a warning that the channelled 
voice is not in fact him, that it is not his true and authentic presence. It may, finally, 
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be both of these voices at the same time: HCE ventriloquized and ventriloquizing, 
HCE dictating and taking dictation. This would be the spectre in the Derridean 
sense. 
A similar dialogue between identities is hinted at in the exchange: “- Are 
you in your fatherick, lonely one? // - The same. Three persons” (478.28-9). As 
soon as one voice is speaking from within another, the notions of identifying and 
counting the identities involved become uncertain. Sameness (that of the son or 
of the father) may turn out be the inhabiting of the position of another (“are you 
in”). Loneliness no longer excludes the multiplicity of several persons. On this 
passage, Brivic thus comments that “III.3 is a major demonstration that the 
discourse of the Wake speaks for multitudes” (“Daughter” 256), because “the 
typical phrase of the Wake has several meanings that speak for several 
voices” (257). I will argue in the following chapters that this dissemination into 
several layers of meaning is indeed a key effect of Joyce’s affirmation of excess. 
Here, I want to emphasise that even Brivic’s “multitudes” of meaning fall short of 
Joyce’s plurivocality if they are understood as a plurality of distinct, separable 
voices. None of the layers of meaning achieved by Joyce’s writing are delineated 
by the purity of a single voice – which is also to say that no central, authoritative, 
and uncontaminated meaning can be isolated (not without doing violence to 
Joyce’s polyvocal writing). 
The conclusion I propose regarding III.3’s play with voices and perspectives 
is that it conveys something about the workings of the rest of Finnegans Wake: 
namely, that this text’s multiplicity of voices is at all points the result of 
interactions that are and are not instances of displacement. The voice of HCE, 
along with many others, would not emerge in III.3 without Shaun’s act of 
ventriloquism (no manifestation would be produced without spectrality). At the 
same time, this act also threatens to usurp HCE’s voice. But in order for the 
ventriloquism to draw on the authority of the other – and this is how usurpation 
is achieved – there must be left in the ventriloquized voice a discernible remnant 
of the position of the other. Which means that there may just be enough of HCE’s 
voice coming through for him to be able to say: this is not me. The position of this 
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voice, I propose, is analogous to that of textual authority. The voice that says “I am 
not myself, I am not I,” and that precisely in saying this preserves the notion of the 
original “I,” is also the voice of the text itself. It is the voice of any text, divided 
from its essence – and preserving the ideal of this essence – as it is being iterated. 
But in particular, it is the voice of this text, of Finnegans Wake, that directs this 
message at us with every non-word we read, with every instance of a non-word’s 
non-identity with any of its readable forms. 
If, in chapter one, I argue that non-words exemplify something about 
reading, I hope to have illustrated in this chapter that they also exemplify a 
characteristic of writing – its excessiveness – and the far-reaching consequences 
this excessiveness has for reading in turn. The usage of non-words means that the 
excess of possibilities that distorts writing is made palpable, as is the power of the 
ventriloquism that inhabits and activates this excess. And in the gesture of 
rendering all this explicit, authorial authority is preserved in the form of Joyce’s 
decision to accept and indeed employ excess. Here, a crucial double bind emerges. 
The peculiar form in which Finnegans Wake is written catalyses excess. It thus 
transports us even further away from unilateral authorial mastery than regular 
texts are. Yet the decision to give Finnegans Wake this form is irrevocably Joyce’s. 
An echo of this decision, a spectral remnant of Joyce’s authority over his text, is 
therefore inscribed in an unusually broad variety of interpretations (though by no 
means any and all interpretations). 
This is what Derrida insists on in his own interpretation of the Wake. In 
“Two Words for Joyce,” he describes Finnegans Wake as a linguistic performance 
so intricate that “everything we could say after it looks in advance like a minute 
self-commentary with which this work accompanies itself” (27). Yet he contrasts 
this statement with the assertion that, in spite of what it may look like, “the new 
marks carry off, enlarge, and project elsewhere – one never knows where in 
advance – a program that appeared to constrain them, or at least watch over 
them” (27). Derrida is commenting on the necessity for a reading to be a response 
to the text, but he expresses this necessity in a defamiliarising mode in order to 
emphasise the Wake’s spectrality. Any reading – everything we could say – must 
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offer itself up to be re-appropriated by the authority of the text. A reading that is 
found to entirely evade the retrospectively identified possibility of its prediction is 
not a reading, but an invalid deviation from the text, unconnected to it by any 
identifiable correspondences. 
If such a process of identification is different from an author’s unilateral 
command, it is not because it has become the unilateral command of the reader, 
but rather because reading and command must reciprocally construe each other 
– and such construction may produce results not foreseen in advance. That is, 
textual authority is absolute precisely to the extent to which it is construed; it is a 
legal fiction. In “Ulysses Gramophone,” Derrida translates this into the vocabulary 
of spectrality and (applying it to Ulysses, but the general thought again holds true 
of Finnegans Wake as well) states that Joyce’s “omnipotence remains a 
phantasm” (69). What the filiation machine of Ulysses and Finnegans Wake 
achieves is a manipulation of the fiction of authority (subjective and objective 
genitive): Joyce is construed as the spectral presence of interpretative law, and 
this spectral presence authorises construction by inscribing itself into the very 
manipulations of the text that we as readers undertake. 
The problem, then, is with the spectrality of writing. This does not indicate 
our sovereignty as readers. It means that we are held accountable for our 
constructions, and in the case of Finnegans Wake, our accountability is inscribed 
from the start in the materiality of its non-words. The Wake is a book full of 
spectres, and each spectre is simultaneously an invitation and a task; in this, the 
Wake is not fundamentally different from any other text, literary or not. What is 
remarkable is Joyce’s insistence on making mechanisms such as anxiety, dictation, 
ventriloquism, and spectrality into his own subject matter. He creates scenes and 
images that reflect on them, and he fashions a Shem-type language that pushes 
the constitutive excess of writing towards its uttermost potential, confronting us 
with a text to which to apply Shaun-type notions of legitimate and illegitimate 
filiation is not possible. This, I would suggest, is one of the most important 
functions plurality serves in Finnegans Wake. By writing the way he does, and 
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writing about writing the way he does, Joyce lends his name and his authority to 
the very excess that does away with the purity of the single voice. 
Precisely insofar as a reading of Finnegans Wake attempts to read the text 
for what it is – for what Joyce in fact wrote – interpretation faces the impossibility 
of reducing the Wake’s excess to stable configurations. Far from serving the 
purposes of interpretative freedom for the sake of itself, however, this 
multiplication of meanings forms part of a much more specific gesture or 
programme on Joyce’s part. By introducing the paradoxes of spectrality at the level 
of its material signifiers, Finnegans Wake achieves an excess of expression that is 
simultaneously more volatile and more powerful than that of more conventional 
texts. The Wake thus problematizes the conventionally assumed opposition 
between, on the one hand, precision in language, and, on the other hand, the 
failure of language. In defiance of a monovalent ideal of purity, the Wake 
celebrates the richness and expressive power inherent in imperfection, in 
imprecision, indeed in so-called failure. 
Regarding the séance in III.3, Anne Cavender highlights the self-defeating 
aspect of an exegesis that begins by denying one of its subject’s primary features. 
Noting how Shaun, and the spectres that speak through him, generate a discourse 
that shuns concrete answers, Cavender points out that “the Four are so frustrated 
at their failure to come to grips with Shaun that their tempers begin to flare” (671). 
She links this aggressiveness/anxiety to a hermeneutical attitude that manifests 
itself both in the four’s “desire for order and fixity” (665) and in the examination 
of ALP’s letter in I.5, conducted along similarly restrictive lines. The four are thus 
an example of what I call a Shaun-type interpretative effort; yet like Shaun, who 
in this scene is once again wrenched away from this ideal, they are confronted 
with the fact that their search for an answer cannot accommodate the complexity 
of what they actually encounter. Thrown into relief by their failure is the fact that 
III.3 also presents us with another, arguably more successful figure for the reader. 
This, as Cavender demonstrates, is the donkey that draws the four’s cart and that 
appears in the séance as another listener or interrogator, one who “exhibits 
genuine sympathy for Shaun” (678) and who, Cavender argues, derives from 
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Shaun’s talk a hermeneutical pleasure that the four forgo in their effort to reduce 
Shaun to stability. 
Joyce’s positing of such an alternative is critical. In view of such moments 
in the text, whose comical elements in no way diminish their importance, we 
should take seriously Joyce’s critique of the fetishization of clarity as well as his 
vision of different artistic and hermeneutical procedures. This vision does not aim 
to replace hermeneutical pleasure with anxiety; it accepts a certain simultaneity 
of the two. As we will see in the next two chapters, this simultaneity renders 
difficulty productive and productivity difficult. It is inevitable insofar as 
interpretation constitutively entails a confrontation with an order beyond 
interpretation; its presence in Finnegans Wake is therefore not remarkable in 
itself. What is significant is the Wake’s active embracing of this simultaneity. If, in 
reading Finnegans Wake, we are to take our cue from Joyce’s depiction of the 
interpretative process in such scenes as the examination of ALP’s letter, Shaun’s 
vilification of Shem, or the four’s questioning of Shaun, then we have to exercise 
caution in any appeal we make to the ideas problematized in these scenes: ideas 
such as purity, clarity, or presence. 
The combination of these meta-textual depictions with the Wake’s 
invention of non-words calls on us to become aware of our own logocentric axioms 
– axioms on which we base our critical enterprises whenever we equate the critic’s 
task with the production of a knowledge that can only be monovalent. By contrast, 
in order to do justice to the meta-textual agenda that Joyce pursues both in the 
content and in the form of the Wake, we have to acknowledge the text’s excesses 
and its explicit break with monovalence. This is a double injunction, through which 
Joyce’s ordering authority is both present and not present in our manipulations of 
his text. The next chapter will be concerned with examining how we can 
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The linguistic fall 
Finnegans Wake locates both reader and writer in the dynamics of the anxiety of 
language, and it exemplifies the possibility of inhabiting and of utilising (but never 
of evading) that anxiety. If interpretation must take into consideration the spectre 
of the author, and if Joyce’s spectral presence is palpable in his decision to give 
Finnegans Wake its particular form, then textual authority resides with the 
plurality of interpretations more than with any individual reading. Every reading 
that makes legible a non-word also decides, in the necessary manipulation of the 
non-word’s materiality, on the limits of its own reach, and thus on its partiality and 
its distance from the authorial non-text. 
Yet the referentiality without reference that is also at work in these 
coinages continues to call us into the text and to tease us with the possibility of 
subjecting the text to a reading. In “Two Words for Joyce,” Derrida’s watchword 
for this dynamic is Joyce’s “double commandment” (39) – the imperative through 
which Finnegans Wake demands of us that we read it, but also that we do so 
without falsifying it for the purpose of reading. It is the law by which the text tells 
its readers: “Change me – into yourself – and above all do not touch me, read and 
do not read, say and do not say otherwise what I have said” (34). Needless to say, 
such a demand cannot be met, particularly (though not exclusively) with regard to 
non-words. The result of such an impossible command is that interpretation is 
perpetuated: the double bind of a double commandment eliminates the possibility 
of the interpretative process producing the decisive answer and thus coming to a 
halt. Derrida describes his own experience in reading Joyce: “the endless diving in 




We should be careful here not to infer from the indefinite repeatability of 
the immersion something like a freedom to champion whatever interpretation 
takes our fancy. As I will argue in more detail towards the end of this chapter, the 
fact that the movement of reading cannot be stopped does not mean that it goes 
everywhere. What it does mean is that our readings, all of which are in violation 
of the double commandment, are positioned within the framework of a certain 
equivocality. Joyce’s double bind puts competing interpretations on much more 
of an equal footing than would be possible with a standard text. In a manner so 
fundamental that we almost stop noticing it, our interpretations are all imperfect, 
insofar as they refer to words Joyce did not quite write. And the difficulty of 
measuring a reading’s degree of imperfection, as it were, is precisely what opposes 
the exegetical impulse to distinguish between central and peripheral meaning. It 
opposes this impulse – it does not undo it. 
This, again, is say that with the Wake, we are not in a situation where all 
interpretations are equally valid or equally invalid; we rather find ourselves in a 
context of heightened difficulty, where attempts at sorting out readings according 
to a hierarchy of their importance are troubled by the simultaneity of their 
importance. This is what inhabiting the anxiety of language means: to find in 
difficulty itself a precarious and unpredictable productivity. By contrast, once we 
conceive of Joyce’s non-words as expressions that merely demand particular care 
in the identification of their meaning, we lose sight of the way in which non-words 
rethink the very connection between signification and meaning in the singular. We 
should not pass over this rethinking. Joyce’s implementation of excess and anxiety 
is not a superficial effect, detachable from other things the Wake conveys. The 
plurality of meaning is linked to imperfect language itself: both to the Wake’s 
mode of expression and to the mythological motif – whose importance to the 
Wake I will now examine – of the loss of a once perfect language. 
Derrida links the impossible imperative, the voice of the text that demands 
to be understood and demands that its complexity be left intact, to another voice: 
the voice of the God of the Old Testament. More specifically, the connection 
Derrida makes is to the decisive utterance in the divine idiom that God pronounces 
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to mankind at Babel, both as a declaration of war and as an “act of war which 
consisted in declaring” (33). This utterance is the ultimate disruption of speech 
through speech – and a template for Joyce’s double commandment, insofar as 
both condemn their addressees to negotiate haplessly, within postlapsarian 
idioms, the effects of an order given in an ineffable language. 
The traditional reading of the biblical narrative has it that the divine act at 
Babel, the destruction of the tower and the dispersion of language, reaffirms 
original sin by punishing a transgression that results from this sin. The language 
confusion chastises the Babylonians for their hubris in creating a cultural work to 
rival divine greatness, and it confirms mankind’s fallen status by confining it to a 
corresponding linguistic condition. The events at Babel thus complete Adam and 
Eve’s fall into the corruption of culture, so that we can conceive of the linguistic 
confusion as a second fall to complement the first and decisive fall. In particular, 
the linguistic fall destroys the language Adam creates when he gives a name to 
each animal (see Gen. 2.19-20), an event retold in the Wake as Adam putting “his 
own nickelname on every toad, duck and herring” (506.1-2). Since each name 
miraculously corresponds to the essence of the animal it refers to, the language 
invented in this process is ideal: it constitutes the original and immediate mode of 
expression to which, according to this narrative’s tradition, we have been trying 
to return ever since it has been lost at Babel. We will see, however, that this 
account is complicated by an alternative also presented in the biblical report. 
Occasionally, the Wake’s deliberate immersion in sheer linguistic 
performance, which is also an immersion in evocative condensation, is construed 
as Joyce’s attempt to press language back to this Adamic idiom. This is arguably 
the position adopted by Deane in his introduction to the Penguin edition of 
Finnegans Wake, in which he comments on the “directness of communication” (ix) 
displayed by the Wake’s language. The notion that Joyce’s text is charged with 
inherent significance, rather than with connotations bestowed by convention, also 
informs approaches that conceive of the Wake as radically self-reliant – a view first 
expressed in Beckett’s famous comment that “[Joyce’s] writing is not about some-
thing; it is that something itself” (14). In an article that defends a reading of 
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Finnegans Wake as nonsense literature, Tim Conley suggests that to construe from 
Joyce’s unreadable non-words a normalised, “semantically sensible middle text,” 
a translation sandwiched between Joyce’s writing and the reader’s interpretation, 
might already be to betray “[t]he primary text and its central negation of mean-
ing” (244). This negation, without mediation through semantic codes, draws 
attention to the signifiers themselves. Although with strikingly different results, 
both readings, Deane’s and Conley’s, thus construe the Wake as a book that 
rejects the conventions for creating meaning, to instead rely on its own system of 
signification or non-signification. 
In view of the Wake’s materially idiosyncratic language, to search for the 
text’s own particular logic is an approach I would by no means reject. Conley’s line 
of argument is close to my own contention that in reading the Wake, it is crucial 
to insist on the difference between words and non-words. Yet I would only 
subscribe to a “negation of meaning” if it is understood as the negation of one 
meaning, not as an inhibition to interpret at all. Here, the ready availability of 
meaning remarked upon by Deane comes into play. Not in the guise of direct 
signification, in the sense of a self-sufficient, intuitively decipherable symbolism, 
but rather in the form of the irresistibly productive communication achieved by 
the double commandment. What I would criticise in these two approaches, then, 
is the notion that anything in the Wake happens plainly or effortlessly, be it 
effortless signification or the plain denial of signification. I would, on the contrary, 
maintain the importance to the Wake of the gap that opens between ideal, 
inexhaustible language and human, finite language – as well as of the irreducible 
anxiety that results from this gap. In view of its productive oscillation between 
Shem-type and Shaun-type impulses, we should consider the possibility that 
Finnegans Wake constitutes a form of writing to which the linguistic fall is not an 
impairment to be overcome, but one pole of a dialectic tension that, as a whole, 
enhances the text’s possibilities. 
In the following, I will show that Joyce’s self-reflexive use of postlapsarian 
language indeed casts the linguistic fall in the role of an enabling event. It does 
this at two levels simultaneously. At the formal level, the Wake embraces linguistic 
145 
 
confusion as a catalyst for the creation of meaning. At the level of content, as we 
will see, it draws on the Judeo-Christian traditions of interpreting this linguistic 
confusion that Derrida also makes reference to. By relating the complexity of its 
form to these traditions, Finnegans Wake bestows a thematic significance on its 
very opacity. In turn, some of the myths revolving around transgression, downfall, 
and sacrifice that the Wake rehearses can be read as representations of literary 
production itself. 
One possible starting point from which to explore the double nature of the 
linguistic fall – a decline into limitedness that is also an opening into richness – is 
a consideration of the fact that the biblical account relating this fall describes a 
repeated event, or rather a split event. In the biblical report, the second fall cannot 
be identified with one historical or mythical incident. The acquisition of fallen 
language occurs at two separate moments: with God’s announcement at Babel, 
but also with the division of Noah’s descendants into separate nations after the 
flood. This split should not be taken to mean that the two incidents complement 
each other. Each of the events can be read as a self-contained explanation of the 
linguistic fall, which therefore annuls the alternative explanation and is annulled 
by it. This mutual cancellation further complicates the second fall’s equivocal 
status. 
The construction of the tower at Babel is the event I have already identified 
as the point at which humanity, through its own hubris, causes the wrath of God 
and brings onto itself the loss of ideal language. It is the instant of God speaking: 
Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this 
they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, 
which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there 
confound their language, that they may not understand one 
another’s speech. (Gen. 11.6-7)1 
The language that is lost through this divine punishment is explicitly identified as 
a tongue shared by all mankind: “And the whole earth was of one language, and 
                                                          
1 All references to the Bible are to the Authorized King James Version. 
146 
 
of one speech” (Gen. 11.1). Moreover, although without explicit legitimation from 
the biblical text, this original and common language is usually taken to be the 
Adamic one, meaning that the dispersion at Babel is cast as the explanation for 
both the plurality of human languages as well as their inferiority in comparison to 
the ideal nomenclature invented in Eden. I will refer to the notion that mankind 
speaks Adam’s language up until the fall of Babel, at which point that language is 
dissolved into a multitude of inferior idioms, as the babelian hypothesis. 
This hypothesis conflicts with information given in the preceding chapter 
of the Bible. In Genesis 10, we read that the various lineages originating from 
Noah’s sons, Japheth, Ham, and Shem (a trio the Wake frequently invokes), form 
different nations that are scattered over the earth to repopulate it after the flood. 
The variations of the formula repeated for each genealogical line are as follows: 
“every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations” (Gen. 10.5); 
“after their families, after their tongues, in their countries, and in their 
nations” (Gen. 10.20); “after their families, after their tongues, in their lands, after 
their nations” (Gen. 10.31). The contradiction to the babelian narrative and its 
initial declaration that “the whole earth was of one language” is evident. 
If at this stage of pre-babelian history, each racial or tribal group has 
already developed its own linguistic variety, by which its members can be 
identified “after their tongues,” then linguistic unity has already been lost. Nor is 
there any reason to believe that the languages spoken by Noah’s descendants are 
not roughly equal to each other (and to latter-day language) in their capacity of 
expression. There is no indication given in the biblical text that of the tribal idioms, 
one was a continuation of the pure language of Adam, to which the others would 
have been inferior. Of the numerous questions this raises, the one that particularly 
interests me here is formulated by Umberto Eco in The Search for the Perfect 
Language: “[Genesis 10] is a chink in the armour of the myth of Babel. If languages 
were differentiated not as a punishment but simply as a result of a natural process, 
why must the confusion of tongues constitute a curse at all?” (10). 
Taken seriously, the account in Genesis 10, which I will call the diluvian 
hypothesis, has two major consequences for an inquiry into biblical myths of the 
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origins of language. First, it invites a description of our present, postlapsarian and 
multilingual, condition in terms that are not entirely pessimistic, and it does so not 
only at a historical or scientific level, but also at the level of mythological 
interpretation. After all, as Eco points out, the emergence of multilingualism 
appears to be a development that occurs quite unspectacularly among the 
descendants of Noah – a notion also encouraging us to emphasise the extent to 
which the flood constitutes a new beginning. Secondly, Genesis 10 invites us to 
revisit the story of Babel with a view to other aspects than the punitive dispersion 
of language. In fact, in the light of the several nations already founded by Noah’s 
sons, it becomes possible to read Babel as the preservation of multiculturalism, 
rather than the thwarting of human civilisation. 
I should point out, however, that the split between Genesis 10 and Genesis 
11 – a split that intriguingly begs the question of the ultimate origin of 
postlapsarian language – is not necessarily the symptom of the ineffable nature of 
that origin. It is perfectly possible to imagine the biblical account without this 
ambivalence; in fact, the most common rendition of the linguistic fall, that which 
recalls only the babelian hypothesis, is of this type. What is more important is that 
beneath the split of the linguistic fall into two biblical histories, we find ambiguities 
at work that divide each of these histories into several competing meanings, all of 
which inform and contradict each other in intricate ways. The ambiguous nature 
of the biblical myths thus provides an interpretative framework that will prove 
helpful in unravelling Joyce’s staging of ambiguity in postlapsarian language – not 
least because the Wake’s treatment of the linguistic fall borrows from, but also re-
imagines in significant ways, these biblical narratives. 
 
The flight of the scribe 
In a densely packed passage in the first chapter of Finnegans Wake, we read the 
following with regard to varying explanations for postlapsarian language: 
Somewhere, parently, in the ginnandgo gap between antediluvious 
and annadominant the copyist must have fled with his scroll. The 
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billy flood rose or an elk charged him or the sultrup worldwright 
from the excelsissimost empyrean (bolt, in sum) earthspake or the 
Dannamen gallous banged pan the bliddy duran. (14.16-21) 
Campbell and Robinson are probably the first critics to point out that “Ginnunga-
gap (‘Yawning Gap’) is the name given in the Icelandic Eddas to the interval of 
timeless formlessness between world aeons” (p. 45 fn. 1). It is a gap interrupting 
history itself, and in the context of this passage, it also takes on the form of a 
breakdown of continuous tradition. Ignorance inserts itself, in the shape of a 
sudden, cataclysmic event, between ourselves and the memories whose passing 
down cultural continuity is meant to ensure. The precise nature of this 
interruption is unclear, since we are offered four competing explanations for it. 
Whatever has happened, the record is now lost: “the copyist must have fled with 
his scroll.” This loss of recollection is moreover so comprehensive that not only 
the manner, but also the moment of the loss is nearly forgotten. We cannot date 
it more precisely than as having occurred “between antediluvious and 
annadominant,” at any point in a stretch of time that reaches from before the 
flood right up to the birth of Christ. And the reference to the flood recalls another 
cultural loss: that of the Adamic language as portrayed in the diluvian hypothesis. 
For if we now turn to the different explanations offered for the copyist’s flight, it 
becomes apparent that the linguistic fall is indeed at stake in this passage. 
Let us consider the four alternative histories: the flood, the elk, the 
thunder, and the bird (I will presently explain what a bird has to do with the fourth 
history). I will gloss them out of sequence – bird, flood, elk, thunder – in order to 
develop a thematic interpretation that links the motif of disrupted tradition to the 
interference of an aggressor, a link most explicitly sounded in the last of the four 
histories. This version, which we therefore need to consider first, contains an 
allusion to “Biddy Doran” (112.27) or “Belinda of the Dorans” (111.5), the hen that 
in I.5 scratches up “on that fatal midden” (110.25) an object that “looked for all 
this zogzag world like a goodish-sized sheet of letterpaper” (111.8-9) – ALP’s letter. 
This literary bird, associated with the recovery of the recorded past, is here 
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“banged pan” – presumably killed, fried in a pan, and eaten – by “the Dannamen,” 
a coinage that incorporates a reference to Danish men, that is, to Viking invaders. 
Read in this way, the account adds to the many parallels between ALP’s 
letter and the Book of Kells (for instance, ALP’s letter and the Book of Kells share 
the fate of being lost and subsequently found under a heap of earth). Joyce’s chief 
source for constructing these parallels was Sir Edward Sullivan’s introduction to 
his facsimile edition of the Book of Kells, a paradigm of scholarly analysis both 
painstakingly detailed and wildly speculative, to which chapter five of the Wake 
makes frequent, often parodic, reference.2 The violence towards Belinda Doran, 
and the hurried escape that the scribe makes with his scroll, would then evoke the 
history of attacks on the abbey of Kells described in Sullivan’s text. Sullivan lists 
the Danes as one of the nations that most frequently pillaged the abbey, and states 
that “[h]ow the Gospels of St Columba [i.e. the Book of Kells] survived this century 
of violence and spoliation it is impossible to say” (21). 
In the version we are concerned with here, ALP’s letter proves somewhat 
less fortunate than the illuminated manuscript on which it is modelled. For the 
mother-bird personifies both the unearthing of the past as well as the procreation 
of future generations to engage with that past: “she just feels she was kind of born 
to lay and love eggs (trust her to propagate the species […])” (112.13-4). With her 
destroyed, the letter – the signifier itself – remains undiscovered and barren: it 
takes on the hue of the part of heritage lost in violent cultural transitions and 
intersections, a reading reinforced by other renderings of the passage. As “banged 
upon the bloody door,” it makes use of Danish “døren:” “door” (McHugh 14), 
which contains another hint at the invaders’ nationality and moreover links the 
intruders to the “cad with a pipe” (35.11), who late at night tries to gain entrance 
to HCE’s house by breaking down the door (see 63.20-64.21). McHugh also 
identifies “Danny Mann” (14) as the character from Dion Boucicault’s play The 
Colleen Bawn, in which Danny attempts to murder the title heroine Eily O'Connor: 
another example of violence against a female character. Similarly, the word 
                                                          
2 For instance, the description I.5 gives of different punctuation marks found in ALP’s 
letter’s (see 121.12-3 and 123.33-124.5) echoes the similarly meticulous remarks Sullivan makes 
on punctuation in the Book of Kells (see 26 and 49-50). 
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“gallous” echoes the line from J. M. Synge’s The Playboy of the Western World: 
“there's a great gap between a gallous story and a dirty deed” (act 3, lines 572-3). 
This exclamation refers to Christy Mahon’s attempt to kill his father – a variation 
of the Freudian patricide and thus an instance of violence, if you will, against 
heritage or the past. In addition, “gallous” also conjures up a rooster (Latin 
“gallus”), thus further gendering, and arguably sexualizing, the violence against 
Belinda the hen. 
Yet all these relatively straightforward interpretations of “the Dannamen 
gallous banged pan the bliddy duran” are destabilised by the proximity of the 
phrase “the copyist must have fled with his scroll.” If invasion, plundering, and 
murder are amongst the themes echoed in this history of Belinda the hen, then a 
scribe’s flight could be taken to signify the opposite of what I have so far suggested 
its meaning to be: it would not indicate that the written record ends, but that it 
continues (with the scribe hastily abandoning the abbey under assault to save 
himself and his precious document). In the context of the linguistic fall, the very 
event that apparently represents a destruction may contain an element of 
creation. This motif is only hinted at in the sentence about the scribe – in the form 
of a possible preservation that may catalyse future development – but it is evoked 
more explicitly in two of the other three histories. 
As it is imagined in the other versions, the catastrophic event that 
interrupts history and jeopardizes the remembrance of the past may indeed take 
on an ambiguous shape combining destruction with suggestions of a new 
beginning. The first explanation offered for the copyist’s flight ventures that what 
causes it is the rising of a “billy flood.” In this version of events, it would be God 
who sends a global, punitive disruption, a “biblical flood” (which also seems to be 
irreverently identified here as a “silly flood,” the divine equivalent perhaps of 
someone losing their temper). This proposition repeats the diluvian motif already 
sounded in “antediluvious,” it links the disappearance of the copyist’s scroll to the 
violent new beginning of the flood, which reduces antediluvian culture to a nearly 
clean slate. Yet we should ask what precisely happens to the copyist and his scroll 
once the “billy flood” rises. This question, though it cannot be answered from a 
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narrative point of view, is by no means irrelevant or fanciful. After all, the tale of 
Noah is that of an infinitesimal but all-decisive departure from the destruction of 
all else: the preservation of that which allows a new start. 
Joyce refers to this story, and to its relevance to linguistic matters, in book 
IV, the part of the Wake most concerned with questions of disappearance and 
return. There, at the moment of dawn, a personified bringer of light addresses 
“the cowld owld sowls that are in the domnatory of Defmut after the night of the 
carrying of the word of Nuahs” (593.20-22). These are cold old souls, but they are 
also animals – cows, owls, pigs – that when listed like this evoke the catalogue of 
animals assembled on Noah’s (“Nuahs”) ark. As the night is ending, these animals 
and/or people find themselves in a “domnatory.” This evokes “damnation” and 
the “dominion” of the damned, it thus introduces the theme of after-life. The same 
theme is sounded by the combination of the passage’s particular wording with its 
references to the Ancient Egyptian deities “Tefnut” and “Nu” (McHugh 593): 
elements that, between them, suggest the presence of the Book of the Dead, a 
strand of Egyptian mythology to which the Wake frequently alludes. Then again, 
“domnatory” could also contain a reference to a dormitory, a reassuringly ordinary 
place in which to find oneself at dawn. The dormitory in question is the 
“domnatory of Defmut,” which might indicate the absence not only of spoken 
language (“deaf-mute”) but of all articulate expression and of understanding in 
general – keeping in mind the dialogue between Joyce’s Neanderthals Jute and 
Mutt in I.1 (see 16.10-18.16) as well as Giambattista Vico’s mute prehistoric giants, 
of which more presently. 
If these readings emphasise death (the afterlife) and silence (the mute 
giants), the night that has passed is, crucially, “the night of the carrying of the 
word,” indicating the persistence of a logos – word, language, knowledge, spirit, 
etc. Moreover, “Nuahs” is “Shaun” backwards (McHugh 593), thus evoking the 
character who, as Shaun the Postman, is literally a carrier of words. In view of the 
presence of Noah’s ark, the night in question could then be interpreted as the 
metaphorical darkness of the flood; it is the darkness of a catastrophe that 
extinguishes nearly all of life (plunging it into damnation), but through which one 
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decisive word is nevertheless carried: the essential formulation of life as it is 
preserved aboard the ark, and from which a new (Irish “nua”) civilisation emerges. 
As with the flight of the scribe, there is a split narrative to be found here, a twofold 
movement that indicates both ending and continuation. We should therefore 
consider the possibility that the “billy flood,” too, is charged with ambiguity as to 
whether it is destructive or creative, whether it refutes or confirms the capacity of 
the word to transcend the most violent disruptions. 
Let us furthermore bear in mind that in book IV, where this description of 
Noah’s carrying of the word is found, ALP figures not only as the river Liffey, but is 
also identified with the biblical flood. At the beginning of her monologue, we read: 
“Folty and folty all the nights have falled on to long my hair” (619.20-1), a 
statement partially echoed three pages further on in the phrase: “Afartodays, 
afeartonights” (622.15). Both passages recall the apocalyptic rainfall reported in 
the Bible: “And the rain was upon the earth forty days and forty nights” (Gen. 
7.12). This is significant, since it complicates the symbolism of ALP’s river-form in 
this section of the Wake. Book IV’s description of the river Liffey joining her “cold 
mad feary father” (628.2), the sea, is arguably a representation of death and of 
the fading away of one generation as life makes its cyclical return in the next: in 
ALP’s daughter Issy who is ready to rise from the sea in the form of a cloud (see 
627.3-13), subsequently to return, as rain, to the earth and to the cycle of life. 
In this image, ALP is, on the one hand, the personification of life-force and 
of procreation (as we have seen with regard to Belinda the hen). When she says “I 
feel I could near to faint away” (626.1), “I’m getting mixed” (626.36), or “I am 
passing out” (627.34), her experience symbolises the fading of cultural 
continuance itself. Yet, on the other hand, ALP’s association with the biblical flood 
adds another level of meaning as it identifies her with the cataclysm that 
accompanies each turn of history’s wheel. This merging of opposite meanings, I 
suggest, insists on the violence that constitutes an inherent part of each new 
beginning. ALP’s role is split in a manner that reproduces the split of the flood 
myth itself, in which both divine wrath and divine mercy can be seen to manifest 
themselves. In view of the Wake’s famous cyclical structure, which ends and 
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begins with the river, ALP is herself an end that contains a beginning and a 
beginning that contains an end.3 The Wake’s motif of cyclical recurrence is linked 
to the split between ending and beginning, between renewal and violence. And 
via the biblical flood, this split echoes in the simple phrase: “The billy flood rose.” 
To the growing list of potential sources of violence – which so far includes 
humans and gods – the next alternative history adds another entry when it gives 
the reason for the scribe’s disappearance as: “an elk charged him.” I admit that if 
there are any relevant mythological implications to this particular version, they 
escape me. Although deer feature in Christian, Greek, and Norse mythology, there 
seems to be precious little mention made of elk. (For considerations of space and 
coherence, I will not here discuss the question of how much freedom the Wake 
might grant us to travel along the metonymical lines provided by taxonomic 
relationships). Perhaps, then, this is a Darwinian variant on the broader theme of 
attack and destruction, included in order to remind us that violence is present 
among non-human animals as well. 
That these various forms of violence – cultural, natural, and divine – are all 
linked to the problem of language is made evident by the third history listed in the 
passage, the one centring on the theme of thunder: “the sultrup worldwright from 
the excelsissimost empyrean (bolt, in sum) earthspake.” Contained in this 
explanation is a reference to yet another theory on the origins of language: one 
put forward by eighteenth-century philosopher Giambattista Vico in his New 
Science. Though Vico’s theories are something of a commonplace of Wake 
criticism, it is necessary here to revisit his views on language in light of split 
narratives. This will initially lead the discussion away from the passage on the 
scribe and the “ginnandgo gap;” I will return to it, however, for a number of closing 
remarks. 
According to Vico, the first utterance of spoken words is attributable to a 
manifestation of religious awe that our prehistoric ancestors felt towards the 
                                                          
3 In an unpublished conference paper, John Bishop moreover points out that ALP’s 
monologue combines references to the development of a foetus with references to old age and 
failing health (“Joyce’s Last Word;” referred to in Slote 152). 
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phenomenon of thunderstorms. Vico argues that “[w]hen people are ignorant of 
the natural causes that produce things, and cannot even explain them in terms of 
similar things, they attribute their own nature to them” (§180). Observing thunder 
and lightning, early humans, whom Vico pictures as brutish giants, therefore 
instinctively anthropomorphised the phenomena. They concluded that an 
immensely powerful being, a god, “was trying to speak to them through the 
whistling of his bolts and the crashing of his thunder” (§377). Whether it was 
because they tried to answer the god who was thus earth-speaking from the 
empyrean heavens through his bolts, or whether they wanted to contain the 
terrifying phenomenon by taking possession of it through replicating it, “articulate 
language began to take shape in onomatopoeia” (§447). That is, speech began at 
the precise moment at which the giants attempted to imitate the sound that had 
frightened them. In so doing, they invented the first word of human language: the 
name of the thunder-god, “initially called Ious after the sound of crashing 
thunder”, “Zeus after the whistling sound of lightning”, or “Ur, after the sound of 
burning fire” (§447). 
Finnegans Wake makes frequent reference to Vico’s theory of 
onomatopoeia, most significantly perhaps where it comments on “[t]he 
hundredlettered name again, last word of perfect language” (424.23-4). The name 
or word of one hundred letters (or one hundred and one letters in the case of the 
word that immediately precedes the phrase I cite here) is a thunder-word: a 
distinctive feature that occurs ten times in the Wake and that, in its prolonged 
rumbling, onomatopoeically represents the sound of thunder – a rendering not 
unlike the awestruck stuttering of Vico’s giants. The notion that thunder is the 
“last” instance of “perfect language,” moreover, highlights a critical difference 
between Vico’s theory and the two biblical hypotheses. 
To Vico, articulate language does not begin with Adam adequately naming 
each animal and thus demonstrating his perception of the true nature of each 
being. It begins with the giants inadequately imitating thunder – inadequately 
because thunder is a sound that the human vocal tract is unable to reproduce – a 
phenomenon of whose natural cause they remain ignorant. “Perfect language” 
155 
 
ends with the meteorological event; once the thunder-god has spoken his awe-
inspiring name, what follows is a history of misunderstanding and feeble mimicry. 
Contrasting his account with the biblical one, we therefore find that Vico argues 
that mankind has at no point lost a perfect idiom but has always used language of 
an inferior nature, all the way back to those hardly articulate shouts and grunts 
sprung from the first giants’ state of near bestial unreason. 
It is possible to still read this as an updated version of the biblical narrative, 
as a translation of the biblical portrayal of mankind’s humiliation into the terms of 
an aspiring natural science. For whether fallen language originates from the 
imperfect imitation of thunder or from God’s thundering announcement at Babel, 
the linguistic fall would appear to be associated with complete and irreversible 
failure. In either narrative, our expressive capacity is measured against a sublime 
ideal that, in its unrivalled power, demonstrates nothing if not the feebleness of 
our own language. Joyce’s implementation of Vico, however, is arguably 
somewhat more subversive than this manner of aligning Vico with traditional 
readings of the Bible. In the phrase cited above, Joyce does not cast “perfect 
language” as an object of admiration or yearning, but associates it with an agent 
constituting a perceived threat to humanity: thunder. The aspect of Vico’s thought 
that is brought out in this application is not so much the idea that speech begins 
imperfectly, but the decisive reason for its beginning at all: a perception of danger. 
In Vico’s opinion, the giants’ hardly articulate first expressions were motivated by 
fear. 
Vico’s theory is thus an instance of yet another split narrative, yet another 
account in which destructive and creative forces can be found subsumed in one 
and the same influence. The thunderclap that initiates Viconian history is first of 
all a catastrophic limitation of the giants’ freedom. As it causes them to stutter in 
helpless imitation, it also sends them to live in caves, henceforth afraid of the sky 
that has manifested itself as the native sphere of the frightful divine being. As Vico 
puts it: “Now, with his lightning bolts, which were the source of the greater 
auspices, Jupiter had laid low the giants, driving them underground to live in 
mountain caves” (§ 491). However, there is also an enabling element to the 
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thunder-god’s mythical rage: “By laying them low, he brought them good fortune: 
for they became the lords of the ground in which they dwelt hidden, and so 
emerged as the lords of the first commonwealths” (§ 491). Mary Reynolds 
comments that “Vico’s psychology finds men escaping the bestial primitive state 
only when the superstitious fear of thunder drives them into caves. Seeking 
shelter, they begin to form families; thus, the first step is taken toward the City, 
toward civilized human life” (118-9). It is in response to a perceived threat that the 
giants first discover the concepts of home and community. Thus, in a manner not 
unlike the subject’s entry into the Lacanian symbolic order, the shattering of the 
giants’ narcissistic self-image becomes part of the process that allows them to 
overcome their ignorant state. Yet the cultural achievement exemplified in Vico’s 
first cities remains a profoundly ambiguous one. The organisation of the proto-
households, as Vico imagines them, is violent and cruel enough (see §510), and in 
chapter four, I will discuss how Joyce’s dramatization of the Viconian cities of 
refuge underlines the problem of a critical mass where progress deteriorates into 
chaos and accelerated change collapses into violence. 
Of the four alternative histories, it is therefore in this one that we find the 
most perfect coincidence of constructive and destructive forces. In Vico’s account, 
it is not the fall from Edenic perfection that contains the seed of present-day 
existence; his view is thus opposed to the Christian interpretation of history as 
decline. Yet the description he gives of our forebears also opposes itself to 
approaches that posit human rationality as the attribute that fertilises prehistory’s 
otherwise clean slate. As Bishop observes, Vico’s philosophy also “completely 
breaks with such forms of Enlightenment belief as Cartesian rationalism and 
Lockean empiricism, both of which regarded ‘Reason’ as an eternal manifestation 
of laws of nature” (“Vico’s” 183). In Vico, civilised life (though, again, civilisation is 
not always so civilised) results from the human ability to use palpably imperfect 
means of cognition and communication in order to develop forms of social 
organisation that aspire to improve on an originally brutal situation, but that are 
not – given said imperfection – necessarily guaranteed any success. 
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History, in this view, proceeds through what are essentially limitations 
imposed on an otherwise bestial state. Bishop furthermore argues that it is this 
aspect of Vico’s thinking that can explain for us Joyce’s somewhat peculiar 
proposition “that Freud had been anticipated by Vico” (Richard Ellmann 340). 
Bishop’s suggestion is that the Viconian “crash of thunderbolts […] operates like 
the thunder of the patriarchal ‘NO!’ in Freud’s accounts” (192-3), providing the 
template for the internalisation of law that becomes the basis of self-imposed 
limitations. I would add that the Freudian narrative of prehistoric patricide, like 
Vico’s theorising of the thunder-god, relies on a dialectic of crisis and response in 
order to explain the origins of culture (in Freud’s case: the killing of the father and 
the perturbations caused by it). Thus, I would read as one of the Wake’s 
reformulations of Vico’s theory the phrase: “Now their laws assist them and ease 
their fall!” (579.26). It is only after their fall from self-absorbed supremacy that the 
giants develop the formalisations that underpin culture. Vico insists that a fall, 
precisely because it creates a need to be eased, is also the starting point without 
which there would be no human response at all, no struggle, and therefore no 
foundation for civilization or language as we know it. 
 
Re-reading Babel 
This reading of Vico allows us to return to Derrida’s “Two Words for Joyce” with 
an adjusted focus. At the beginning of this chapter, I began to cite Derrida’s 
definition of God’s declaration of war at Babel as an “act of war which consisted 
in declaring” (33). We should now consider Derrida’s description of that 
declaration as a statement in which all that needs to be declared is God’s own, 
ineffable, name: “the vocable of his choice, the name of confusion” (33). For 
Derrida, the act of declaring war, the divine name, and the process of confusion 
are all one. The three aspects come together in the two words Derrida extracts 
from Joyce’s text, “he war,” which can be found in the following passage in the 
Wake: “And shall not Babel be with Lebab? And he war” (258.11-2). As “he wars,” 
these words report an act or a declaration of war: “he wages war, he declares war, 
he makes war” (22), as Derrida puts it. As “he was” (German: “war”), they are the 
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name of God, the name of him who says of himself: “I am he who is, who am, I am 
that I am” (22-3). But as “he war,” they are the symbol and the symptom of the 
dispersion of language – a multilingual pun (summoning, at least, English and 
German), suspended between meanings that can never be reproduced in their full 
range and their full ambiguity by any expression employing only one language. 
In some respects, Derrida’s description of God’s declaration of war thus 
parallels Vico’s description of Jupiter, who in his thunder speaks his own name and 
who through this announcement condemns humankind to linguistic inferiority. If 
we apply the Viconian insight that this ruinous event can be the starting point for 
a beneficial development, it quickly becomes apparent that Derrida’s text goes 
even further in overturning traditional evaluations. Derrida suggests that God’s 
“act of war is not necessarily anything other than an election, an act of love” (33). 
For when God declared war, “he declared war in tongues [langues] and on 
language and by language, which gave languages” (23, my emphasis). This motif 
of giving through waging war is repeated towards the end of the lecture, where 
Derrida proposes that God, by speaking his name at Babel, puts in place both the 
law and the “gift of languages” (39). To Derrida, the babelian act of war gives 
something in the same gesture in which it takes something away. 
It is worth pointing out again that Joyce’s own rethinking of linguistic 
confusion takes place in an explicit dialogue with the Judeo-Christian tradition. The 
Tower of Babel and the babelian confusion of tongues are recurrent motifs in the 
Wake: “overgrown babeling“ (6.31), “babbelers with their thangas“ (15.12), 
“babel allower“ (64.10), “turrace of Babbel” (199.31), “towerable” (224.12), 
“barrabelowther” (266.10), “babble towers” (354.27), “Tower of Balbus” (467.16), 
“tour of bibel” (523.32), and  “tonguer of baubble” (536.8) are all instances in the 
text that remind us that the chaos of Joyce’s writing happens in close thematic 
proximity to the biblical narrative – a narrative that arguably informs much of the 
language confusion of the Wake and much of its manipulation of the motifs of 
hubris, crime, and falling. Derrida is thus elaborating a biblical connection that 
Joyce himself foregrounds as an important aspect of the Wake’s staging of 
postlapsarian languages. Yet the notion of giving languages that Derrida insists on 
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is not necessarily confined to Babel as it appears in Finnegans Wake, though it 
certainly reflects on this appearance, too. 
In “Des tours de Babel,” an essay on translation the first part of which is in 
many ways a companion-piece to “Two Words for Joyce,” Derrida comments that 
“the text of Genesis links without mediation, immediately, as if it were all a matter 
of the same design, raising a tower, constructing a city, making a name for oneself 
in a universal tongue that would also be an idiom, and gathering a filiation” (195). 
These, then, are the things that God’s intervention is going to disperse, and he will 
disperse them all in one and the same gesture. Further down, we read: 
Can we not, then, speak of God’s jealousy? Out of resentment 
against that unique name and lip [idiom] of men, he imposes his 
name, his name of father; and with this violent imposition, he 
initiates the deconstruction of the tower, as of the universal 
language; he scatters the genealogical filiation. (195-6, my 
emphasis) 
The traditional answer to the question Derrida poses is yes. The 
Babylonians’ vision of “a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto 
heaven” (Gen. 11.4) represents an act of hubris that God cannot tolerate. But the 
actual words that the Bible reports are more ambivalent: “they have all one 
language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, 
which they have imagined to do” (Gen. 11.6, my emphasis). The Babylonians’ 
universal language is a source, or at least a symbol, of their growing power. It is 
part of an empire and of a lineage that is ambitious about perpetuating itself. 
Perhaps, we may even say that the universal Babylonian idiom is part of an 
aggressive political agenda: of a project as intolerable to the rest of humankind as 
it is to God. With this in mind, it becomes possible to interpret the story of Babel 
in the way Derrida reads it in “Des tours de Babel:” as an act of deconstruction 
that “ruptures the rational transparency but also interrupts the colonial violence 
or the linguistic imperialism” (199) of the Babylonian project – all in one and the 
same gesture. In this sense, there would be as much preservation and new 
beginning to the babelian confusion as there is devastation and punishment. 
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This reading, it should be added, makes historical sense, as can be seen 
from a comparison of Derrida’s proposition to the original context of the biblical 
narrative. One account of this context is given in Nicholas Ostler’s 2005 Empires of 
the Word, which provides an expansive overview of ancient and modern examples 
of world languages. Regarding the myth of Babel, Ostler comments that as a 
cautionary tale about the dangers of linguistic confusion, “it is bizarrely ill placed 
as a fable of Babylon, which was notable throughout its history for the leading role 
of a single language. For almost two thousand years this language was 
Akkadian” (59). He adds that “Akkadian was pre-eminently a language of power 
and influence” (60), and elsewhere, he elaborates that from about 2000 BC to 
about 500 BC, the entire region of Mesopotamia was “periodically unified under 
Akkadian-speaking dynasties ruling from Babylon in the south or Assyria in the 
north” (40). 
Ending in approximately 500 BC, the supremacy of Akkadian extends up to 
or indeed beyond the setting down of the biblical Babel narrative. This section of 
the Pentateuch derives from a source known in compositional studies as the 
Yahwist, or “J” (see Baden 68-9). J is typically dated to about 900 BC – well prior 
to the demise of Akkadian in the empire of Babylon – with some critics arguing for 
other dates as late as about 600 BC (see Campbell and O’Brien 5-6). One of the 
most prominent defenders of a late dating, John Van Seters, actually proposes that 
J wrote “within a particular sociohistorical environment – that of the Judean exiles 
in Babylon” (287). That is, Van Seters holds that J lived as a deportee in the so-
called Babylonian exile (which came to an end with Babylon’s defeat at the hands 
of the Persians in the mid-sixth century BC). Based on this hypothesis, Van Seters 
reads the story of Babel as “a deliberate effort to lampoon this massive royal 
construction and all that it stood for” (32-3). 
Ostler, despite his reference to the biblical tradition, does not propose an 
altered reading of Babel based on the facts he presents. But he repeatedly 
discusses the phenomenon of the Akkadian language’s regional dominance with a 
view to political and military power. Together with what we know of the 
Pentateuch’s composition, this suggests a historically founded connection 
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between, on the one hand, the privileged position of a single language as a 
correlative of jingoistic politics, and, on the other hand, the time and place from 
which the portrayal of Babylon emerges as we now encounter it in the Pentateuch. 
For the author or authors of the narrative found in Genesis 11, the link between 
linguistic diversity and political liberty may have been very real. 
In theology, Interpretations that conceive of the Babylonian empire as a 
menacing force whose destruction is a welcome event go back to antique sources 
(though removed from the original setting down of the biblical text by more than 
half a millennium). One of the earliest exponents of this approach is the first-
century historian Flavius Josephus. In his magnum opus, Jewish Antiquities, 
Josephus identifies Nimrod as the Babylonian king who ordered the construction 
of the tower (a non-biblical identification), and writes that Nimrod “little by little 
transformed the state of affairs into a tyranny, holding that the only way to detach 
men from the fear of God was by making them continuously dependent upon his 
own power” (55). As we have seen, current scholarship similarly finds that an 
emphasis on the liberation from Babylonian oppression is historically realistic; 
contemporary research thus underpins the traditional view. However, to suggest 
that the positive inflection of the events at Babel, far from residing in the dire 
necessity of the imposed punishment, can be located in a divine act that is not a 
punishment at all, constitutes an incomparably more recent line of argument. The 
first efforts from within theological studies to revisit the narrative in this manner 
are about contemporary to Derrida’s tentative attempt in the same direction. The 
interpretation flies in the face of the established (but not, I would venture, 
intrinsic) significance of God’s action, for the revisionist approach sees liberation 
in the very multiplicity of languages – what Derrida’s text refers to as the 
deconstruction of the limitations of a monolingual culture. 
One theological account that relies on this political reading of Babel is an 
essay by Latin American theologian José Míguez-Bonino published in 1999. There, 
Míguez-Bonino argues that Babel’s linguistic uniformity may be aligned with the 
symptoms of totalitarian co-optation, and that the Babylonians’ power is that of a 
hegemony threatening not so much divine supremacy as individual human 
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freedom and cultural diversity. The purpose of the myth of Babel, writes Míguez-
Bonino, 
is not primarily the explanation of the origin of diverse languages, 
but the condemnation and defeat of the imperial arrogance and 
universal domination represented by the symbol of Babylon. God’s 
action, then, is twofold: the thwarting of the project of the false 
unity of domination and the liberation of the nations that possess 
their own places, languages, and families. (15) 
It is the second of these two aspects – the setting free of individual characteristics 
– that constitutes a significant reinterpretation of God’s destruction of the tower. 
If the dispersion of language is read as an act of decentralisation and 
democratisation, then this means that the act of war opens up a field of cultural 
undertakings that not only deviate from the centralised, overpowering, and 
megalomaniac project of the single language and the single tower, but that 
actually profit from entrusting themselves to that project’s opposite: a state of 
chaos. 
I go into some detail about all this because I want to suggest that the Wake 
draws on the myth of Babel in precisely this revisionist sense (if not necessarily on 
the basis of the historical perspective sketched above). This reading of Joyce in 
turn falls in place with what Derrida calls Joyce’s double commandment. Regarding 
attempts at linguistic unification, “Two Words for Joyce” conjures up a scenario in 
which translators attempt to capture the meanings contained in the multilingual 
pun “he war:” an enterprise Derrida declares to be futile. “Their very success 
cannot but take the form of a failure. Even if, in an improbable hypothesis, they 
had translated everything, they would by that very fact fail to translate the 
multiplicity of languages” (34). This scenario demonstrates the ethical and political 
use that Joyce’s method makes of plurality, of the babelian confusion. The 
translators’ project, aiming to confine every aspect of “he war” in one translated 
or standardized expression, is in certain ways akin to the scheme of the single 
tower at Babel that would unify all ambition and all work into one structure. But 
Joyce’s “he war” escapes translation of this kind. By creating a scope of meaning 
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that exceeds any single expression in any single language, it indefinitely suspends 
the moment at which its essence would be pinned down, and thus it enables the 
process of elucidation to go on indefinitely, defying the project of comprehending 
the non-word in a single, towering, transcendental interpretation. 
 
Pentecostal plurality 
It should have transpired that, in examining the points of intersection between 
Finnegans Wake and these biblical myths about language, my intention is not to 
privilege any traditional theological frameworks. Rather, the revisionist take on 
the Babel narrative provides us with an important way of linking linguistic chaos 
to certain political and ethical considerations. I moreover hold that this 
applicability of a re-interpretation of Babel to Joyce’s ethics of form is not simply 
fortuitous. By including Vico’s philosophy and the book of Genesis among his 
sources, Joyce positions Finnegans Wake within the traditional Judeo-Christian 
discourse on the flawed nature of language. What is crucial about his use of this 
tradition is that his response to it consists in an amplification, not an evasion, of 
postlapsarian un-decidability. I therefore argue that the revisionist reading of 
Babel is relevant to the Wake. Babel symbolises the loss of a perfect clarity, of a 
pure meaning that would reach its addressee immediately and not see itself 
challenged by rivalling interpretations. But read in the manner I outline above, 
God’s act of war also makes possible a diversity of meaning that could not be 
achieved within an ideal idiom. The biblical narrative thus serves to question the 
very ideal of univocality, in a manner that aligns itself both with Joyce’s use of 
ambiguity and with his implementation of the theme of fallen-ness. 
The myths that the Wake either invokes or newly creates on the subject of 
the linguistic fall (the flight of the scribe, Noah’s ark, Vico’s thunder, the Tower of 
Babel) are all depicted in Joyce’s text as suspended between creative and 
destructive gestures. My suggestion is that we can therefore read these motifs as 
miniatures of the Wake. On the one hand, the split narratives of these myths 
parallel the way Joyce’s non-words remain suspended in a state of plurality and 
cannot be integrated into a unified interpretation like the one envisioned by 
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Derrida’s hypothetical translators. On the other hand, these myths inscribe the 
Wake into a certain counter-tradition of interpreting the linguistic fall and 
postlapsarian ambiguity: a counter-tradition that conceives of them as of 
something other than a failure of language. In other words, a revisionist reading 
of the linguistic fall offers itself as a description of the way Joyce makes the excess 
of language, the irreducible plurality I analyse in chapter two, a part of his artistic 
agenda. 
There is another biblical narrative we should consider here, since it can in 
fact be read as already forming part of the counter-tradition of re-reading Babel. 
It constitutes a possible (New Testament) response to the (Old Testament) 
challenge posed by Babel, and it aligns itself with the idea that the destruction of 
a domineering centre can liberate a vibrant multitude of peripheral endeavours. 
This is the narrative of Pentecost: the moment at which the Holy Spirit descends 
and miraculously enables speakers of different languages to talk to each other. 
The biblical account describes this moment in a rhapsodic enumeration of 
nationalities that bears quoting at length: 
Now when this was noised abroad, the multitude came together, 
and were confounded, because that every man heard them speak 
in his own language. And they were all amazed and marvelled, 
saying one to another, Behold, are not all these which speak 
Galileans? And how hear we every man in our own tongue, wherein 
we were born? Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the 
dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, 
and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the parts of Libya 
about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes 
and Arabians, we do hear them speak in our tongues the wonderful 
works of God. (Acts 2.6-11) 
I cite the passage in its entirety because its juxtaposition of ethnicities and 
nationalities creates an impression that a summary would, by definition, ruin: the 
catalogue exemplifies that Pentecost is a moment of plurality, not unity. The 
people in this narrative are from different cultures and they speak any number of 
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languages; what changes during the described event is their ability to understand 
one another. The Pentecostal miracle thus answers the babelian dispersion not in 
the mode of a re-convergence into a single position, but in that of a dialogue 
between numerous positions. 
Whereas we may or may not read Babel itself as a positive event (and the 
norm, until recently, has been not to), the counterpart represented by Pentecost 
unquestionably takes place within the post-babelian diversity of languages and 
just as unquestionably turns this very diversity into a source of delight. People with 
wildly different backgrounds can suddenly understand one another, can 
communicate with each other, peacefully and in a fruitful manner. Pentecost thus 
affirms the babelian diversification rather than to undo it. In particular, there is no 
miraculous Pentecostal language temporarily granted to all interlocutors in this 
scene. The text states that “they all heard them speak in their own language” – in 
Greek: “ὅτι ἤκουον εἷς ἕκαστος τῇ ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ λαλούντων αὐτῶν” (Acts 2.6 in 
Aland et al.), with “ἰδίᾳ” meaning “own” (as in “idiolect”). The experience of the 
event thus varies from speaker to speaker, and the overall effect is a bustling 
disarray confusing enough to be mistaken by some witnesses for drunkenness (see 
Acts 2.13). 
On the basis of these considerations, I disagree with the description of 
Pentecost that Laurent Milesi offers in “L’idiome babélien de Finnegans Wake,” 
where he writes that “le miracle de la Pentecôte, le don divin des langues venant 
racheter la confusion babélienne, permet de restaurer l’unité linguistique” (178).4 
A few pages further on, Milesi adds that in the Pentecostal event, “[l]’universalité 
et l’intelligibilité sont restaurées localement” (186).5 Milesi is not arguing for the 
presence of a universal idiom at the Pentecostal event – in fact, the terms “unité” 
and “universalité” can be understood to indicate the sort of joyful capacity for 
exchange I also have in mind. Nevertheless, I hold that this way of phrasing 
matters – particularly the double emphasis on restoration – over-emphasises a 
contrast between the destruction of the tower and the creation of Pentecostal 
                                                          
4 “The miracle of Pentecost, the divine gift of languages that undo the babelien confusion, 
allows the restoration of linguistic unity.” (my translation) 
5 “Universality and intelligibility are locally restored.” (my translation) 
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unity, and under-emphasises a more crucial contrast between the totalitarian 
project of building the tower and the liberating momentum of Pentecost. 
In the Pentecostal gathering of voices, the passage that is initiated by the 
erasure of the tower and that leads from orderly univocity to illimitable diversity 
is not reversed: it reaches its zenith (albeit temporarily). I propose to conceive of 
the ensuing interaction along the lines described by theologian Letty M. Russell, 
who writes: “This is a different kind of world than the one envisioned by the 
builders at Babel. Here the unity comes, not through building a tower of 
domination or uniformity, but through communication” (463-4). The miracle of 
Pentecost gives the ability to communicate; what it does not do is to remove the 
element of chaos inherent to postlapsarian speech. On the contrary, what 
Pentecost adds to the babelian confusion is an unreserved toleration of plurality 
and of chaos. This aligns itself with Joyce’s chosen mode of expression in 
Finnegans Wake. If Milesi, based on his definition of Pentecost as a restorative 
gesture that redeems confusion, argues that “L’avènement de la Pentecôte est 
sans cesse déjoué et la réconciliation n’apparaît pas derrière la fusion formelle des 
langues dans le moule de l’idiome wakien” (178),6 I would suggest, by contrast, 
that the language of the Wake is already Pentecostal – precisely because of this 
indefinite suspension through which the text boldly affirms chaos, plurality, the 
other, the unknown, uncertainty, and so on. 
However, if we are to translate “Pentecost” from the name of a specific 
mythological event into a theoretical term describing a certain way of writing, a 
number of qualifications are needed. First of all, although the Wake is a 
multilingual text, I am not referring to that multilingualism per se when I discuss it 
as Pentecostal writing. The remarkable feature of the Pentecostal event is that in 
bringing together heterogeneous and possibly contradictory outlooks, cultures, 
and languages, it generates a productive (though not entirely harmonious) 
discourse. Where we would expect to find a disintegration into the flat 
meaninglessness of white noise – the usual result of a merging of too much 
                                                          
6 “The arrival of Pentecost is continually suspended and the reconciliation cannot manifest 
itself behind the formal fusion of languages in the cast of the Wakean idiom.” (my translation) 
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information – we instead find an abundance of meaning. It is this abundance on 
the brink of total confusion, an abundance we also find in the Wake, that I propose 
to label “Pentecostal.” And although the Wake’s multilingualism certainly 
contributes to its production of this effect, a text does not have to be multilingual 
to partake in Pentecostal heterogeneity. Nor is the Pentecostal chaos of the Wake 
in every case the result of Joyce’s use of non-words, although non-words are 
certainly this text’s most notable and most far-reaching enactment of Pentecostal 
plurality. 
For similar reasons, Pentecostal writing is not related to the project of 
artificial languages such as Esperanto. These constructed languages aim to meet 
the challenge of linguistic diversity by means of unification. Where they synthesize 
existing languages, it is to make themselves available to an international 
community of speakers by providing one system easily accessible to all. The 
Pentecostal event, by contrast, maintains the differences between those present 
at it even as it allows them to communicate with each other. Similarly, Pentecostal 
writing, as we encounter it in the Wake, intertwines various layers of signification, 
but it does so in a manner that invites juxtaposition and re-separation rather than 
fusion. The difference between this way of writing and the goal of most artificial 
languages is pointed out by Norris, who remarks that 
[u]nlike artificial or “auxiliary” languages whose purpose is to 
overcome the Babelian diversity of national languages, Joyce’s 
“mutthering pot” (20.7) in the Wake appears to be a dump or 
rubbish heap like ALP’s scavenger sack, in which the fragments 
merely mix and mingle to be distributed anew. (Decentered 
Universe 129) 
The essence of Pentecostal writing as I would describe it hinges on this capacity 
“to be distributed anew.” The various meanings that coexist in the Wake’s 
Pentecostal utterances, although they interact productively, cannot be subsumed 
under a single heading, and they defy complete synthesis – which is precisely how 




And another clarification is required. In proposing to dub the language of 
Finnegans Wake Pentecostal, I am not suggesting that one should read Joyce’s text 
for a particular exegesis of that biblical story (even less for any affinity with 
Pentecostal forms of Evangelicalism). My application of this theological framework 
to the Wake is rather intended to demonstrate that we should not hastily term 
Joyce’s text an example of babelian confusion without problematizing what is 
meant by this shorthand – Babel – that perhaps presents itself somewhat too 
readily when we try to describe what Finnegans Wake does with the plurality of 
languages. For to contrast Babel with Pentecost in the classical manner – as fall 
and redemption, as punishment and resolution – cannot do justice to how much 
the Wake is in fact enjoying the fall. 
Finnegans Wake fully enjoys both the theme of the fall – and the possibility 
of its positive inflection, as in Joyce’s use of Vico – and the linguistic fall itself, the 
linguistic condition that may be subsumed under this name. Thus, in Joyce Effects, 
Attridge comments: “Finnegans Wake retells the myth, a number of times, from a 
different perspective: neither lamenting language’s fall nor trying to secure its 
recovery, it finds its pleasures in the knowledge that language, by its very nature, 
is unstable and ambiguous” (161). With the Wake, rather than holding on to a 
traditional understanding of Babel that can only over-emphasise the myth’s 
negative connotations, we should think Babel in Pentecost and Pentecost in Babel. 
In multiplicity, chaos is implied. In turn, a certain chance is part of the fall, as we 
will also see at the end of the next chapter, where I discuss Felix Culpa, the 
fortunate fall, of which the linguistic fall at Babel can be regarded as one version. 
We encounter a re-imagination of Babel whenever, in reading the Wake, we are 
caught up between the creative and the destructive aspects of the text’s double 
commandment. 
This is not to say that the story of Pentecost is entirely absent from the 
Wake. The description of HCE’s escape in I.4 makes reference to “pentecostal 
jest” (99.21). That it does so shortly after HCE’s resurrection in the same chapter 
(see 83.4-6) may allude to Pentecost’s following Easter in the liturgical year, 
particularly since this link is referred to, in the quiz of I.6, when HCE appears as 
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“Mr Easterling of pentecostitis” (130.8-9). I.6 also merges Pentecost with a 
museum in “pintacostecas” (152.27-8). Then, the term appears again in the séance 
in III.3, in the phrase “Paas and Pingster’s pudding” (550.12-3), “Pfingsten” being 
German for “Pentecost.” Finally, Book IV refers to the story’s motif of drunkenness 
in “losing her pentacosts after drinking their pledges” (624.34-5). As is readily 
apparent from this list, my terminological choice is not a response to Joyce’s 
implementation of Pentecost itself. It rather reflects my proposition to draw on 
instruments from theology that go beyond the (standard version of the) Babel 
story, as a way of responding to how Joyce re-imagines the multilingualism and 
the plurivocality on which that story centres. In short, if we examine Joyce’s use 
of the Babel narrative as one of his strategies in problematizing language itself, its 
complexity and imperfection, then the revisionist style of his implementation of 
the myth requires, on our part, a more sophisticated theological toolkit than has 
so far largely been applied to his text. 
To clarify this, let us return to the flight of the scribe, and consider again 
the four alternative histories presented in that section. Their listing, we can now 
say, constitutes an instance of Pentecostal plurality. The gesture of offering 
disparate accounts without giving any indication that one of them is authoritative 
replaces hegemonic singularity with a multiplicity of interpretations, none of 
which can be singled out as the central one, and whose very simultaneity takes on 
an importance of its own. No reading, however astute, can do away with the fact 
that this passage offers several answers simultaneously, and that these answers, 
which should exist in a state of mutual exclusion, speak to each other. Another 
Pentecostal moment, then, can be found in the phrase “the copyist must have fled 
with his scroll.” I have already agued that this flight may be taken to signify either 
the loss of information or its rescue, and that this allows us to read the sentence 
as reporting both an end and a beginning. 
We can now add that this split between destruction and creation is a 
Pentecostal one – in fact, this particular ambiguity between preservation and 
collapse is present in all cases of Pentecostal plurality. The Pentecostal overload 
of meaning already contains the breakdown of meaning, and this flaw of 
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Pentecostal writing in turn contains its productivity. But as with the list of 
alternative explanations, our interpretation must not stop here, with a neat 
separation of the elements whose simultaneity we establish. If we take “the 
copyist must have fled with his scroll” to mean that the passing on of information 
has been interrupted, that we have no access to the knowledge recorded in the 
missing document, then what we nevertheless have knowledge of is this lack itself, 
which we immediately begin to interpret. In other words, there is something like 
an oscillation here that touches on both versions of the split narrative. Something 
has been lost, but it is a partial loss, for although we cannot say what has been lost 
or how (or even when), we know about the loss itself, and thus loss and 
preservation come together in one and the same event. 
What, then, of my claim that Pentecostal language defies synthesis? Is not 
the notion of such a partial loss a quintessential synthesis of the flight of the 
scribe? My answer would be that although the idea of a partial loss combines some 
of the text’s connotations, it is far from exhausting the text. The split that disrupts 
the narrative of the scribe does not disappear once this synthesis, the story of a 
partial loss, is found. On the contrary, the split remains present in that story as the 
very result brought about by the partial loss. A partial loss or a noticeable lack – 
which amounts to the same – is what makes a split narrative possible. In order for 
such a narrative to exist at all, some remainder must persist and be noticed, some 
interest must be aroused in order to get underway a series of alternative 
hypotheses regarding that remainder, however distorted by lack it might be. Yet 
if we could remember, communicate, or otherwise summon into presence the 
precise details of that lack, it would cease to be lack, and with it would cease to 
exist any space for multiple interpretations. Here, destruction and creation of 
meaning are truly interdependent. 
It is in this view that the flight of the scribe can be read as a passage mise 
en abyme. The text here addresses the conditions of its own existence as a split 
narrative, by reflecting on how loss or distortion of information leads to a state of 
uncertainty. It also addresses the conditions of the existence of non-words, which 
are possible only if the record has been disrupted – but not completely, not 
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beyond a point at which the knowledge that something is absent still comes to us 
and entices us to interpret this lack itself. A Joycean non-word is not a word, but 
it is close enough to being one to have us look for words it resembles. Like the 
copyist’s flight, each of the Wake’s non-words is thus split into several meanings 
that cannot be gathered under the heading of one translation or one 
interpretation, and which nevertheless all communicate with each other as we 
indefinitely oscillate between them. 
The fundamental problem with a Pentecostal plurality, therefore, is that it 
is not a totality, set, or pattern that controls or summarises its components. It does 
not branch out from the semantic centre of an equivocality. We can clarify this by 
considering some examples. Is “he war” an expression in German or in English? 
Does “Nuahs” mean Noah, Shaun, or new? What exactly does “Allmaziful” mean 
(and how many languages does it mean it in)? Or, to give an example not based 
on a non-word, what kind of fusion or confusion is taking place between Shem and 
Shaun? A co-operation? A conflict? A supernatural merging of their existences? A 
split identity? Or simply a difficulty, in particular instances, of distinguishing 
between them? And how, stranger still, are we to unite Issy the girl and Issy the 
cloud? My point is that we can no more integrate these instances of plurality into 
the hierarchy of an “either/or” than we can subject them to a neat synthesis. What 
we are left with, then, is the “and” of an open-ended list without centre or 
margins. Yet the excess of this list is not necessarily a question of quantity or 
magnitude. It is not the meaningless chaos of all-inclusiveness but a more 
intriguing state – an intensification of the excess of writing – in which chaos stems 
from the fact that what is included does not naturally divide itself into discrete 
units, that this division has to be undertaken in an identification that already 
changes the material it distributes. 
To appreciate the role Pentecostal diversity plays in the Wake is therefore 
not to abandon all caution and to indiscriminately accept any interpretation we 
care to invent. On the contrary, the appreciation of Pentecostal plurality prompts 
us to question how we construct meaning, and to rigorously examine the 
simplifications we make when we translate non-words into words. We can always 
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construe inapplicable readings of a non-word. However, a serious consideration 
of the material manipulation that any reading of a non-word requires must lead 
us to acknowledge that it is difficult to decide what readings are in fact applicable, 
and that it is altogether impossible to once and for all synthesise or hierarchically 
arrange these readings: to bring the act of translation to a halt and produce a 
stable conclusion. It is precisely by having us grapple self-consciously with our 
anxious search for common denominators or stabilising centres that Joyce makes 
us comprehend the extent of his text’s resistance to systematisation, the extent 
of its refutation of purity and univocality as the proper realm of artistic production, 
and its defiant reliance on postlapsarian fallibility instead. 
The split meanings of non-words are possible only in a state in which 
something is missing, in which we encounter, and indeed acknowledge, a palpable 
lack or an absence made present. What is missing is the copyist’s scroll, his 
document, perhaps we could even say, his letter – ALP’s letter, in fact. There is 
more at stake in this identification than a superficial resemblance of the images in 
question. The scroll that is missing and the letter that is absenting itself are two 
representations of one and the same thing: they both symbolise that which would 
once and for all remove uncertainty and give us a conclusion. It is the loss of this 
possibility that destabilises language by introducing into it the problems of 
equivocality, plurality, and suspension. And this loss afflicts all forms of linguistic 
capability. Pentecostal writing, for instance the writing of the Wake, is therefore 
not fundamentally different from other language use; it is the exemplification and 
radicalisation of what could be called the fallen state of all language. What is 
particular about Joyce’s procedure is that, in the Wake, the postlapsarian split 
between producing meaning and subverting meaning is not buried, hidden, or 
suppressed. It is made explicit in a text that challenges us to engage in a plurality 
of meaning even if, in order to do so, we have to acknowledge that this plurality 
results from the anxiety-inducing loss of the letter/scroll. 
This is to say that the creation of a Pentecostal plurality of meaning is not 
a problem that can be reduced to the structure of the text itself. It is also a task 
imposed on the reader. The counter-intuitive nature of this task – to accept Joyce’s 
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head-on implementation of the loss of essence, his making-present of its absence 
– can hardly be overstated. In our critical endeavours to make sense of Finnegans 
Wake, we more or less by definition tend to treat the difficulty of this text as if it 
were an underlying but (after a period of initiation) unobtrusive principle. That is, 
we run the risk of nominally acknowledging the difficulty only to subsequently 
exclude it from our readings, which it could only serve to destabilise. Yet whether 
we acknowledge it or not, this difficulty introduces a certain built-in shortcoming 
(to which the interpretation I develop here, too, falls prey whenever it settles on 
a specific meaning) into our anxious movement towards minimal stability, towards 
that which need no longer be questioned. A non-word destabilises the 
interpretations it provokes. It subjects each of our readings to the double 
commandment: “create, and destroy what you created,” bestowing on it the 
status of provisional hypothesis, making it one in a potential series, thus putting 
into question its conclusiveness. 
Pentecostal writing does not introduce this instability into our readings 
simply for the sake of flaunting technical brilliance. As I hope to have shown, such 
writing embraces instability so as to offer an alternative programme to those 
forms of writing that strive to approximate the ideal linguistic state by controlling, 
as far as possible, each expression’s scope of meaning. Such modes of writing 
subject themselves to a limitation structurally akin to that of the monolingual 
project of Babel: namely, to achieve univocity at the cost of rigidity. To this vision, 
Pentecostal writing opposes an agenda that finds in ambiguity itself – in the very 
flaw that separates us from the ideal state – a force that creates new opportunities 
for expression. Finnegans Wake not only subscribes to such an agenda, but details 
it: by describing the excess of writing that I discuss in chapter two, and by inflecting 
some of the old and new myths forming part of its source material so as to 
emphasise the uses of splits and imperfections. If we want to take seriously this 
poetic agenda, we must remain careful not to cast Joyce’s non-words as obstacles 
to a clarity that well-informed criticism would be tasked to bring about. 
If we posit that the partial and provisional nature of our readings can be 
overcome through sufficiently accurate interpretation, if, in other words, we aim 
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to identify one translation (or indeed a given number of translations) of a Joycean 
non-word as the one whose overriding likelihood can hold at bay all alternatives, 
and if we venture that in the process of translating the non-word in question into 
a limited number of standard words, we overlook no relevant possibility and 
exclude only such readings as are demonstrably invalid, then the very first step of 
our exegetical procedure is to undo Joyce’s decision to use a non-word rather than 
a word. Thus, we return the outrageous otherness of his text to the very rigidity 
from which Joyce has risked to sever his writing. 
The emphasis that my interpretation places on this severance, however, 
must raise the question whether the account of Pentecostal plurality I give here 
may not be a misapprehension that perceives unfathomable conundrums where 
there are in fact barely disguised standard words. After all, many of Joyce’s non-
words are the result of slight alterations of expressions (in English as well as in 
other languages) that seem all too recognisable under the veneer of their 
unfamiliar inscription. To address this problem – a crucial one for the approach I 
am outlining here – I will devote the final subsection of this chapter to discussing 
an article by Geert Lernout, “The Finnegans Wake Notebooks and Radical 
Philology.” Lernout’s approach goes further than most interpretations of the 
Wake in making a case for identifying what exactly Joyce wrote. It does so on the 
basis of the following proposition: “Take away intention and context, and the only 
thing left to say about a text is that it can mean anything at all” (47) – which is of 
course tantamount to saying that it means nothing whatsoever. 
I partly agree with this claim. For reasons outlined in the previous chapter, 
I think it impossible to univocally identify an author’s intentions; they cannot serve 
as an unmovable basis of interpretation. But I do believe that they should form 
part of what is at stake in interpretation. The notion of a creative and at least partly 
intentional process that gives a text its shape – a structure that, although 
constitutively excessive, is also distinctive as well as unique, along the lines of what 
Attridge terms singularity (though this should not be taken to stand in opposition 
to what I call plurality) – such a notion does not, I hold, return us to the intentional 
fallacy. On the contrary, as I have also indicated in chapter two, the process of 
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interpretation as such can be conceptualised as an interaction with the author’s 
spectral presence as it comes into being through interpretative query. It is only 
through a response to the singularity of Joyce’s writing that we are able to read 
this writing’s pluralities without producing meaningless isotropy. Crucially, 
however, the nature of any inheritance is necessarily bilateral. The notion of 
listening to Joyce’s own voice is thus complicated by the ventriloquism that lends 
the text the only vitality it can posses: a spectral vitality. To deny the risk that 
accompanies spectrality does not mean a return to the safe ground of Joyce’s text. 
I would argue that such a denial denies the text itself, by denying the extraordinary 
risks that Joyce’s non-language requires us to take. 
If, in examining this requirement as an authorial gesture, the following 
subsection discusses Lernout’s article at some length, it is for two reasons. First, 
many critical approaches, although they stop short of what Lernout’s title calls the 
radical nature of his methodology, nonetheless implicitly or explicitly agree with a 
goal that is central to Lernout’s procedure: to oppose one meaning to another, to 
dismiss some meanings by finding others sound (and thus to stabilise meaning and 
bring the interpretative process to a halt). In a certain sense, of course, this is 
nothing if not a direly needed procedure to bring to Finnegans Wake. I have 
argued that the instability Joyce imposes on his text is effectively an unbearable 
one, that it is a source of anxiety, and that the Wake actively relies on our desire 
for meaning. 
Yet the double bind that we cannot escape with the Wake is that in 
responding to this desire, our constructions of meaning also pass over certain 
aspects of Joyce’s intention. The following discussion will help to clarify why an 
appeal to the legitimate nature of one particular reading is not, by itself, a sound 
basis on which to infer the irrelevance of other readings. My second reason for 
examining Lernout’s text is that he posits a distinction between private readings 
and objective readings in such a way that examining this distinction will prove 
helpful in detailing my own approach. The interdependence of the private and the 
public (though not in their juridico-economic opposition) is crucial to my own 





To approximate the singular creative event of Joyce’s writing, Lernout proposes 
the consultation of the notebooks in which Joyce jotted down preparatory 
materials for his composition. Drawing on these notebooks serves as a kind of 
homing beacon, keeping our readings from losing sight of the scope and the focal 
points of Joyce’s creative labour. “It is only when we refer to the notebooks and 
the drafts that we can decide with some degree of probability which parts of the 
world went into the book and which parts probably did not” (45). This referencing 
takes the form of identifying the standard expressions underlying Joyce’s non-
words, as well as, where possible, tracing these source-words “to the text from 
which they were taken by Joyce” (37). It is an identification that, when undertaken 
with the care and rigour that Lernout stipulates, promises to reveal in some detail 
“the chaos of ideas out of which Finnegans Wake developed” (34). By contrast, 
immediately before the first sentence I cite here, we read that “[i]f we decide to 
ignore the notebooks – and maybe we have every right to do so – we can only 
continue to read as much of our world into the Wake: each reader will then 
inevitably create his or her own private Wake” (45). The private text, in the 
function in which it appears here, is something like the text filtered through our 
own individual chaos of ideas. Insofar as it can be understood as Lernout’s term 
for the isotropy of an interpretation that can go absolutely anywhere, it is a term 
that requires careful analysis. 
First of all, if an isotropic reading is private, then what are we to make of 
the claim that a reading in good faith, a radically philological reading, is to be based 
on Joyce’s notes? It would be too simple here to maintain that Joyce’s notebooks 
constitute private records. In fact, Lernout rejects this approach quite clearly; he 
writes: “I do not believe that the notebooks are private documents in more than 
the most pedestrian of meanings” (46). This could be demonstrated in various 
ways – for instance, we have evidence that Joyce took some care to preserve the 
notebooks. They are not, however, part of the book published as Finnegans Wake. 
One could immediately object that such a publication would have been as 
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impractical as unnecessary, and the point is certainly not sufficient to discredit the 
notebooks’ status as partaking in criticism’s public enterprise as well as in Joyce’s 
authority. But it does raise the question of whether the public realm can be treated 
as a homogeneous space, or whether it is traversed by certain fault-lines – and if 
so, what the relations are in which the various manifestations of the public stand 
to each other. 
The relation of avant-texte to text is of course a problem that is everything 
but unknown to genetic approaches. In addressing it, however, Lernout opts for a 
solution that raises further questions. He takes on board an axiom he adopts from 
Danis Rose, who, in the introduction to James Joyce’s The Index Manuscript, states 
that “Finnegans Wake is an ordered aggregate of elements each of which can be 
identified with a unit entered in one of the notebooks” (xiii, qtd. in Lernout 30). 
That is, Lernout follows Rose in resolving the relation between the two public 
archives – Finnegans Wake and the notebooks – by concluding that this relation 
can under certain circumstances be treated as a mode of identity: namely, as a 
translation. Rose continues: “The translation of each unit from notebook to draft 
was intermediated by referring that unit to one of a small number of contextual 
invariants” (xiv, qtd. in Lernout 30). 
If such an identity between text and source material can indeed be 
assumed, then it is curious that Lernout still concedes that we may have “every 
right” to ignore the notebooks. Here is the explanation that directly follows the 
passages I have already cited from this section of Lernout’s text: 
The difference between the two approaches is one that is familiar 
from recent practice in the performance of classical music. Either 
we attempt to play the Brandenburg Concertos or the Goldberg 
Variations or the Ninth Symphony in the way Bach or Beethoven 
would have wanted them performed, or we play them our own 
way. The two approaches are irreconcilable because we have set 
ourselves different tasks. (45-6) 
In one case, the task consists in the public reconstruction of the author’s 
intention, in the other case, it is to explore the mobility and variety of private 
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readings. This strikes me as a problematic distinction for two reasons. First, it is 
not obvious why reading with our own concerns in mind – playing our own way – 
should necessarily be opposed to what Joyce would have wanted. Observant 
interpretations may inherit from Joyce’s thought so as to think about our own 
contexts in his spirit. And where the concerns of the reader can indeed be seen to 
displace the concerns and the context of the writer, it is by no means certain that 
this invariably leads to private interpretation in the sense of what, in another 
article, Lernout terms “textual solipsism” (“James Joyce” 96) – that is, to a reading 
primarily interested in its own hermeneutical or aesthetic powers. Readings that 
bring their own contemporary issues and theoretical models to bear on Joyce may 
do so in order to explore social, political, and ethical questions. Where this is the 
case, reading our own way, even along the lines of idiosyncratic or anachronistic 
procedures, constitutes an interpretative enterprise that is anything but confined 
to a solipsistic or private realm (one could argue, though I will not do so here, that 
it is more public than readings concerned solely with what one person – Joyce – 
wrote). 
Secondly, and more importantly to my present argument, the division 
cannot do justice to the intrinsic complexity of the public sphere that encompasses 
both the notebook entries and the published form of the Wake. An appeal to what 
Joyce would have wanted does not, in the complexity of this sphere, 
unambiguously delineate a reading, for this complexity points us in the direction 
of an authorial intention that is itself varied and potentially mobile. Let me 
illustrate this understanding of intentionality by giving another example from the 
field of music. In a documentary by British filmmaker Peter Greenaway, the 
composer John Cage tells an anecdote that involves authorial intention. Cage, too, 
is talking about the relation between the performance of a piece of music and the 
intention of the artist who wrote the piece (in particular, Cage uses the story to 
illustrate his own sceptical attitude with regard to any recording of music, a 
practice that gives the impression of a musical activity where, according to Cage, 
none is taking place). To make his point, Cage narrates a personal experience: 
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I was present at a concert, conducted by Stravinsky, of one of his 
own works, and I was sitting behind a ten year old child and his 
father, and after the performance was finished, the child turned to 
his father and said: “That isn’t the way it goes!” (Greenaway 41.30 
– 41.50) 
For Cage, the anecdote demonstrates the danger of conceiving of one – 
recorded – version of a musical piece as of its essence, as how “it goes.” There is 
no indication given in the interview what version the child in the story is comparing 
the performance to. If we follow Cage’s assumption that it is a record, there are 
two principal cases we can imagine. Either the boy is familiar with a record 
conducted by someone else. Or, more intriguingly, he knows another version 
interpreted by Stravinsky himself. What the latter possibility illustrates is that an 
artist’s, for instance Stravinsky’s, interpretation, re-interpretation, or reprisal of 
their own work may always challenge our assumptions about how they 
themselves would have wanted this work to be played or understood – even if 
these assumptions are based on the most authoritative of interpretations, 
including previous interpretations by the artist himself or herself. This is to say that 
in our attempts to conceptualise intention, we must keep in mind that Stravinsky 
or Joyce or any other artist may at any point have changed their mind or – more 
problematically still – may have had in mind more than one thing at the same time. 
This potential plurality of authorial versions complicates the notion of 
performing a work as intended, in a scientific mode not afflicted by the 
complexities of private fickleness. For the complexity in question may be that of 
the artist: an artist employing a notation or a language capable of transporting the 
plurality of her or his intentions. Language’s capacity for plurality, in turn, 
destabilises the clear-cut distinction between the public mode and the concept 
Lernout uses to describe unscientific reading: private language. Citing Derrida, 
Lernout proposes a connection between what he calls “a private form of 
writing” (46) and what Derrida, in “Signature Event Context,” says about the 
possibility of disengagement and citational graft which belongs to 
the structure of every mark, spoken or written, and which 
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constitutes every mark in writing before and outside of every 
horizon of semio-linguistic communication; in writing, which is to 
say in the possibility of its functioning being cut off, at a certain 
point, from its “original” desire-to-say-what-one-means [vouloir-
dire] and from its participation in a saturable and constraining 
context. (12, qtd. in Lernout 46). 
With regard to this possibility of citational graft, Lernout states that “[a] radical 
philology simply does not see its relevance. I don’t think there is such a thing as a 
private language in this fundamental sense” (46-7). Here, Lernout’s usage of 
“private” can be seen to stretch the term to the point of encompassing its 
opposite. For the grafting that “Signature Event Context” is concerned with is not 
a total uncertainty, deriving from something like unrestrained interpretative 
power and allowing for the construction of private/irrelevant meaning. Derrida is 
arguing almost the exact opposite: that a subtle but irreducible uncertainly results 
from any reader’s all too limited powers vis-à-vis the task of public/relevant 
interpretation. 
The limitation in question is iterability, without which no legibility can 
come about. The citational graft, then, refers to the inaccessibility of essence, not 
to a belated change interfering with an essence that is otherwise secure, which 
appears to be Lernout’s reading. As Derrida puts it in the passage Lernout cites, 
citational graft “belongs to the structure of every mark, spoken or written,” and it 
defines this structure “before and outside of every horizon of semio-linguistic 
communication,” since it represents the mark’s very functioning as a mark. The 
possibility of a signifier’s being iterable, and legible in its iteration, is the same as 
the possibility of its being cut off from one context and appearing in another: “in 
writing, which is to say in the possibility of its functioning being cut off”. If this is 
still a somewhat awkward formulation, we read, a few lines further down in 
Derrida’s text: “This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but 




Derrida is not presenting an alternative to, or giving a recommendation 
against, contextualisation. He is arguing that even the best contextualisation we 
can carry out still depends on decisions made by the reader in ways that cannot 
be exhaustively controlled. If citational graft is a possibility, it is so in the sense of 
an underlying condition such that we can never be quite sure to what extent 
grafting has taken place and what direction it may have taken us in. It is not 
possible (for a reader) to identify a vouloir-dire as it would have existed 
“originally,” outside any context. Nor is it possible (for a writer) to saturate a 
context with a signifying gesture’s wanting-to-say in such a manner as to ward off 
the fact that the gesture’s legibility will consist in its appearance in other contexts 
whose relation to the original one is imperfectly knowable. 
When Lernout goes on to suggest that “[a] radical philology limits the 
inquiry to the original desire-to-say of any form of writing and to its participation 
in a saturable and constraining context” (47), he therefore adopts the position of 
a metaphysics of presence to which intention appears as monovalent, inert, and 
accessible (as public knowledge) but which leaves unexamined the private co-
ordinates of this very appearance (and I will presently discuss the particular 
perspective that radical philology brings to bear on Joyce’s text). The uncertainty 
that Lernout attempts to banish by subsuming it under the category of the private 
thus returns to haunt public discourse; it forms the condition of any gesture of 
making public through language. If the citational graft, and the possibility of 
misreading that comes with it, are to be regarded as instances of private language, 
then private language is at work within public language, indeed private language 
is what makes public language possible and what is thus at the core of public 
language – a point I will expand on in the next chapter. 
To be clear, the blurring of this distinction does not mean that 
intentionality is disregarded. To acknowledge that we lack a language that would 
be perfectly public does not result in an outlook to which signification has no 
meaning apart from whatever a reader wants it to mean. This brings me back to 
the point that Pentecostal plurality resides not only in the number of possible 
interpretations, but also in the difficulty of deciding between them: that is, on the 
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difficulty of measuring and comparing the imperfection of individual 
interpretations. Before I continue this discussion, however, let me briefly address 
the problem of infinite interpretability. Lernout’s use of the expression “freedom 
of intentionality” (36) in his critique of the deconstructive approach leaves open 
whether the freedom he has in mind is an infinite one, yet to comment on the 
point in general should help to clarify my own position. 
The claim that interpretation goes on indefinitely and produces what is at 
least potentially an infinite number of different readings is not the same as saying 
that a signifying gesture can be made to mean absolutely anything. In inferring the 
latter from the former, the mistake that is committed is to conflate infinity with 
universality. This distinction, however, is fundamental: an infinite series does not 
include everything. The series of even numbers, for instance, is infinite; yet it does 
not include the number one. There is in fact an infinite series of numbers located 
outside of it: the series of odd numbers. But not even this infinity of numbers not 
included demonstrates that the series of even numbers is anything else than 
infinite. Analogously, it is possible to invent an altogether absurd reading of a text. 
Yet even if we were to list an infinite number of unacceptable interpretations, this 
would not suffice to prove that the number of acceptable interpretations must be 
finite. The assertion that interpretation must be limited, in the sense that there 
must be cases located outside the acceptable range of reading, is no way opposed 
to the assertion that interpretation is potentially infinite, for an infinity does not 
cover a universal ground, and indefinite interpretation is therefore not opposed 
to an exploration of intentionality. 
Having said this, let me turn to the more specific critique Lernout offers of 
interpretations based on what he terms freedom of intentionality. He ventures 
that “[t]he results of such interpretations are more or less interesting”, but he 
immediately adds that “[f]indings that derive from a radical philological approach 
belong to a different category: they are true in a different sense for the simple 
reason that they can be proven wrong” (48). Therefore, they form part of “a type 
of research that is falsifiable and therefore scientific in Karl Popper’s sense of the 
word” (48). The problem with this argument is that the findings the philological 
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approach produces are falsifiable in this precise manner only in tests that refer 
them to the notebooks, not to Finnegans Wake. Where this approach offers to 
resolve the conundrum of a Joycean non-word – that is, where the notebooks can 
provide a standard word as the source on which the non-word can be shown to be 
based – the notebook entry is by the same token different from the expression 
found in the Wake. As soon as we bring a source-word to the Wake, the possibility 
of falsifying it is complicated by the same problems of material manipulation I have 
been discussing throughout. 
If a private reading is one applying a strategy that does not arise 
immediately with the text itself, then we have to ask how a philological strategy 
of reverse engineering that forgoes portions of Joyce’s text in favour of a different 
source is anything else than a private reading. The proposed answer would 
presumably be that although this strategy (as indeed absolutely any strategy of 
reading) brings something of its own to the text to be read, it nevertheless draws 
directly on Joyce’s authority, included in the interpretative process in the form of 
his notebooks. Yet, in thus reconsidering matters, it is already becoming apparent 
how, in relation to Finnegans Wake, the authorial authority contained in the 
notebooks can only ever be a partial authority, because the notebooks are only 
part of the public archive and convey only part of the authorial intention. This is 
what I try to indicate in the above example about Stravinsky conducting his own 
work. In such cases of witnessing what amounts to one authorial version, we do 
not automatically have empirical grounds on which to assert that the artist also 
intends only this one thing with this particular creative gesture (in fact, we will see 
that authorial intention itself can be said to contain private elements: not in the 
sense of elements irrelevant to interpretation, but in the sense of elements that 
remain unknowable). 
This is first of all to say that it is always possible that Joyce draws on a 
notebook entry in order to achieve a meaning different from the entry’s original 
connotations. One process through which Joyce’s use can transport a word away 
from its original meaning is described by Dirk Van Hulle, who writes: “Since each 
B-notebook is based on several source texts, it constitutes a creative environment 
184 
 
in which a note from a newspaper can end up next to a note from, say, the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, without any distinction. This obliteration of the original 
context creates opportunities for new associations” (89). Wim Van Mierlo similarly 
comments on “the multiplicity of origins in the genetic dossier which interact and 
interfere with each other” (“Indexing” 180), and he adds that “Joyce’s creative 
dynamic does not lie in the sources or conceptual notes only, but in the interface 
between source and notebook, and notebook and text” (181-2). It is therefore 
conceivable that the meaning Joyce is primarily interested in is different from that 
of a source-word’s original context. Yet this is a possibility about which we are 
unlikely to possess any certain knowledge. More important, therefore, than this 
absence of proof is that the partiality of a source-word’s authority has its presence 
in the material difference between a non-word and its source-word or source-
words. 
More often than not, no argument can be made that would actually 
exclude a source-word as a possible translation or normalisation of a non-word. 
All this proves, however, is that identifiable source-words, and the thematic and 
contextual fields that come with them, are likely to be present in the Pentecostal 
plurality of meanings spawned by a non-word. There is no reason to assume that 
source-words can control this plurality or arrange it around a core meaning, that 
they can hold divergent translations at bay or tell us what the primary, actual, or 
true meaning of the non-word is. For source-words can no more exhaust a non-
word than any other translation can: what gets in the way of this exhaustion is the 
constitutive difference between a non-word and any and all of its source-words. 
This difference, although it is not, as identifiable source-words are, separately 
recorded, is just as material. It consists in the empirically verifiable changes that 
source-words undergo: the distortion produced by Joyce’s addition and/or 
deletion of letters. The absence of this distortion from the source-words cannot 
assure us of its secondary nature. On the contrary, this absence means that Joyce 
has introduced the distortion at some point. Consequently, it is part of the 
authorial intention that goes into the formation of the text and of the linguistic 
material to which criticism is required to respond. 
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What I would criticise in the approach Lernout proposes is the implication 
that the authenticity of a source-word can outweigh the authenticity of a 
distortion. A translation based on a source-word is precisely not “true in a different 
sense” from any other translation: as a normalising translation of the illegible non-
word, it is as imperfect as any other. I would agree that the interpretation provided 
by a source-word is different in the sense that the likelihood of its relevance is 
singularly hard to deny (likely though imperfect: this is Joyce’s double 
commandment at work). A source-word, once it has been found, will hardly be 
placed, at any subsequent stage, outside the plurality of meanings of the non-
word in question, which is to say that in most cases, other interpretations will co-
exist with it (though they need not refer to it). Yet to call this “true in a different 
sense” is to identify how readily we can affirm its significance within the authorial 
design with the extent of this significance. 
It is this identification – more deserving of analysis than Lernout’s rhetoric 
lets on – that contains a sliding towards an altogether different claim: that in 
comparison to the likely relevance of a source-word, any other interpretation can 
be inferred to be less relevant, less authoritative, less scientific, and should 
therefore be rejected or metaphorically put in brackets. In making the transition 
to this latter claim, what is passed over is that the source-words themselves are 
already put in brackets by Joyce’s distortion of them. At this point, Lernout’s 
drawing of a dividing line between what is certain and what is uncertain about 
Joyce’s text ends up including on the side of alleged certainty precisely such 
meanings as Joyce goes to unprecedented lengths to destabilise. If a different 
translation violates the authorial intention contained in the source-words, the 
source-words violate the authorial intention contained in the distortion. 
In arguing against the absolute authority of source-words, I am therefore 
not querying the relevance of authorial intention. Nor am I returning to the whole-
sale rejection of avant-textes that Van Mierlo comments on when he notes “how 
sticky the debate can get as critics question the relevance of evidence not provided 
by the text itself” (“Reading” 53). I am on the contrary arguing that Joyce’s creative 
process, as it emerges from the public archive (published text, available 
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manuscripts and notes), reveals a complexity in his intention that is given short 
shrift by its reduction to monovalent elements. In its very attempt to secure the 
essential and authentic parts of Joyce’s creation, such a reduction introduces 
hierarchies that run counter to Joyce’s pervasive programme of generating 
hermeneutic impasses and indeed of demonstrating the value of such impasses. 
Here, the theoretical approach I am following finds itself in agreement with 
Van Mierlo’s argument that “[t]he works and the manuscripts” are not placed in 
opposition, but on a continuum on which they “share a state of incompletion with 
each other, revealing that there is no well-wrought urn but only a coming-into-
being of the text through an intricate process of trials, errors, hesitations, 
reconsiderations, coincidences and so on” (56). Van Mierlo advances this as a 
critique of the poststructuralist position, whose emphasis on the medium itself, 
he argues, conceptualises the text as a self-contained entity. Yet there is nothing 
in his description that contrasts with either the Derridean or the Lacanian 
approach, both of which posit the writer as precisely the fragmented, divided 
subject of a writing process over which she or he does not have unchanging 
mastery (as we have seen in chapter two). Joyce’s creative gesture paradoxically 
affirms and implements this fragmentation, and what I hold to be crucial is that 
neither theoretical nor genetic procedures can return his text to stability and well-
wrought wholeness. “Each step along the discontinuous path of composition 
involves a new intentional moment” (56), and we cannot subsume these moments 
to an overarching pattern without bypassing the unpredictable, discontinuous 
nature of the process itself. 
This is also to say, I would suggest, that we cannot assert any hierarchical 
relationship between the intentional moment represented by a source-word and 
the intentional moment represented by the compositional step of introducing a 
distortion – not without making assumptions about Joyce’s own thought-
processes that are as far-reaching as they are unfounded in empirical evidence. 
Or, as Van Mierlo has it: “What is falsifiable seems limited to a few applications: 
the dating of notebooks, identification of sources, location of notebook units in 
the drafts of ‘Work in Progress’. Beyond that every part of the game involves 
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interpretation” (“Indexing” 176). In nevertheless asserting that the source-word is 
the only answer not based on conjecture, radical philology reveals itself to be – 
again, like all interpretation – an example of what I call ventriloquism. It speaks in 
Joyce’s voice, modulating its pronouncements through references to the avant-
textes of Finnegans Wake, in order to claim to be listening to this voice, the voice 
of authority itself, even though what is being said is pervasively structured by a set 
of priorities originating with the purported listeners. 
The conclusion I now propose is that in a non-word, authorial intention 
itself is uncertain and potentially split, and that it is precisely with reference to this 
uncertainty that all interpretations of the Wake are, at a fundamental level, 
imperfect. If we cannot subject what I call the Pentecostal plurality of Joyce’s 
writing to a final either/or, if we cannot exclude an interpretation solely on the 
basis of having shown another interpretation to be convincing, it is because no 
interpretative strategy can simultaneously do justice to all authorial manipulations 
operative in this text. There is no reading of Finnegans Wake without a minimum 
of conjecture – and in this, Joyce’s text is an exemplification and indeed an 
examination of virtually any act of reading. Its non-words drive home this point, 
as every decision we make in order to negotiate their plurality of meaning imposes 
certain limitations on this plurality and thus violates their double commandment 
to be read and read in full. Reading the Wake is thus a task that cannot be free 
from the anxiety of language. If it may appear that a competent reading strategy 
is one that at least temporarily banishes anxiety, such an assumption is part of the 
tradition of reading and writing that Joyce is breaking with. 
In Finnegans Wake, the forces of risk-taking, distortion, imperfection, 
inadequacy, frustration, and anxiety do not stand at the beginning of the 
processes of writing the book or of reading it – as obstacles to be eventually 
overcome by a strategy careful and/or creative enough. They compete with 
exhilaration, richness, diversity, pleasure, and benefit at every step of the creative 
process and of the reading experience. What this means is that Joyce challenges 
us not only to adjust our exegetical methodologies but also, as we will see in the 
next chapter, to find new perspectives on what the goals of our exegesis are: on 
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what we expect to happen to us (as opposed to the text) when we read the Wake. 
Effectively, the Wake has the potential to transform any exegetical discourse we 
construct around it into a meta-discourse – a discourse about the formation of 
discourse, about the frameworks within which we move and think, and therefore 








If a reading of the Wake continues to suggest other interpretations after the 
identification of source-words has been put forward as one possible exegetical 
path, it is not necessarily because this reading values interpretative freedom over 
responsibility towards Joyce’s text. A reading may also proceed in this way on the 
basis of asking what the authorial intention is behind the distortions that undo the 
source-words’ standard form and give us the non-text we encounter in the Wake. 
I have argued that in order to address the question of this intention (or, if you 
prefer, of this textual structure), it is necessary to relate the form of Joyce’s writing 
to the various motifs through which Finnegans Wake illustrates the flawed state 
of language – as well as the powerful uses to which language can nevertheless be 
put. The key to these self-aware uses of flawed language is linguistic invention. If 
the previous chapter’s discussion of post-babelian multilingualism and 
plurivocality relates such invention to the multiplicity of meanings, the present 
chapter will shift the focus still further towards an ethics of interpretation by 
examining linguistic invention as oriented towards the unknown. I will base this 
examination on yet another of the Wake’s meta-textual images: the building of a 
city. 
In the “Haveth Childers Everywhere” section (532.6-554.9), which forms 
the ending of III.3 and thus of the séance already touched upon in chapter two, 
HCE describes himself as a builder of cities, or of one city, that he has constructed 
in honour of his wife ALP. In Reflections on James Joyce, Stuart Gilbert gives an 
intriguing anecdotal account of the method Joyce employed in writing this 
passage. Here is how Gilbert renders the scene of Joyce’s literary workshop: 
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Five volumes of the Encyclopedia Britannica on his sofa. He has 
made a list of 30 towns, New York, Vienna, Budapest, and Mrs. 
[Helen] Fleischman has read out the articles on some of these. I 
“finish” Vienna and read Christiana and Bucharest. Whenever I 
come to a name (of a street, suburb, park, etc.) I pause. Joyce 
thinks. If he can Anglicise the word, i.e. make a pun on it, Mrs. F. 
records the name or its deformation in the notebook. (20-1, 
insertion in original) 
Gilbert disapproves of this method, which to him appears random and mechanical. 
It does not create what he calls “appropriate” (21) puns – that is, puns that play 
on a meaning forming the bottom layer of the text. Instead, Joyce’s procedure 
generates chance effects: deviations that, in all probability, have nothing to do 
with what Joyce, according to Gilbert, is actually writing. 
The assumption that underlies Gilbert’s account, and whose violation 
scandalises him, is that there should be a fundamental level of the text whose 
meaning is straightforward and governs all distortions the text can subsequently 
undergo. As Rabaté points out in “The Fourfold Root of Yawn’s Unreason,” 
“Gilbert’s position corresponds to that of the reductive reader who imagines that 
a first-draft version of Finnegans Wake would be written in ‘normal’ English and 
would provide a ‘basic text’” (395), with puns and neologisms forming a secondary 
layer. This is a version of what Rabaté identifies as “the genetic fallacy” (399), 
which he describes as the belief that “[w]hen, as in this case, we have retrieved 
almost all the sources from which the text is constructed, […] the meaning of the 
text is finally provided” (399). 
With regard to “Haveth Childers Everywhere,” Rabaté makes a case against 
this idea, suggesting that, in contrast to what Gilbert appears to suspect, Joyce’s 
method of composition is indeed sound: that the layers of revision Joyce executes 
introduce ambiguities and overtones that serve important functions in the text. 
Rabaté posits that Joyce “was interested in adding overlays of meaning applied to 
the text in an almost mechanistic manner. And yet it is in this very method that he 
gained access to a different and original generation of meaning” (398). As Joyce 
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adds more and more allusions to HCE’s recitation of the monuments he has 
constructed in praise of ALP, the “sheer excess of references” (401) begins to 
change the account into what Rabaté proposes to read as HCE’s “vainglorious 
praise of his prowess” (401). At the same time, the increase of the passage’s 
“endless piling up of textual debris” (404) comes to evoke more and more strongly 
the chaos and filth of big cities. Rabaté argues that through these parallel 
processes, HCE’s city-building becomes charged with increasingly complex and 
contradictory meanings: “the Dublin that originally embodied the love and eternal 
desire linking HCE and ALP then generates a more fragmented ‘drama 
parapolylogic’ (FW 474.05) that stresses contradiction” (404). 
In this view, to which I subscribe, Joyce’s mechanical multiplication of 
references to cities becomes part of his larger strategy of implementing excess as 
a formative element of his writing. In this process, the individual allusions Joyce 
makes – which, if Gilbert’s account is to be believed, are disconcertingly random – 
are subordinated not to a straightforward narrative but to a theme: here, the 
theme of excess itself, both as meta-textual comment and as various forms of 
excess in relation to city space. If it is by no means certain that the primary purpose 
of Joyce’s non-words is to conjure up the words from which he forms these 
coinages, as well as these words’ original contexts, the approach to Joyce’s writing 
that I instead propose is centred on this notion of a thematic field. 
We can compare “Haveth Childers Everywhere” to another of the Wake’s 
thematic clusters: the accumulation of river-names in chapter I.8. With regard to 
this amassing of references, Max Eastman reports Joyce telling him “that he liked 
to think how some far day, way off in Thibet or Somaliland, some lad or lass in 
reading that little book would be pleased to come upon the name of his or her 
own home river” (100). This might seem an innocent enough remark (and Eastman 
treats it as such). Yet we might ask ourselves what precisely makes possible the 
scenario Joyce imagines. Joyce having included the names of sufficiently many 
rivers in Tibet and Somaliland in his text is not the only explanation for the scene 
of the reader who recognises her or his home river. An alternative one is put 
forward by Attridge, who in Joyce Effects recounts the following experience: 
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Rereading the “Anna Livia Plurabelle” chapter recently I came upon 
the phrase “bakereen’s dusind” (FW 212.20) and there before me 
was the name of the South African river near whose banks I grew 
up (the Umsindusi, or in its familiar abbreviated form, the Dusi), 
and, like the small boy Joyce imagined in just such a situation, I felt 
a momentary pleasure in this unlooked-for bond between the work 
and me – a pleasure in no way diminished by my awareness that, if 
asked whether I was responding to an intended allusion or to a 
coincidence thrown up by the chapter’s dense web of names, I 
would probably have to answer, like Bloom in his response to 
Stephen’s story set in the Queen’s Hotel, “coincidence.” (121) 
The question that is opened up by such an occurrence, of which there are many in 
any sustained reading of the Wake, revolves around the fact that Joyce’s “dense 
web of names” contains its own form of intentionality. In the anecdote told by 
Eastman, Joyce takes pleasure in the knowledge that coincidental recognitions will 
happen; he anticipates them and arguably relies on them. Attridge argues that “if 
Joyce intentionally builds a machine of such complexity that unforeseen 
connections are bound to arise when it comes into contact with a reader 
possessing equally complex systems of memory and information, we cannot call 
them ‘unintentional’ in any straightforward sense of the word” (121). 
The distinction is thus troubled further between public interpretations 
based on the author’s intentions and private interpretations based on the 
intentions of the reader. In the case of “Haveth Childers Everywhere,” to return to 
this example, it is always possible that we find in this passage the names of cities, 
districts, villages, and sites that we fail to trace to Joyce’s sources, but that, 
through their participation in the thematic field, refer us to Joyce’s singular 
structuring of the text, to what he has us associate. What is furthermore crucial is 
that a thematic field does not necessarily have to be identifiable via extra-textual 
evidence, in the way that the themes of city-building and of rivers are on the basis 
of the information given by Gilbert and Eastman, respectively. Chapters, passages, 
and smaller units such as paragraphs and sentences can create internal 
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correspondences that make possible the emergence of a local theme. And these 
structures can overlap and contradict each other, creating the suspended 
decisions characteristic of Pentecostal plurality. Still, plurality is not synonymous 
with isotropy. Rather, as Attridge writes in a different section of Joyce Effects, “we 
can still conduct meaningful and valuable discussions about rival frameworks – not 
in order to settle, once and for all, upon the right one, but to ascertain which are 
useful in which particular ways” (151). This holds true even of the infinitely 
extended and extendable plurality as which I propose to read Finnegans Wake. 
Infinity is not universality; the notion of an infinite number of possible readings is 
in no way opposed to the specificity of each reading or to the principle of limiting 
interpretation to such readings as meaningfully relate to the text’s structures. 
The problem is with the identification of these structures: with the 
measuring of intention in what we could call controlled distortions with uncertain 
outcomes. And contrary to what my focus on the non-word may imply, we cannot 
approach this uncertainty in a piecemeal manner. In Peculiar Language, Attridge 
writes that for each of Joyce’s coinages, “the context itself is made up of puns and 
portmanteaux” (202). As this reciprocal destabilisation branches out, “a 
‘contextual circle’ is created whereby plurality of meaning in one item increases 
the available meanings of other items, which in turn increase the possibilities of 
meaning in the original item” (202). With the notion of such circles, we have 
arrived at a level of complexity that can no longer be accounted for in terms of 
atomistic meaning, but that requires us to take into consideration the synergies 
generated by Joyce’s distortions. 
For one thing, our awareness that his is a text suffused with non-words 
means that “as we read the Wake we test for their possible associations not only 
the obvious portmanteaux but every apparently normal word as well” (205). The 
presence of material distortions gives rise to a notion of what we might term a 
zero degree of distortion, that is to say, of an interference with the wholeness of 
a word that remains invisible but that splits the apparently normal expression. Yet 
for all this proliferation of meaning, Attridge points out: “It is important to note, 
however, that the network of signification remains systematic” (202). If thematic 
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fields can be created through context, and if context in the Wake is variable, what 
is undone by this mobility is meaning in the singular, not the task of referring 
meaning to the singularity of Joyce’s writing. 
Within such contextual volatility, even the deletion or addition of a single 
letter in a non-word can entail the appearance of one or several new translations 
that need not be a solitary aberration but may prove to reverberate with the 
context provided by translations of other non-words. If this mechanism does not 
obstruct the possibility of assessing the relevance of each step along the way, what 
it does do is to multiply any such assessment’s reference points. Our 
interpretations can only be measured against the mobile and above all 
heterogeneous contexts of the Wake. Slote gives a helpful account of this effect. 
He states that “the complexity of the Wake is primarily syntactic rather than 
semantic in that glossing, or unpacking, the portmanteaux is only of small (but not 
insignificant) help” (Joyce’s 131). Syntactic complexity, which may or may not 
include convoluted grammar, suggests that Wakean ambiguity destabilises more 
than the univocality of individual expressions. It extends to the relations these 
expressions establish among each other, in such a way that interpretation is not 
limited to exploring the variable connotations of a single expression in an 
invariable context. Instead, reading becomes what Slote terms “linguistically 
parallactic: multiple perspectives are allowed, which complement and subvert 
each other” (131). 
Complementation and subversion are here no longer understood as 
variations on a single meaning. Given that Joyce’s non-words often fuse together 
expressions whose phonetic or orthographic similarity is coincidental rather than 
etymological, the layered perspectives suggested by a non-word need not be 
semantically compatible. Accordingly, phrases and passages that draw on non-
words can generate multiple senses that do not necessarily stand in any relation 
to each other, they can be “sometimes harmonious, sometimes discordant, often 
both” (131). Most importantly, the various interpretations are not sufficiently 
comparable to permit their hierarchical arrangement. The patterns remain 
suspended in Pentecostal simultaneity: potentially informing one another, but not 
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allowing conclusive deductions about each other’s validity, precisely because 
there are too many potential verdicts coinciding. Or, as Slote puts it elsewhere: 
“Joyce is developing a writing strategy in which nothing could be correct since any 
and every element is short-circuited by another” (“Imperfect” 148). 
It is this simultaneity of meanings – a more peculiar and more challenging 
effect of Joyce’s linguistic inventiveness than the mere number of possible 
interpretations – that is undone by any interpretative strategy that grounds 
hermeneutical rigour in an assumption of monovalence. Consider the following 
description given by Roughley of an effect resembling closely what I term 
Pentecostal plurality: 
Take any of his multiple puns. Dismantle them and identify the 
forms from which Joyce took the fragments he fuses together. 
Identify the allusions to the proper names that Joyce has ruined. Do 
we then have Joyce’s meaning, or is it possible that our operations 
upon Joyce’s writing might have unravelled the fabric that Joyce 
painstakingly wove together? […] Is it not possible that we might be 
closing up Joyce’s “between”, the gap between the either and the 
or, that Joyce opens for us? (“Untitled” 260-1) 
Returning to the city-references: to imagine that these are put into the text solely 
to recall their original contexts (and the event of their own citing) would be to lose 
sight of the fact that Joyce is, after all, using them to write a work of his own. This 
work’s strategies include its usage of a space in between the either and the or – 
the space of linguistic parallax, of Pentecostal suspension. This is to say that 
Pentecostal plurality is concerned with the emergence of un-decidability within 
certain limits, within a “between” that indicates the enfolding boundaries of 
Joyce’s writing. The tension between, on the one hand, the necessity of these 
boundaries and, on the other hand, the play of parallax effects that produce 
meaning within them is thus a case of certain liminality with regard to range. 
Pentecostal writing increases the text’s productiveness by enabling it to embrace 
and implement the excess of possibilities that feed into it; yet the text’s range, in 
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order to realise itself at all, also has to remain shy of an entirely boundless reach, 
which would collapse signification into a state of white noise. 
It is with regard to this process – signification on the very boundary of its 
own collapse – that is possible to read the city-building passage as one of 
Finnegans Wake’s instances of meta-textuality. City-building, as Joyce presents it, 
constitutes an activity that is split between productive and destructive elements. 
At the very beginning of “Haveth Childers Everywhere,” we read: “Eternest cittas, 
heil!” (532.6). The evocation of the eternal city, Rome, is thus immediately 
followed by the Nazi salute, suggesting that in his entirety, HCE, who here appears 
as E.c.h., encompasses both the splendour of the great cities and what Joyce 
identifies as their fascistoid elements. HCE’s rhapsody of cultural achievements, 
which ranges from the seven wonders of the ancient world (see 553.9-11) to the 
modern wonder of electricity (see 549.14-6), is thus from the start complicated by 
a sense that “the ‘eternal city’ can embody all cities only if it carries its onus of 
guilt, betrayal, and totalitarianism” (Rabaté, James Joyce 179). This is echoed in 
HCE’s declaration: “Seven ills so barely as centripunts havd I habt” (541.1), 
transforming into “ills” the seven hills on which Rome is famously built. 
This emphasis on the hubris and brutality of great cities may also be what 
is at stake in the instances in which the city-building passage mentions Babel: first, 
when HCE speaks about a “Babbyl Malket” (532.25), and again when he tells of 
someone “confused by his tonguer of baubble” (536.8). Yet this second 
manifestation already transports us away from the overbearing tower of Babel, 
seeing how it also evokes the confusion of tongues that reduces mighty Babylon 
to the dimensions of a mere bauble. The power-hungry aspect of these cities, then, 
is far from self-sustaining or self-stabilising; quite the contrary. We may also note 
here that in Ulysses, Babylon features as one in a series of examples that go 
through Bloom’s mind when he thinks about the finitude that catches up with 
architectural constructions as well as with their inhabitants: “Cityful passing away, 
other cityful coming, passing away, too: other coming on, passing on. […] Piled up 
in cities, worn away age after age. Pyramids in sand. Built on bread and onions. 
Slaves Chinese wall. Babylon. Big stones left” (8.484-490). It is significant that this 
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interior monologue occurs in “Lestrygonians,” the chapter concerned with eating 
and (via the Homeric parallel) cannibalism, for this suggests entire populations and 
indeed entire cities devouring each other; one edifice built on the ruins of the last. 
In fact, as Rabaté notes, in HCE’s account of his city-building, “cities tend to be 
coupled, thus New York goes with Kyoto (FW, 534.2), Budapest with Belfast, Cork 
with Calcutta (541.16), Bucharest with Berlin (540.21), London with Buenos Aires 
(540.34-35), etc.” (James Joyce 192), creating such omnivore hybrids as 
“Corkcuttas” (541.17). 
City-building sooner or later undoes the project of Babel with its single and 
inert centre, and feeds into plurality and change, into structures that are shared, 
modified, connected, divided, and put to new purposes, that influence each other 
and edge each other on – if always on the brink of collapse. In short, it feeds into 
what can ideally become a Pentecostal process. City-building can take the form of 
the “first commonwealths” of Vico’s giants, or of the different nations of Noah’s 
descendants. It can create the great cities of ancient and modern times, with all 
their dirt, violence, and poverty, but also their cultural momentum and diversity. 
In achieving these ambiguous results, the construction of cities will potentially 
take the momentum of cultural ambition to the point of nearly self-destructive 
excess. Thus, the city HCE builds sports numerous negative aspects, including 
prostitution (“daughters-in-trade being lightly clad” [532.25-6]), ill health 
(“tuberclerosies” [541.36]), overpopulation (“fair home overcrowded” [543.22]; 
“shares same closet with fourteen similar cottages and an illfamed 
lodginghouse” [545.2-3]), waste (“house lost in dirt and blocked with 
refuse” [543.32-3]), and poverty leading to the deterioration of the city space itself 
(“copious holes emitting mice” [545.8]). 
Some of these are issues that arise from the sheer complexity of a city, 
from the adding on of new materials and technologies, from the subdivision of its 
spaces to accommodate more people, from the palimpsest-like overwriting of its 
uses. This is indeed a different world from that of the single tower: it is a world 
richer and more varied, but also prone to generating its own kind of violence 
against the individuals caught up in its mechanisms. We can thus read the kind of 
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cultural achievement presented in HCE’s account – chaotic, bursting at the seams, 
and always on the brink of turning into its own opposite – as one of the Wake’s 
many self-reflexive comments on its language, sufficiently cluttered with meaning 
as to continually risk breaking down into meaninglessness. This meta-textual 
imagery is similar to what we have already encountered in the chaos of Shem’s 
house as described in I.7. If Shem’s situation stresses the mutability of the self, I 
now propose to draw a connection between, on the one hand, the spaces of HCE’s 
city, so dangerously and yet productively open to a plurality of lives and meanings, 
and on the other hand, a more general problem of encountering the other: a 
theme that Derrida conceptualises under the name of hospitality. 
 
The space of the other 
That which gives hospitality, that which allows someone to offer hospitality to 
someone else, may at first appear to be the space of a certain privacy. I am 
hospitable by welcoming the other within the space that is mine: the space that I, 
by right, inhabit. Yet, as Derrida points out, welcoming and indeed inhabiting 
already imply an irreducible publicness: “There is no house or interior without a 
door or windows. The monad of home has to be hospitable in order to be ipse, 
itself at home, habitable at-home in the relation of the self to itself” (Derrida and 
Dufourmantelle 61). Once hospitality becomes sufficiently continual, sufficiently 
busy, sufficiently hospitable, it reveals the frailty of the boundaries that we draw 
to divide up space (something like this is sounded in the city-building passage 
when it speaks of a “staircase continually lit up with guests” [543.31-2]). In this 
view, there is no fundamental difference between the hospitality offered within 
an apparently private space – the hospitality of an individual – and the hospitality 
offered within a public space: say, the hospitality of an entire city. Either 
constellation consists in opening up towards an outside whose public nature, 
whose possibilities of communication, exchange, economy, infrastructure, law, 
and so on, already structure the inside of the seemingly self-contained subdivision. 
Privacy, in its most radical form, is on the contrary found in the secret, in 
the unknown, in the stranger who is granted hospitality. It is here that hospitality’s 
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significance with regard to texts signals itself. A text, too, is not cut off in any 
definitive sense from the economies and interactions that surround its writing and 
its reading. Yet at the imaginary centre of these interactions, there remains a 
secret into which none of them can tap. It remains secret not because it is hidden 
away more cunningly than other meanings. A secret is not part of a text, which is 
why a text cannot be made to divulge it; it is the purely conjectural essence around 
which a text is necessarily presumed to be structured. Miller states: “The reader 
cannot go behind [the literary text], or beneath it, or before and after it. Literature 
keeps its secret, but on the surface” (Topographies 310). 
The literary secret, in this sense, is that about which we have only 
insufficient information from the text, that about which the text has nothing left 
to reveal. In The Work of Literature, Attridge similarly writes: “A work of art states 
what it states, presents what it presents, no more, no less; and it refuses to say 
anything further; no matter how hard we press it” (256). There is, for each case, 
no text but the text itself, or no archive but the archive – to which I would add that 
the economy of essence is such that a text or archive can never say enough: it 
always ends before its essence is articulated. Add more information, and the 
boundaries shift, essence withdrawing once more. It is this withdrawal that 
renders interpretation open-ended, as a text or archive always engenders 
hermeneutical conundrums that it refuses to resolve. The secret is the question 
raised but never answered: “with no other basis than the abyss of the call or 
address” (Derrida, “Literature in Secret” 157). Thus, for all to see, there is in any 
text a dimension of that which no reading can appropriate. 
This “for all to see” must recall the purloined letter from Poe’s story as well 
as middle Lacan’s reading of it. There, the letter is retrieved; yet what we have to 
keep in mind is that the destination this letter invariably reaches, according to 
middle Lacan, is that of creating anxiety in any receiver – anxiety resulting from 
the fact that the signifier both is and is not where it is (“it will be and will not be 
where it is” [“Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’” 17]). If it is possible to overlook 
an openly displayed letter, it is because successful hiding engages in the 
manipulation of symbolic frameworks: in the foiling of expectations, reverse 
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psychology, and so on. As Lacan puts it: “what is hidden is never but what is not in 
its place” (17) – and a letter/signifier is never fully in its place. If you can miss it, it 
is because no manipulation of the symbolic can assure you that the signifier has 
been restored to its original place; if you can misread it, it is because you can only 
ever read it, its origin remaining an imaginary centre. For Lacan, when the letter is 
eventually found in Poe’s story, it is by the same token robbed of parts of its 
significance: “What now remains of the signifier when, having already been 
relieved of its message for the Queen, its text is invalidated as soon as it leaves the 
Minister’s hands?” (28). The answer Lacan gives is: a manipulation of desire. What 
is retrieved and presumably delivered to the original recipient is, in Lacan’s 
reading, not the signifier’s essence, but that remainder of referentiality that resists 
identification and that consists solely in the anxiety caused by a secret – what late 
Lacan reformulates as the impact of the real on the symbolic frameworks it 
permeates and distorts. 
Rather than contrasting the sphere of public communication with a private 
sphere understood as the personal idiosyncrasies of reading, we can thus conceive 
of the private as the dimension of the secret, of the real, of that which withdraws 
from any reading and leaves any reading in anguish. This dimension of the secret 
is what we encounter in amplified form in Joyce’s non-words, whose distortions 
exemplify that at the heart of intention itself, there is an illegibility: that a 
manipulation of measurable extent may raise questions whose answers escape us. 
What I want to propose, in the following, is that even though we cannot 
appropriate the secret, cannot resolve it, cannot do anything to read it, our 
readings should nevertheless remain open to it, in defiance of the twin strategies 
of exclusion and normalisation. This is to say that our readings should remain 
hospitable. Hospitality, as Derrida thinks it in the mode of unconditional 
hospitality, is hospitality to the utterly unknown, to that or she or he who carries 
or constitutes a secret. Derrida makes this point with regard to the stranger whose 
name, whose origin or genealogy (family) one does not know: 
absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give 
not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with the 
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social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, 
unknown, anonymous other, and that I give place to them, that I let 
them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer 
them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a 
pact) or even their names. (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 25) 
Unconditional hospitality is hospitality to the secret and thus to that which 
does not give any hospitality in return, that which undoes the very law of 
hospitality. Derrida continues: “The law of absolute hospitality commands a break 
with hospitality by right, with law or justice as rights” (25). Hospitality breaks with 
hospitality not only because in respecting the inviolability of the secret it refrains 
from the welcoming gesture that is asking the other’s name; in extending itself to 
the unconditional, hospitality also suspends the very law of hospitality, which in 
all its conditional forms would always be a law of reciprocity. Naas gives a helpful 
pointer when, in Derrida From Now On, he describes hospitality as “a welcoming 
of an other whose identity and character are thus not assured, an other, therefore, 
who may in fact pose a threat to us, who may cause us to question our right to 
what we call ‘our home,’ or who may in fact try to evict us from that home and 
from everything we consider ‘our own’” (22). The project of constructing 
hospitable spaces is potentially a dangerous one, though this danger should not 
be read as an invitation to phobic connotations, but rather in the sense of a 
challenge to our complacency and preconceptions – causing us to ask questions 
about ourselves, as Naas puts it – that is productive of new meanings precisely if 
and when we refrain from reducing them to meanings already known, and instead 
allow them to contain aspects we cannot master. 
This notion of alterity as something both productive and potentially 
threatening returns us to HCE’s city as a productive chaos, in which we may also 
discern echoes of Vico’s first commonwealths. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, Vico’s philosophy conceives of the origins of political community as a 
process that makes a virtue from necessity. The groups of giants that organise 
themselves, first into family structures and then into larger social units, are driven 
together by catastrophic interruptions of their pre-social lives. The resulting 
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communities are reactions to an outside threat. Vico writes that “refuges were the 
origin of cities, whose invariable property is to protect their residents from 
violence” (§561). And he continues: “such refuges were the world’s first hospices, 
and the first people received there were the first guests or strangers, hospites in 
Latin, of the early cities” (§561). On the one hand, the link that Vico here 
establishes between threat, refuge, and the hospites that receive refuge resonates 
with Derrida’s discussion of the terms “hostis,” “host,” “hospitality,” but also 
“hostility” (see Derrida and Dufourmantelle 45). On the other hand, Vico’s 
elucidations are arguably what “Haveth Childers Everywhere” alludes to when it 
makes reference to “my stavekirks wove so norcely of peeled wands and 
attachatouchy floodmud, now all loosebrick and stonefest, freely masoned arked 
for covennanters and shinners’ rifuge” (552.2-5, my emphasis). 
Some of these elements are also singled out by Rabaté in James Joyce and 
the Politics of Egoism (which moreover contains a different version of Rabaté’s 
essay on III.3 that I cite above, “The Fourfold Root of Yawn’s Unreason”). In his 
book, Rabaté cites discussions of the split etymology of “hospitality” by both 
Derrida (see 160) and Vico (see 175), and he notes the applicability of hospitality 
to Finnegans Wake: “we should not forget that Earwicker is variously described as 
a publican or an innkeeper” (175). In bringing hospitality to bear on III.3, however, 
Rabaté somewhat diminishes its ambivalence. He initially draws a connection 
between the “dangerous hospitality” of HCE’s city and Joyce’s “linguistic 
mechanism” (179). Subsequently, however, he recasts hospitality as a “utopia of 
linguistic welcome to all” (184). Arguing that Joyce is manipulating his material 
quite freely and unsystematically, Rabaté concludes that in III.3, Joyce “proves the 
unique ‘hospitality’ of English when he makes it ‘accept’ the most foreign 
signifiers” (193), rather than having it appropriate these signifiers in what might 
be called an imperialist manner. My contention is that the full extent of III.3’s 
interweaving of alterity and instability is better brought out by Rabaté’s remark in 
“The Fourfold Root of Yawn’s Unreason” that “the performative gesture of the text 
becomes one with its meaning” (404) – there, however, this theme is developed 
without reference to hospitality. In the following, my aim is to further examine the 
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connection between the Wake’s reflections on its own volatile productivity and 
Derrida’s analysis of one’s harbouring of the other. 
What groups Derrida, Vico, and Joyce together is the theme of finding 
one’s bearings in a situation in which interference with self-presence cannot be 
avoided. Derrida’s position, in particular, is not as idealistic as the term 
“unconditional hospitality” might at first suggest. Nor is Joyce’s evocation of Vico 
simply progressivist. There is a development to be found in the sentence from III.3 
cited above, a cultural history in miniature, leading from the catastrophe of the 
flood (“floodmud” and “arked”) to the building of certain structures that can serve 
as a refuge for sinners (after the fall, humankind in general). The passage 
establishes yet another connection between biblical notions of the fall and the 
thought of social organisation as a remedy. I will return to this connection later on 
in this chapter; for now, I want to remain with the sense of the precariousness of 
postlapsarian existence: a city that is a refuge from sin and from outside threats 
and that is nonetheless only half “stonefest” (as solid as stone; from German 
“fest”), being at the same time “loosebrick.” HCE’s city, like the text in which it 
appears, takes on the hue of a dangerous plurality, where unstable and productive 
aspects co-exist. 
In view of this theme of the precarious progress achieved by the social, we 
should also keep in mind that the entire city-building scene takes place within the 
séance at which Shaun is channelling HCE (perhaps prompting one of the 
interrogators to ask, four pages into “Haveth Childers Everywhere:” “Have you 
headnoise now?” [535.23]). The remarks on space and its sharing that we find here 
are thus spoken by a voice that already endures speaking from the place of the 
other, from the most secret of spaces – that of the other’s voice – or, inversely, 
they are spoken by a voice that endures offering, within itself, hospitality to the 
voice of an other. I argue that in this interweaving of motifs of meeting, 
interacting, co-inhabiting, and so forth, there is contained a call for a 
hermeneutical procedure that tasks itself with accepting the presence of the other 
without already looking for ways of turning it into the self (though, of course, no 
interaction can unconditionally fulfil this demand). 
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Here, we can first of all turn to Derrida’s “Rams,”1 where he writes about 
this acceptance as not a merely passive procedure of postponing decision, but, as 
it were, an active un-deciding: 
Indecision keeps attention forever in suspense, breathless, that is 
to say, keeps it alive, alert, vigilant, ready to embark on a wholly 
other path, to open itself up to whatever may come, listening 
faithfully, giving ear, to that other speech. Such indecision hangs 
upon the breath of the other speech and of the speech of the other 
– right where this speech might still seem unintelligible, inaudible, 
and untranslatable. (146) 
The productiveness of an encounter arises from a certain suspension that keeps 
diversity and alterity alive, not from hurried unification. It is in this sense that we 
can conceive of the unreadably other as not an obstacle but as “the occasion to 
countersign the future as much as the past: the unreadable is no longer opposed 
to the readable” (148). In the possibility of reading and inheriting, the unreadable 
– the uncontrollable, unknown, or secret – is not a snag that interrupts inheritance; 
it is what makes inheritance inexhaustible, since not exhaustively programmable. 
It is what opens up inheritance towards the future and towards “the chances of 
infinite, unfinished readings” (148). In fact, that which is not already absolutely 
readable constitutes the very possibility of an inheritance that, as we have seen in 
chapter two, always consists in the affirmation not of a solid presence but of a 
spectral one, of the spectre as possibility: it consists, in other words, in the 
interpretation of an excess of patterns organised “in a contradictory fashion 
around a secret” (Specters 18). 
Addressing what may nonetheless appear as the necessity to be able to 
access an inheritance, Derrida continues, in Specters of Marx: “If the readability of 
a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and at the 
                                                          
1 Derrida puns on the double meaning of this title: “a ram (Widder) will soon bound into 
the poem: sacrificial animal, battering ram, the bellicose ram [bélier] whose rush breaks down the 
doors or breaks through the high walls of fortified castles (Mauerbrecher)” (153). The link to Joyce’s 
section about city-building is fortuitous, but my discussion of cities, spatial demarcations, their 
transgression, and the ensuing encounter with the other follows Derrida’s usage of these terms. 
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same time defy interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit from 
it” (18). As the very possibility of iterating the past and thus carrying it into the 
future – “the only chance of an affirmed or rather reaffirmed future” (45) – 
inheritance is never closed to interpretation; but even as it calls for interpretation, 
it also defies it. Anything else than this double bind would return us to the absence 
of iteration and thus to the absence of anything that could be called event: “the 
event that cannot be awaited as such” (82), as predictable, as recognisable. What 
the event – the possibility of the future – requires from us is precisely “a hospitality 
without reserve” (82). 
In Aporias, Derrida says of “the arrivant that makes the event arrive” (33) 
that we should think it as a guest, as “he or she who comes, coming to be where 
s/he was not expected, where one was awaiting him or her […] without knowing 
what or whom to expect, what or whom I am waiting for – and such is hospitality 
itself, hospitality towards the event” (33). In this view, hospitality ties together the 
encounter with the other, the emergence of the possibility of the future, and an 
irreducible unpredictability – and therefore a risk. As Derrida puts it as early as Of 
Grammatology: “The future can only be anticipated in the form of an absolute 
danger” (5). Or, again in Aporias: the other “surprises the host – who is not yet a 
host or an inviting power – enough to call into question, to the point of annihilating 
or rendering indeterminate, all the distinctive signs of a prior identity” (34). 
We must therefore conceive of hospitality towards that which remains 
unreadable as a split strategy that is productive and destabilising in one and the 
same gesture, in a simultaneity that cannot be broken up. The unreadable never 
unfolds its innovative potential without threatening our very identity. In The 
Singularity of Literature, Attridge writes of the alterity of the unreadable that 
“when I encounter alterity, I encounter not the other as such (how could I?) but 
the remolding of the self that brings the other into being as, necessarily, no longer 
entirely other” (24). As the unreadability of a text’s secret is, by definition, 
inaccessible to our readings, we cannot assimilate unreadability itself; yet a 
reading can respond to the presence and to the particular circumstances of an 
unreadability by allowing these circumstances to transform the self that does the 
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interpreting – in such a manner that part of the text’s otherness ceases to be other 
and comes within the compass of the resulting self. Or, as we read in The Work of 
Literature: “In order to acknowledge the other, I have to find a means to 
destabilize or deconstruct the set of norms and habits that give me the world – my 
idioculture, in short – in such a way that the force of that which they exclude is 
felt” (71). 
Altering the self, destabilising the world – there is a sense here of 
something unnerving: a sense that alterity makes of us demands that are very 
serious indeed. In Of Hospitality, Derrida makes it clear that when he speaks of the 
danger inherent in such processes, he is not offering a rhetorical or abstract 
gesture. He insists that hospitality itself risks undoing the law of hospitality – along 
with an entire world of ethics – when he draws attention to the biblical narrative 
of Lot and his family, to “the moment when Lot seems to put the laws of hospitality 
above all” (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 151). The moment in question is the 
horrifying scene in Genesis 19 in which Lot seeks to protect the guests to whom 
he has offered his hospitality (two angels disguised as men) against the citizens of 
Sodom by telling the latter: “Behold now, I have two daughters which have not 
known man; let me, I pray you, bring them out unto you, and do ye to them as is 
good in your eyes: only unto these men do nothing; for therefore came they under 
the shadow of my roof” (Gen. 19.8). The aftermath of this offer is that the angels 
defeat the citizens and enable Lot’s family to escape into exile. There, it is Lot’s 
daughters who think of yet another desperate measure: “Come, let us make our 
father drink wine, and we will lie with him, that we may preserve seed of our 
father” (Gen. 19.32). 
In James Joyce and the Politics of Egoism, Rabaté points to this narrative’s 
affinity with certain motifs in Finnegans Wake (see 163-4). In particular, both 
sexual violence and incest potentially figure in the Wake in the form of HCE’s 
crime, which can be interpreted as a sexual assault on his daughter Issy (see Shari 
Benstock, “Nightletters” 224-5, and Eide 134-137). I emphasise this connection 
because Derrida’s invocation of Genesis 19 lends itself to what I consider to be 
two serious misinterpretations. On the one hand, one could take Derrida to be 
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retracting here a notion of hospitality whose catastrophic self-destruction in the 
face of actual threats the biblical reference demonstrates. I will presently argue 
that this is not Derrida’s point. On the other hand, it could be suggested that 
Derrida is in fact urging us to accept the unspeakable violence committed by Lot 
as a necessary cost of the ideal of hospitality. Transposed onto my discussion of 
Finnegans Wake and its implementation of the postlapsarian condition, the 
implication of such a reading would be that HCE’s abusing Issy is part of a fall into 
greater cultural complexity. If it is necessary to address this reading here, it is 
because a consideration of the connection that Finnegans Wake establishes 
between postlapsarian existence and responsibility demonstrates that such an 
interpretation is to be categorically rejected. 
After his discussion of the biblical scene, Derrida asks: “Are we the heirs to 
this tradition of hospitality? Up to what point?” (155). I read these questions 
(which appear on the final page of the text) as a rejection on Derrida’s part of any 
notion, in the context of hospitality, of violence as an acceptable means to an end. 
Instead, Derrida appears to be suggesting that we can never exclude violence as 
simply extrinsic to the problem of hospitality. If the encounter with the other 
entails a transformation of the self, then we cannot reassure ourselves that this 
transformation will automatically be for the better. However, Derrida is not 
arguing either that hospitality puts us at risk by making us the passive recipients 
of a transformative event that is already pre-programmed and awaiting us (the 
most shocking brutality in Genesis 19 does not come from an outside, but 
originates with Lot). What the encounter with the other sets in motion is a re-
configuration or re-invention of the public realm: of our laws, our ethics, our 
interactions. And it is precisely because, depending on our choices, this re-
invention can take us in any direction whatsoever – violent or humane, ethical or 
horrifying – that it inscribes us into responsibility. 
I would argue that this reading of Derridean hospitality, for all the 
emphasis I place on responsibility, is ultimately a version of the approach 
pioneered by Martin Hägglund’s Radical Atheism. There, Hägglund shows that 
Derrida’s analysis of the encounter with the other does not provide any ethical 
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prescription. The problem of hospitality “does not refer to an ethical obligation to 
be open to the other, since it is not a matter of choice. The exposure to the coming 
of the other – which is inseparable from the coming of time – precedes every 
decision and exceeds all mastery” (126). Interacting with alterity, in this view, is 
not so much a marker of goodness as it is an irreducible fact. If Derrida’s discussion 
of hospitality does not provide an ethical programme in the sense of specific 
prescriptions of how one should act, however, what it does provide is a 
formulation of an ethical problem – the problem, in fact, of ethics itself. And I 
would argue that, in countering such misreadings of Derrida as construe 
hospitality as an ideal to be aspired to, Hägglund is somewhat too quick to 
dispense with this formulation. He so forcefully opposes positions that derive 
straightforward ethical recommendations from Derrida’s work as to risk, if not 
denying, then largely passing over certain implications of hospitality that are highly 
ambiguous (rather than simply positive) but that constitute what Derrida, in a 
phrase cited by Hägglund, calls “[t]he nonethical opening of ethics” (Of 
Grammatology 140, qtd in Hägglund 75). 
If hospitality, in all its complexity, is at the basis of any interaction, then it 
is arguably “precisely the operation of the logic identified by Hägglund that makes 
ethics possible” (Attridge, Work of Literature 303). As the structure underlying all 
interaction, hospitality cannot be co-extensive with ethical behaviour; yet neither 
is it opposed to it. Hospitality is what makes ethical interaction possible – along 
with any other form of interaction. In this opening-up, there is already contained 
a certain demand to affirm this opening-up, in the sense of acknowledging, and 
responding to, openness itself. Hägglund takes this into consideration when he 
writes that there is something in hospitality defying anticipation, that 
the law of unconditional hospitality does not provide a rule or a 
norm for how one should act in relation to the other, but requires 
one to make precarious decisions from time to time. The only 
unconditional law of hospitality is that one will have been forced to 
deal with unforeseeable events. (105) 
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What is at stake in the precariousness of these decisions – decisions that 
no preliminary reflection or convention can quite resolve for us – is responsibility. 
This is further elucidated when we read, one page further down, that “to deny this 
inevitable risk, to deny the essential corruptibility of responsibility or to project its 
consummation in an ideal future, is to deny the condition that makes responsibility 
possible in the first place” (106). Hospitality towards the unpredictable is not 
ethical, it opens up the possibility of the ethical. Yet in drawing this preliminary 
conclusion, we must keep in mind that the possibility in question here is not one 
in the sense of an option that can be denied. The risk is inevitable; hospitality is 
not a matter of choice. In fact, we are placed in a position of responsibility no 
matter what we do. 
A denial of this position cannot therefore create a safe space outside 
responsibility: what it effectively denies is an understanding of the only available 
space’s intrinsic precariousness. Relying on a stability that is not actually given, it 
fails to address the demands placed on us by our inevitable inscription in 
responsibility. In this view, what Derrida calls hospitality arguably takes on the 
additional meaning of an affirmation of this inscription. It is an affirmation not in 
the sense of an acceptance that embraces any event that may take place, but 
rather in the sense of a contemplation of responsibility’s underlying structure, a 
willingness to engage the precariousness of the ethical, and an attempt to do 
justice to the demands placed on us by the coming of the other – including the 
potential threat of the other. 
Derrida’s thinking on hospitality is thus neither an encouragement to 
engage in utopian reveries, nor a fatalistic or nihilistic judgement that declares 
violence something to be accepted. What Derridean hospitality ultimately 
demands is action, including political action. Again Hägglund: “Far from absolving 
us from politics, it is the undecidable coming of time that makes politics necessary 
in the first place, since it precipitates the negotiation of unpredictable 
events” (171). The key term here is “negotiation” – this is politics not as exhaustive 
anticipation, but as an ongoing process. For what Derrida shows is that even 
though we cannot but offer hospitality, we are responsible for how we do this. 
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Hence, as Attridge writes, “the never-ending interaction and negotiation between 
the unconditional and the conditional” (Work of Literature 302), as each individual 
case tries to respond to a demand that is infinite. 
There is arguably less at stake in the act of reading a literary text, yet I 
would suggest that some problems in interpretation are structurally equivalent to 
those outlined in this discussion of affirming responsibility. A text’s secret – that 
private and illegible centre that makes an absolute demand on our hospitality – 
does not enter a public discourse that is essentially inert (that can deny the 
unpredictability of the other). Nor is interpretation so mobile as to be essentially 
private, removed from any common ground and thus from responsibility. Rather, 
the privacy of any individual interpretation that is actually an interpretation, in the 
sense of an iteration, is informed by the trace structure that relates the production 
of meaning to a play of differences that is at least partly public. At the same time, 
the necessity, in each iteration, to newly construct the trace from this play entails 
that interpretation is invariably impacted by decisions beyond public calculability. 
In this view, the productivity of the private in the sense of the unreadable 
or the secret is that, in responding to it, we re-invent the coordinates of public 
discourse. Yet this is not to argue some sublime capacity for transformation. It is 
instead to recall that the public realm is in a sense nothing but the sum of the ways 
in which we inherit, interpret, interact – and in which we are responsible for these 
inheritances, interpretations, and interactions, insofar as they are neither simply 
objective nor simply subjective. Unreadability, the secret, the private: these are all 
facets (to which we can add the untranslatability discussed in the introduction and 
the referentiality without reference discussed in chapter one) of the dynamic 
whereby a text induces us to search for essential meaning whilst foreclosing the 
possibility of any end to that search. The responsibility entailed by unreadability, 
as it emerges from a consideration of the hospitality that unreadability demands, 
is a responsibility for a public realm that, in this search, we are called upon to help 
create and from which we effectively cannot absent ourselves. 
In placing emphasis on this public space, my approach differs from 
Attridge’s argument that what the reader is responsible for is chiefly “the work 
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itself” (Work of Literature 121) – the work as it comes into being in a reading that 
through its own creativity “does justice to the inventiveness of the author” (191). 
If such a reading is understood to always refashion the reader as well – refashion 
what Attridge terms the reader’s idioculture, precisely her or his mode of 
participation in the public realm – it is this element whose transformation I would 
highlight: the realm of discourse, the framework that relates reader, work, and 
author to each other. With regard to public space as something that has to be 
built, I take my impetus from an essay by Miller in which he imagines the relation 
to the other as a relation “maintained at one and the same time to all the 
others” (“Absolute Mourning” 20): a relation that therefore partakes in a process 
of veritable “world-building” (21). 
In “Hostipitality,” Derrida insists that responding to an individual alterity 
(in our case: a particular text) cannot be thought separately from the building of 
societies and worlds as a response to alterity more abstractly speaking: “the third 
[le tiers], who is the birth of justice and finally of the state, already announces 
himself in the duel of the face-to-face” (364). Inversely, we may attempt to leave 
everything the same, to leave everything unchanged, to create a public space 
unaffected by any private or secret; yet this gives us not a different kind of 
iteration or a safer way of doing justice to a text, but no reading at all. As we cannot 
separate one iteration from another – pharmakon from pharmakon – the only 
possible iteration is an absolute danger. It is therefore in transforming ourselves 
and transforming the space of our discourse that we both aim to respond to a text 
and risk doing violence to the other, including the otherness of a text. As Derrida 
puts it: “As soon as there is substitution, and as soon as there is a third [un 
troisième], I am called by justice, by responsibility, but I also betray justice and 
responsibility” (388). 
In other words, as soon as there is differance, the systematic play of 
difference and identity that enables us to conceptualise alterity and the necessity 
of responding to it, there is also a system of signification that enables us to reduce 
alterity to sameness. This simultaneity is such that response and reduction are 
never neatly distinguishable. And even though we can imagine a prelapsarian state 
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of perfect lucidity that would allow us to distinguish between these two 
procedures, in actual reading, there is no sacrifice or trade-off of this prelapsarian 
state involved, since we can only think this state as a state before iterability and 
differance and therefore, from within any epistemological perspective we can 
actually inhabit, as no state at all. (That events already play out in a state of 
imperfection and, for this very reason, in a state of ethical accountability is also 
how, in the following, I will approach the violence Finnegans Wake confronts us 
with). The decision we are left with is how we want to inhabit the responsibility 
resulting from that risk. 
 
Lacan’s creation myth 
Our response to unreadability entails a discourse-formation that can also be 
understood as a process of world-building. What is at stake in this response is 
therefore the world-discourse interaction, and I now propose to expand on this 
interaction by returning to Lacan’s analysis of it as symbolic codification. In 
chapters one and two, we have seen that, from a Lacanian perspective, Joyce’s 
writing disturbs our discursive habits by making present certain distortions on 
whose absenting and covering-up symbolic codification is typically based. Joyce’s 
undoing of legibility may thus strike us as something that does not form part of 
our world as it ordinarily decodes itself, presenting itself instead as what Thurston 
calls “something outside the discursive bounds and bonds of social reality” (James 
Joyce 96), something that is outside this reality because it “refuses to be subject 
to the constraints that constitute that reality” (96). 
Yet our reaction to the presence of these distortions is not (usually) a 
descent into a psychotic unravelling of meaning. Rather, the nature of the 
symbolic is such that we strive to interpret even transgressions of it: to 
reconstitute it in new forms where it has been transgressed (the only instances in 
which this fails are traumatic ones). Thus, “an act of this kind is always a masked 
act, its transgressive edge blunted by an implication in social discourse; its 
exposure of jouissance is limited to an anamorphic instant, a momentary glimpse 
of the forbidden Thing” (196-7). Responding to the Joycean distortion, we are 
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compelled to move from the literary thing to the re-constitution of discourse: we 
re-invent the symbolic, and we do so indefinitely and in ever-changing forms, since 
we can never quite catch up with or truly repeat Joyce’s “unspeakably 
innovative” (210) gesture. However, if this failure to catch up with unreadability 
“dooms literary criticism to an eternal recurrence of misreading and 
misappropriation” (80), I would argue that this is first of all a productive 
mechanism – though along the lines of an anxiety-inducing productivity. Secondly, 
our own inventiveness need not break with the responsibility inherent in 
interpretation. Where our construction of readings leads us to reflect on how 
these readings inevitably constitute misreadings and misappropriations, the result 
may on the contrary be a heightened awareness of the role that (short of the 
possibility of iteration without iteration) active interpretation plays in discourse-
formation: in the production of the symbolic realm. 
The importance of this activity aligns itself with Lacan’s thinking about the 
sinthome. We have seen in chapter one that the sinthome effectively turns the 
symptom from an effect into a cause: into the idiosyncratic braiding of the three 
orders into a subject’s singular topology. Yet, crucially, the fundamental illegibility 
of this idiosyncrasy does not transport us outside symbolic accountability, to a 
realm where (symbolically, psychologically, ethically) anything goes. Re-knotted 
and reshaped, the symbolic returns us to discursive bonds and to accountability 
precisely because it can be seen to depend on our decisions, rather than simply 
being imposed on us. As Thurston writes, in late Lacan, “[w]hat ties the knot of 
human subjectivity is therefore not some universal patriarchal law of signification, 
but an act” (196). Even as our social existence takes place in the symbolic order 
and therefore in this order’s constitutive deficiency, we still have some freedom 
in deciding how to live in that deficiency. Therefore, even though the deficiency 
itself is not the result of any choice of ours, our mode of living in it is our 
responsibility. 
This is first of all structurally similar to Derrida’s notion of a self that renews 
itself by re-inventing the public realm it inhabits. In fact, the sinthome’s function 
resembles that of hospitality insofar as both raise the problem of welcoming that 
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which is illegible (the Other, the real, the private) within that which is legible (the 
self, the symbolic, the public). Secondly, the ethical implications of Lacan’s 
discussion are also reminiscent of certain theological debates on fallibility and 
responsibility. This link to theology is not lost on Lacan, nor that the sinthome 
itself, by way of a Joycean pun, can be taken to suggest the biblical fall. Early on in 
Le sinthome, Lacan states: “C’est la faute, le sin, dont c’est l’avantage de mon 
sinthome de commencer par là” (13).2 The sinthome, the psychological 
manifestation of the state of not being whole, not being perfect, already carries 
within it an echo of the fall from grace (and perhaps Lacan is implicitly keeping in 
mind here the etymological root of “symptom” – “falling together”). 
Since the fall is also one of the elements that tie together imperfection and 
responsibility in Finnegans Wake (as we will see in the next subsection), it is worth 
examining in some detail this brief aside in Lacan’s text. Speaking of Eden and of 
original sin, Lacan, too, refers these issues back to Joyce, via the palindrome 
“Madam, I’m Adam” – “le joke qu’en fait Joyce justement” (13)3 – with the added 
twist that in Lacan, Adam is himself said to be a madam. This identification 
conjures up a problematically gendered figure of symbolic castration; yet if 
castrated Adam is the one who invents language (by naming the animals, a scene 
for which Lacan has only belittling words), Lacan suggests that it is Eve – whom he 
dubs l’Èvie – who first puts language to actual use: “la première personne qui s’en 
sert, c’est elle, pour parler au serpent” (13).4 In using language to communicate 
with the snake, “l’Èvie fait du serpent […] faille, ou mieux phallus” (13).5 She makes 
a phallus of the snake, makes transgression itself into a phallic moment – a 
moment that partakes in formative authority but that, through the illusory 
character of the phallus, also constitutes a failure or flaw (“faille”). 
Lacan thus invokes Eden and original sin, the invention of language, the 
failure brought about by symbolic castration, and the possibility of nevertheless 
                                                          
2 “It is the fault, the sin, with which to begin is the advantage of my sinthome” (my 
translation). 
3 “the joke made, precisely, by Joyce” (my translation). 
4 “The first person who makes use of it is her, in order to speak to the snake” (my 
translation). 
5 “Eve makes of the snake […] flaw or, better still, phallus” (my translation). 
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drawing on language to bring about a certain effect – and he associates all this 
with Joycean wordplay. On this cluster of elements, Harari comments that 
“[t]hrough Joyce, Lacan marks a certain inflection in the story of the Bible: the 
point that highlights how a site of castration or lack is linked to a certain 
knowledge” (28-9). After all, the sin to which the snake tempts Eve consists in 
eating from the tree of knowledge: falling from grace is intertwined with 
hermeneutical gain. Flawed or not, the moment of speaking to the snake proves 
highly productive: Lacan goes so far as to say that “[l]a Création dite divine se 
redouble donc de la parlote du parlêtre” (13)6 – the parlêtre indicating a speaking 
being, a symbolically constituted subject. I follow Harari in reading this as 
maintaining a distinction between a “‘so-called divine’ creation” (346) and the 
“symbolic nomination” (346) that is the human variety of creation. What I want to 
suggest is that in Lacan’s account, this human creation should be taken as truly 
duplicating the divine one. 
Original sin, which Lacan imagines as the implementation of the symbolic 
order – the speaking being’s putting speech to use – creates its own world: the 
world as we encounter it through the symbolic order. What is important to 
highlight is that, in Lacanian terms, this really is an altogether different world. 
Insofar as the symbolic contains fragments of the real, reveals the real as 
fragmented, or, more precisely, fragments the real, the symbolic is never in the 
presence of a divine and whole real, of a perfect world that it would merely fail to 
represent. As soon as the symbolic order is so much as possible, its possibility 
changes the real. The fall, in this view, is not to be thought as a delayed exclusion 
from a divine world, but as the fact that, for beings inhabiting the symbolic order, 
the world cannot in the first place exist in that state of perfection – and further 
parallels to the Derridean idea of world-building should be becoming clear. 
Accordingly, the insight to be gained in the fall, in the eating from the fruit that 
opens Adam and Eve’s eyes to their own predicament (in the Bible: to their own 
nudity), is precisely the revelation of this fact. As Žižek puts it in The Parallax View, 
the “‘Fall’ is the first step toward liberation – it represents the moment of 
                                                          




knowledge, of cognizance of one’s situation” (96). In a reading of the fall as 
fortunate (more about which presently), “[t]he loss is thus not recuperated but 
fully asserted as liberating, as a positive opening” (127). And again, in The Puppet 
and the Dwarf: “We rise again from the Fall not by undoing its effects, but in 
recognizing the longed-for liberation in the Fall itself” (86) – namely, the liberation 
(but also the responsibility) that comes with our recognition of the opening that 
our situation inevitably already provides. 
Thinking back to my first chapter’s argument about nudity and clothing in 
relation to the fall, we could say that whereas nudity is the real, the symbolic is 
the dressing-up that covers the real. Yet just as postlapsarian nudity is no longer 
spontaneous but is, as it were, tainted by the idea of clothing, and thus displaces 
the ideal state rather than returning to it, so the postlapsarian real only makes 
itself known to us through a sense of fragmentation that displaces whatever 
access to the real may be possessed by beings existing outside the symbolic. As I 
have also indicated in chapter one, the sinthome should not be taken then as a 
synthesis of the symbolic and the real. What the sinthome indicates, for Lacan, is 
that we have to make up for the fragmentation of the real – and constitute us as 
subjects living within the real – through our cunning use of the symbolic. Rewriting 
the symptom as the sinthome, he emphasises, always within the horizon of 
incessant demands addressed at us by the three orders, that there is a degree to 
which the response to these demands depends on the self. 
Such dependence, however, does not indicate mastery. Our braiding of the 
three orders that give us our world – our world-building – amounts not 
(automatically) to solipsism, but to the sinthome as encompassing both the 
idiosyncrasy of the process and the fact that this idiosyncrasy constitutes a 
problem for us, insofar as we would like to experience the real, if not in the 
psychotic encounter with its rawness, then nonetheless without the fallibilities 
that are introduced by its being filtered through the other two orders. Like Derrida, 
Lacan can thus be seen to insist on a certain difficulty in the manipulation of the 
symbolic or public, as the problem once again manifests itself as a degree of 
freedom that is substantial enough to place on us certain responsibilities or 
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demands, yet limited enough to make meeting those demands a considerable 
challenge. 
Here, Le sinthome can also be seen to take up some of Lacan’s earlier 
reflections on the subject of responsibility. In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, he 
states: “Moral experience as such […] puts man in a certain relation to his own 
action” (3). And he continues: “moral experience is not limited to that acceptance 
of necessity, […] to that slow recognition of the function […] of superego” (7). 
Instead, Lacan relates moral experience to the Freudian dictum “Wo es war, soll 
Ich werden” (7), which he glosses in the following way: “That ‘I’ which is supposed 
to come to be where ‘it’ was […] asks itself what it wants. It is not only questioned, 
but as it progresses in its experience, it asks itself that question and asks it 
precisely in the place where strange, paradoxical, and cruel commands are 
suggested to it by its morbid experience” (7). In sum, even as experience 
bombards us with all kinds of demands (often enough impossible ones), Lacan 
associates the sifting and interpreting of this experience with an active self – 
whose activity he describes in his late teaching as the braiding of the three orders. 
The reference to Joyce in Le sinthome’s discussion of creation and original 
sin is offhanded enough, and not directed at an examination specifically of 
Finnegans Wake. Yet I hold that by conceptualising a connection between, on the 
one hand, the problem of the real, and on the other hand, the subject’s capacity 
for articulating their own attitude, Lacan delineates a position that is indeed 
relevant to the linguistic distortions of the Wake, and that the Wake itself can be 
seen to be taking up in some of its implementations of biblical themes. Lacan’s 
teaching on the sinthome thinks fallen-ness (the fundamental divide that prohibits 
any neat synthesis between the symbolic and the real) as something to which we 
can respond in a variety of manners – just as Derridean hospitality opens up any 
number of possible reactions – thus placing us in a position of responsibility. I will 
now consider the interlinking, in Finnegans Wake, of responsibility, illegibility, and 
the fall, and I will do so by means of another theological motif that Joyce alludes 





The traditional idea of the fortunate fall goes back to St. Augustine and interprets 
original sin as the Felix Culpa (Latin: “happy fault” or “happy fall”) on the basis that 
a postlapsarian world occasions greater proofs of divine mercy than would be 
possible if humankind had not fallen. It should be becoming clear that the 
inflection given to the term by the various contexts of Finnegans Wake is a slightly 
different one. Two of Joyce’s sources, Vico and Freud, converge on the view that 
the state of innocence is not to be considered as standing at the beginning of 
human history, but is essentially excluded from this history, given that humanity 
only truly begins with the horde’s patricide (as discussed in chapter two) or with 
the giants’ flight from the thunder god (as discussed in chapter three). 
Vico’s secular history, in particular, insists that at no point has a perfect 
language or an ideal social organisation actually existed and subsequently been 
lost. Bishop comments that, in Viconian history, “man creates over generations his 
own human nature – and exactly as he also creates human nations” (“Vico’s” 189), 
that is to say: not from the blueprint provided by an inherent or divinely bestowed 
reason, but through a process of world-building. This process operates in a manner 
that is decidedly less than perfect. According to Vico, as Bishop puts it, “history is 
made by men descended from animals, and not always well” (183). In other words, 
world-building makes do with means – in particular: with languages – that are 
anything but the ideal ones we are capable of attributing to superhuman beings 
such as the god of thunder. We can see, then, how this reading of Vico aligns itself 
with the Derridean and Lacanian approaches outlined above, which similarly argue 
that certain intrinsic conditions of human perception and interaction – differance 
in Derrida, the symbolic in Lacan – already locate us in a state of fallibility and 
responsibility. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that a similar attitude towards 
the fall also informs the Wake. In this sense, I agree with James Atherton’s 
somewhat sweeping statement that, in the Wake, “creation is the original 
sin” (32). Joyce’s text is steeped in notions of guilt and fallen-ness that are 
balanced by motifs of new beginnings but remain practically unmitigated by any 
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classical notion of salvation. In all of these various perspectives, which posit an 
already imperfect world, the fortunate fall can be defined as an active affirmation 
of this imperfection: one that aims to inhabit the world in the complexity in which 
we find it and that therefore strives towards a better understanding of what this 
complexity entails – even at the cost of uncovering its more anxiety-inducing 
aspects. In short, falling is a hermeneutical procedure. 
Such a procedure, I propose, is what is at stake in the mechanism of the 
Wake’s non-words, which confront us with the imperfections underlying all 
language use: imperfections made present by the Wake’s own fall into linguistic 
complexity. Compare what Attridge writes about the fall in Finnegans Wake being 
necessarily fortunate, not, as the Christian tradition would have it, 
because it brings forth otherwise unattested Divine mercy, but 
because by its own daring it makes manifest the prohibition it 
transgresses against, and in doing so exposes the hidden power 
structure – whether we call it the force of God or the force of Nature 
– within which humanity is obliged to operate. (Joyce Effects 157) 
What aligns this strategy of exposure with the fortunate fall in the sense I am 
concerned with here is that Joyce depicts the outside of this power structure – the 
superhuman or pre-human realm of social and linguistic perfection – as radically 
absent from the Wake’s own mythos. 
Take, for instance, the sentence “Now their laws assist them and ease their 
fall!” (579.26), already briefly mentioned in chapter three. I have suggested to 
read this as positing fallen-ness as a starting point, and procedures of world-
building as a response to that start. This dynamic is linked to Vico not only by the 
logic of historical progress discussed in the previous chapter, but also by the term 
“laws.” As Klaus Reichert points out, Vico’s giants, in responding to the rumbling 
of thunder, learn “something like self-restraint which in its turn leads to some form 
of natural law which Vico claims to be already present in the name of Jupiter (Jovis 
– Jous – ius)” (51). This etymology of “ius” derives the term from the name of a 
law-giving figure who embodies the conditions of the law’s invention. In this 
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explanation, the figure of Jupiter serves not merely as a convenient fiction, but as 
a necessary fiction covering over an absence. 
In a logic that closely parallels the paternal metaphor in Lacan, as well as 
the Wake’s depiction of HCE as an empty name, authority itself is fictional, is 
authoritative to the extent to which it is constructed. Vico’s Jupiter can serve as 
the origin of the law, and thus of the law’s name, only as the figure whom the 
giants hypothesise upon hearing thunder. Without being invested with this absent 
ideality, the noise in question would not become what the Wake calls the “last 
word of perfect language” (424.23-4), it would remain a natural phenomenon 
incapable of giving rise to anything like legal structures. Crucially, then, what 
precedes these structures is not a perfect language or any other ideal state; 
ideality as a concept emerges simultaneously with the giants’ fall into culture, 
whereas what precedes the fall is, as Reichert puts it, that “human beings in the 
first phase are still in a status [sic] of animal-like savageness” (49). 
I would argue that the view on history the Wake develops in such moments 
is similar to Derrida’s and Lacan’s propositions that human activity exclusively 
takes place in a state that various mythological accounts describe as fallen-ness. 
And like Derrida and Lacan, Joyce tasks world-building with acknowledging, and 
thinking through, this fallen-ness. That the purpose of world-building (for instance, 
of the creation of laws) cannot be to undo fallen-ness seems part of what is at 
stake in the statement: “Ut vivat volumen sic pereat pouradosus!” (610.16). 
McHugh translates this as: “that the book may live let paradise be lost” (610). As 
“that the book may exist, let the fall from grace happen,” this risks returning us to 
the brutal calculation of a sacrifice, along the lines of: that we may have knowledge 
or freedom, let Eden be lost, let us give up on perfection. But from a perspective 
of already inhabiting a postlapsarian world, it is possible to read the phrase in a 
slightly but crucially different way: namely, as an affirmation. Let the fall from 
grace have happened; and let us boldly accept and indeed affirm that it has 
happened: let, consequently, the paradise of an absolute and stable interpretation 
of the book absent itself from our endeavours, so that (at least) the book may be 
the more alive, and we alert to this liveliness. In other words, one way of actively 
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affirming the fall and acknowledging the complexity it entails – a particularly far-
reaching way – is to work towards a state of Pentecostal plurality. 
My decision to opt for this reading of the sentence takes its cue from the 
fact that, for all its repetition of the motif of falling, the Wake does not present us 
with any one scene that corresponds to the moment of Eve and Adam’s original 
transgression, dividing the Wake into a part set before and a part set after the fall. 
This suggests that the entirety of the Wake takes place in a postlapsarian world, 
within the horizon of a certain belatedness. The origin of this state of affairs, 
moreover, remains itself outside this horizon. In creating its narrative world, one 
of the opening gambits of Finnegans Wake is not to answer in a univocal way the 
question: “What then agentlike brought about that tragoady thundersday this 
municipal sin business?” (5.13-4). Instead, we are told: “There extand by now one 
thousand and one stories, all told, of the same” (5.28-9). Although its 
manifestations are versions “of the same,” the very frequency with which the fall 
is evoked, its vertiginous repetition and division, transport the text away from the 
all-decisive move from a prelapsarian to a postlapsarian condition, emphasising 
instead a problem of fallibility more generally speaking. 
Thus, in the city-building passage, HCE/Shaun tells his four interrogators: 
“I gave you of the tree” (535.32). Together with his reference to an 
“Adder” (535.31), this suggests the snake, the tree of knowledge, and original sin 
as we find them depicted in the biblical account. Original sin, however, is not 
presented as the starting point of HCE’s chronicle, nor is it given a significant status 
within the activity of city-building. The cited phrases form part of a plea HCE 
addresses to the four several pages into his monologue, whereas, at the beginning 
of “Haveth Childers Everywhere,” we find descriptions of cultural activity already 
steeped in postlapsarian conflict. In the third and fourth lines of the passage’s first 
paragraph, McHugh annotates “Shitric Shilkanbeard” (532.8) as “Sitric 
Silkenbeard” (532), leader of the Danes at the battle of Clontarf, and 
“MacAuscullpth the Thord” (532.9) as “Ausculph Mac Torcall” (532), the Irish king 
under whose rule Dublin came under English control. Based on these historical 
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allusions, Rabaté proposes that “the foundation of Dublin sends us back to 
Genesis, less to Adam than to Cain, killer, sinner, and builder” (James Joyce 179). 
HCE’s account unfolds from inside a history in which the state of Eden has 
long been replaced with a belligerence reminiscent of the first fratricide. That this 
has been the context of HCE’s activity for quite some time is furthermore indicated 
when he tells us, of the kind of city he builds, “that from the farthest of the farther 
of their fathers to their children’s children’s children they do inhabit it” (545.16-
8). HCE may build an imperfect city and thus, by affirming the fall into 
imperfection, create an opening in which – ideally – a Pentecostal plurality can 
come about, but he does so in a world in which builders are already sinners. Which 
is to say that no amount of affirmation can do away with the potential for failure 
and conflict that is the very definition of the postlapsarian condition. 
This insistence on fallibility is also indicated in Joyce’s frequent allusions to 
the expression “Felix Culpa” itself. The motif returns throughout the text: “O 
foenix culprit“ (23.16), “Phillyps Captain” (67.22), “O’Phelim’s Cutprice” (72.4), 
“Ophelia’s Culpreints” (105.18), “O’Faynix Coalprince” (139.35), “O happy 
fault” (202.34), “O felicitous culpability“ (263.29), “finixed coulpure” (311.26), 
“Colporal Phailinx“ (346.36), “fellows culpows“ (363.20), “Fu Li’s gulpa” (426.17), 
“O foolish cuppled” (433.30), “Felix Culapert” (536.8-9), “O ferax cupla” (606.23), 
“O, felicious coolpose” (618.1). Amongst other things, the fortunate fall as it 
appears in these phrases can be related to HCE’s crime in its manifestation as the 
deed in the park (“If you want to be felixed come and be parked” [454.34]). And I 
would suggest that a possible hint as to the nature of this connection is found in 
the version: “foenix culprit.” Over the course of I.3 and I.4, HCE, who may or may 
not be innocent in this version of the plot (in I.3, we read: “the unfacts, did we 
possess them, are too imprecisely few to warrant our certitude” [57.16-7]) is tried 
for misconduct towards two girls and three soldiers. It appears that at one point 
in the proceedings, HCE is killed or buried alive and subsequently comes back to 
life: “There was a minute silence before memory’s fire’s rekindling and then. Heart 
alive!” (83.4-5). This makes him, the suspected culprit in the case, an avatar of the 
phoenix, the mythological bird that dies and is resurrected from its ashes. 
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What is presented in this image is therefore HCE’s ability to “rise 
afterfall” (78.7); yet we can already see how this pattern of fall and redemption is 
different from the traditional understanding of Felix Culpa. Whereas the fortunate 
fall conventionally refers to mercy afforded by a divine judge, in HCE’s case, it 
relates to the possibility of his being saved from the verdict of other people. One 
shape this process may take is that of HCE’s being rehabilitated in the eyes of 
others, and it is this goal that ALP, in some of her manifestations, can be seen 
working towards. Her letter is being appealed to throughout the trial scenes and 
throughout the entire book in connection with attempts to reveal the events in 
the park. In this view, it is significant that in the version of this letter found in Book 
IV, she writes: “When he woke up in a sweat besidus it was to pardon 
him” (615.22-3). Part of the letter’s message, then, seems to be ALP’s attempt to 
exonerate HCE. This would be a fall and rise very different from the conventional 
notion of Felix Culpa. It consists not in divine forgiveness, but in the possibility of 
being forgiven by others, potentially by one’s “fellows culpows,” that is, fellow 
culprits: others who are as caught up in fallibility as oneself, and whose forgiveness 
operates from within that postlapsarian condition. What is more, just as we never 
learn whether HCE is guilty or not, so we never get to know whether he and ALP 
succeed in clearing his name. His rise is not a decision already made, a mercy 
already granted, but, at most, the continuation of getting another chance – about 
whose outcome Finnegans Wake remains silent. 
Other narrative choices reinforce the sense that in the Wake, the state of 
fallen-ness is never truly lifted or transcended. Notwithstanding the various 
resurrections that the text rehearses, what the Wake does not stage is a second 
coming, nor an equivalent event from outside Christian myth – a moment of 
judgement and redemption that once and for all puts an end to worldly existence. 
Instead, the Wake ends in as postlapsarian a mode as it begins, with one cycle 
ending and another beginning. Its closed textual loop – “A way a lone a last a loved 
a long the […] riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s” (628.15-3.1) – sends us not to a 
realm beyond the text but back to the start, drawing us into the world of the text 
once more. The process continues, with no end in sight – infinitely, not universally: 
that is, without approaching a state of wholeness or completion. 
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In spite of the violence that potentially forms part of this process (as we 
have seen, for instance, in chapter three’s discussion of ALP as a personification of 
the flood), Finnegans Wake thus encourages us not to fight with the fix of a 
transcendental signifier the necessarily continual nature of reading. As has often 
been pointed out, the time-structure of the Wake is therefore not an 
eschatological one, but one that is similar to the cyclical time of Vico’s philosophy. 
However, what the Wake does not reproduce are certain static elements of Vico’s 
view on history. 
In an article on Vico and Finnegans Wake, Timothy Murphy notes that 
“Vico’s model is an interpretive schema that establishes the meaning of the third 
and present age, the age of men, in the play of signifiers of the past ages” (717-8). 
Unlike this system, which sees the meaning of present events as fully determined 
by their correspondence to events in the past, the Wake remains suspended 
between repetition and renewal. On the statement that HCE “moves in vicous 
cicles yet remews the same” (134.16-7), Murphy thus comments: “The cycle is 
vicious, statically repetitive along the lines of Vico’s model, but the contrapuntal 
‘yet’ undercuts this and insists on the oxymoron of renewal of the same” (722). In 
fact, the wording here contains one of many iterations of a recurrent motif, yet 
Murphy points out that “the ‘original’ English phrase, ‘the same anew,’ appears 
nowhere in the Wake, so Vico’s signifying repetition cannot work as such. There is 
no origin to the motif” (724), and the phrase goes through variations every time it 
appears. 
In James Joyce and Victims, Sean P. Murphy points out a similar logic 
inherent in Joyce’s adaptation of the three ages of Vico’s history into the four parts 
or books of Finnegans Wake. Joyce makes Vico’s Ricorso, the loop that closes the 
cycle of history by returning it from the third age to the first, “an age in and of 
itself rather than, as Vico would have it, a period of retrial (recourse, appeal) or 
transition between historical ages” (138). If the very process of returning is itself 
something new, this complicates nothing if not our desire “to symbolize or 
colonize origins” (136). And in the absence of any stable point of origin, the grand 
narratives of history “give way in the Wake to more provisional, local, and open 
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narratives of rupture” (140), narratives within which our relating to our 
circumstances largely originates with ourselves and within which we therefore 
“bear responsibility for our constructions and our mythic origins” (140-1). 
The sense that we ourselves are responsible for our origins is something 
that should be thought in connection with Joyce’s querying of an original 
expression that would have the capacity to control its repetitions. ALP’s letter, for 
instance, conveys the distortion that interferes with repetition, as the document 
appears in different manifestations that compete for the status of authenticity. 
Shem, in his turn, is about as far from being an unmoved mover as it is possible for 
a writer to be; he is not the source of a work originating solely with him, nor of a 
writing that repeats source material without in the process becoming divided from 
itself and engendering uncontrollable excess. And Shaun, who does aspire to this 
kind of pure repetition, fails as he, too, is brought off course by his message’s 
citational drift. 
I have furthermore argued that these and other depictions in the Wake of 
the interpretative process itself are in dialogue with the Wake’s non-words. Both 
in these scenes and in Joyce’s non-language, there is no Archimedean point 
outside of mobility and negotiation. The repetition of signifiers – that is, discourse 
– is revealed to already constitute discourse formation. And the results that such 
formation produces are far from stable; they are more like the cultural 
achievements of HCE’s city through which Joyce depicts our very means of 
creation as volatile. If we follow the Wake’s lead in affirming this volatility, we may 
render it fortunate in the sense introduced above: by acknowledging complexity 
and thus finding complexity itself productive, giving it a Pentecostal inflection. 
Precisely because essence is absent, repetition means change: means the mobility 
and the liveliness of world-building procedures. 
In these procedures, distinctions cannot be upheld that would reliably 
separate innovation from repetition, activity from passivity, the totally private and 
self-sufficient act of writing from the totally public and transparent act of reading, 
the Shem-type function – creation – from the Shaun-type function: transportation. 
Yet if we thus cannot affirm essence, neither can we affirm the non-referral to 
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essence. Which means that Joyce’s undermining of these distinctions is nothing 
else than an exemplification of iterability’s double bind. The same possibility of 
signification on which any textual singularity relies for its being made present is 
necessarily also the possibility of a replacement that betrays singularity. In this 
manner, we are inscribed into responsibility, and we can now say that the key to 
doing justice to this responsibility is to acknowledge the openness of the process, 
to acknowledge our inhabiting and co-shaping a space of plurality in which 
encountering other articulations of this plurality is not the exception but the norm. 
As in Derrida’s and Lacan’s respective arguments, once prelapsarian self-
presence and self-sufficiency are out of the picture, alterity emerges as that which 
defines the self but also questions the self, as that which constantly entices the 
self to grow but is also met by the self in a highly confrontational manner. In short, 
the existence of the other opens up the possibility of a plurivocality that gives 
meaning, yet it also introduces the possibility of doing violence to the other. In this 
view, (the possibility of) HCE’s crime or crimes, the brother battles between Shem 
and Shaun, and other instances of violence are not, I would propose, presented in 
Finnegans Wake as aspects of something like cynical pragmatism, paralysing 
nihilism, or despairing irony. Rather they are markers of a danger – the danger of 
doing violence to the other – whose being a common theme in human history in 
no way diminishes its seriousness. To return to the point made about HCE’s city, 
the Wake insists that any form of creation is taking place in very close proximity 
to catastrophe. Brimming with contradictions, the space of HCE’s city can be read 
according to a logic I have been approaching throughout this chapter and that I 
will return to in the conclusion: a logic in which justice remains what it is only 
through a responsive and responsible openness that cannot function unless it is 
also open to (whilst guarding against, but unable to foreclose) the risk of an 
injustice. 
No less than Lacan or Derrida, Joyce can thus be seen insisting that in a 
postlapsarian world in which creative means are imperfect, we are responsible to 
the other for our constructions of meaning – responsible to the other both in the 
sense of the text and of other readers who share with us the space created by our 
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interpretation of the text. Here, we come full circle to affirmation of alterity 
discussed at the beginning of this thesis, and we can now say that what is being 
affirmed is the plurality of possible interpretative constructions. When I write in 
chapter one that the non-language of Finnegans Wake is in part about the liminal 
possibility of inhabiting the imperfection of language, this is therefore to say that 
it is about the possibility of inhabiting the question of how to encounter the other 
– and that one answer to this question is: by continually inventing the required 
discursive spaces. 
In Ethical Joyce, Eide suggests: “Readers are asked to suspend decision, to 
entertain ambivalence, to place ourselves in a position between two options; that 
‘place between’ options is the ethical space of interpretation and, as Joyce 
suggests in these elliptical moments, the ethical space of subjectivity itself.” (33). 
Subjectivity – understood as the creation of new, idiosyncratic options in response 
to the presence of a secret – is not locked into a private space that remains 
irrelevant to the world. It shifts interpretation away from the reassuring stability 
of what may appear to be the public, scientific, or objective mode; yet it does not 
transport interpretation towards an ethics-free isotropy or relativism, but rather 
towards a heightened, a more precarious, but also a more encompassing 
responsibility: the responsibility of co-shaping discourse. 
Depicting processes of interpretation as lacking a definitive origin and end-
point, and confronting us with the radical openness of its non-words, the Wake 
urges us to think a text’s secret as the element to which interpretation must strive 
to do justice – both in relating to the text and in relating to other interpretations. 
To acknowledge a text’s secret is to acknowledge the text’s singularity, and 
therefore the necessity to adapt interpretative strategies to the elusive essence 
that is the only thing that can orient them. At the same time, it is to acknowledge 
that this essence remains absolutely unassimilable, that the text withdraws from 
our grasp, and that this withdrawal gives rise to the productivity of an 
interpretative process that cannot stop. And at the same time still, it is to 
acknowledge that through this withdrawal, the text keeps its secret, and that in 
the productivity spawned by it, any interpretative effort we may undertake will 
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consequently be only one among many, gathered around the same secret. 
Hospitality towards the secret is hospitality towards other readings of it. It is in the 
resulting horizontal plane of simultaneity (the city) that the Wake achieves the 
kind of impact and resonance the vertical plane of uniformity (the tower) cannot 
produce. Thus, Finnegans Wake’s reflections on language itself, whether they take 
the shape of meta-textuality at the level of content or the shape of self-reflexive 
elements at the level of form, are powerfully ethical: they speak the value, and the 






I hope to have indicated, over the course of this thesis, some of the ways in which 
the difficulty of Finnegans Wake is a significant element of this work in its own 
right. It is not merely to accommodate his readers’ penchant for free association, 
or his own ambition to dazzle for dazzling’s sake, that Joyce confronts us with 
“variously inflected, differently pronounced, otherwise spelled, changeably 
meaning vocable scriptsigns” (118.26-8). Nor should we treat the Wake as a case 
in which the complexity of the subject matter is such that it requires difficult 
treatment, putting certain unfortunate but necessary obstacles in the path of 
elucidation. Such an explanation would posit that difficulty’s strains and delays are 
superficial: orchestrated by an underlying principle that may eventually reveal 
itself. The difficulty we encounter in Joyce’s last work, I propose, is of a different 
kind. It is itself the underlying principle. It resists identification, resists 
appropriation, resists anticipation, and therefore can always transform our 
reading experience in unforeseen ways. 
I have moreover argued that difficulty is a mode of alterity: that it is 
precisely through its resistance to reading that the Wake represents certain 
aspects of the alterity at work in all signification. The complexities of Joyce’s 
language and non-language, as well as his meta-textual reflections, explore how 
we can neither identify a signifier’s unchanging essence (this is the argument of 
chapter one), nor limit its scope by isolating authorial intention (chapter two), 
how, consequently, interpretations are irreducibly plural, such that the possibility 
of one interpretation does not indicate the impossibility of others (chapter three), 
and how also, ultimately, acceptance of this plurality is acceptance of the partial 
and imperfect nature of each individual reading (chapter four). 
In putting things this way, I have undoubtedly carried out what could be 
called a theoretical reading of Joyce. At the same time, I have tried to show that 
Joyce already anticipates the theoretical position. Thus, when Derrida writes, in 
“Two Words for Joyce,” that, with Joyce, “one remains on the edge of 
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reading” (26), he is clearly applying the type of imagery that is dear to post-
structuralism: on-going processes, the elusiveness of the centre. Yet I hold that 
this kind of application has a sound basis: first of all, as a description, however 
idiosyncratically inflected, of mechanisms that are effectively ineluctable in any 
signifying process, as I have argued throughout. Secondly, and more importantly, 
as a repetition of certain gestures already found in Joyce’s text. Now, it is 
important to note that there exists a tension between these gestures and the 
argument I make for the unreadability of Finnegans Wake. Insofar as Joyce’s text 
remains opaque, the self-reflective narratives I cite can only ever partly support 
any interpretation, including the meta-textual interpretation put forward in this 
thesis. The exegetical decision to be made here is a fundamental one. If we take 
Joyce’s distortions to be denying meaning, then his writing should perhaps not be 
interpreted at all – not beyond an interpretation of the effects of unreadability 
itself.  My wager, however, is that one of these effects is Joyce’s manipulation of 
desire: a manipulation that transports his text away from anything like a pure or 
straightforward denial of meaning, because it reveals unreadability to be at the 
heart of readability. 
Unreadability, through its very referral to a question of reading, appears 
not as the absence of referentiality but as a referentiality without reference (one 
would not think to speak of unreadability where referentiality is not at stake). 
Unreadability is thus the driving force behind language’s excessive productivity. It 
functions as what Derrida calls the aporia that makes inheritance possible, as the 
real that in late Lacan’s thinking about the sinthome not only forms the realm 
outside symbolic and imaginary sense-making – delineating a silence beyond the 
speakable and the productive – but also constitutes a potentially transformative 
force operative within the symbolic: the absolutely illegible stain that in its very 
transgression of meaning opens onto a re-invention of meaning. 
I purposely conflate here Derrida’s analysis of a necessary effect with 
Lacan’s analysis of a violent one, because I hold that such a conflation is one of the 
points Joyce is making. The non-language of Finnegans Wake multiplies meaning 
even as it demonstrates that meaning is inevitably the product of a process that 
does violence to the text: this is what Derrida calls Joyce’s double commandment. 
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I would therefor argue that an interpretation exploring the modes of meaning-
production opened up by this commandment may take forms more complex than 
that of an intrinsically contradictory application of frameworks of interpretability 
to Joyce’s absolute obscurity. If the Wake denies any simplistic notions of 
legitimate interpretation, it equally undoes the argument that a reading of its non-
words is absolutely illegitimate. And one of the things that the Wake allows such 
a reading  to articulate – always in a voice no longer totally intrinsic or totally 
extrinsic to the text – are reflections on just this conflation of voices: on the 
uncertainty that adheres to interpretation and to the construction of evidence, on 
the lack of anything like absolute mastery over the creative process, on the 
tantalising and anxiety-inducing nature of the signifier, and on the richness of 
meaning brought about by negotiations that forgo teleology. 
Joyce can thus be seen as not only a favourite case study but as himself an 
exponent of that strange entity, literary theory. In making this proposition, I am 
aware that I advance what may appear to be yet another self-contradiction. Simply 
put, how can I hold up Joyce’s writing as an example of openness, plurality, and 
decentralisation if, at the same time, I claim him for a school of thought that is 
notoriously inaccessible? I have outlined my views on theory in the introduction; 
in light of this more specific question, however, it will prove helpful to briefly 
review the role played by difficulty. Difficulty, not in the sense of a bad 
presentation obscuring an underlying simplicity, but in the sense of a productive 
alterity, is the chief reason for the oddities that make theory, precisely, difficult to 
access. When, in the Introduction, I define theory by gesturing towards the 
impossibility of doing so, I repeat one of the central strands of theory’s self-
understanding. In Topographies, Miller writes that “it may be the essence of 
literary theory to resist definition” (318), and he continues by proposing that “[t]o 
translate theory is to traduce it, to betray it” (319). As with the non-words of the 
Wake, emphasis cannot be on one particular formulation, on one particular 
translation or interpretation. The coordinates of each reading inscribe on it a 
partiality that makes it one in a series of different possibilities. With regard to 
Derrida, for instance, Nicholas Royle suggests that “reading Derrida means 
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meddling with Derrida […]. His texts call to be read differently, anew, every time: 
they affirm the open-endedness of the or again” (47). 
Consider my own use of Derrida’s and Lacan’s respective work in a 
synthetic approach that neither of them can be said to have anticipated, let alone 
prepared. What I want to suggest is that theory’s reasons for re-reading itself in 
this manner are similar to the reasons that Joyce gives us for re-reading Finnegans 
Wake. Or, to put it more summarily still, Finnegans Wake and literary theory are 
difficult for similar reasons. Each finds that knowledge and its production are not 
coextensive with stability, and each introduces irreducible complexities in order 
to make the point that there are elements – crucial ones – in any system of 
knowledge that escape assimilation. That this is where theory, or indeed 
Finnegans Wake, shows its unwillingness to adopt a consistent positon, however, 
is not a convincing argument. It is, in fact, yet another impatient bout for clarity 
that, in championing monovalence, unduly conflates infinite plurality with 
universality. The double standard it moreover implements quickly becomes 
apparent when we ask ourselves whether there is in fact any intellectual discipline 
of which we would say that it is serious and productive, and that it produces sound 
results, if and only if all of its branches and contributors are in total agreement 
with each other. 
If such a notion is opposed to most concepts of serious debate, theory’s 
difficulty, through which it remains open to on-going interpretation, can in turn be 
shown to produce results of a serious nature. As Robin Valenza and John Bender 
note, in positing an opposition between difficulty and the relevance of the work 
being done, “[t]he operative belief […] is that common speech embodies common 
sense and that anything worth saying can and should be said in broadly accessible 
terms” (36). This is not a belief theory shares, given its analysis of how accessibility 
is generated through a dissimulation of the constitutive complexity of linguistic 
codes – that is to say, through a metaphysics of presence that gives the name of 
common sense to what can only ever be partial outlooks. A critique of theory that 
passes over this analysis by reasserting the primacy of accessibility therefore 
masks “deeper structural divergences that such thinking refuses to 
acknowledge” (34). In such a constellation, it is n
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that constitutes a refusal to make a relevant contribution. Where difficulty is used 
to transform a debate’s operational framework, it is rather the out-and-out 
rejection of this transformation that risks denying productivity, flexibility, and 
relevance in the name of an unquestioned, inert stability. 
The observation that, when theory is returned to the logocentric 
procedures with which it explicitly breaks, much of what theory does in excess of 
logocentrism, or in opposition to it, takes on the appearance of inconsistency, 
obscurity, and purely rhetorical effects – such an observation does not, in fact, tell 
us much that was not already given in the movement of that break. On its own 
terms, by contrast, theory delineates its hermeneutic upshots quite clearly. 
Theory’s first result, the one all subsequent results are in some form of dialogue 
with, is the finding that there is no intrinsic stability to any signifying gesture and 
that logocentrism can uphold the clarity and stability to which it lays claim only at 
the cost of violent processes of normalisation and exclusion. 
The structural divergences that are masked by a rejection of difficulty thus 
hinge, to a significant extent, on the question of whether or not we find that, in 
representing to ourselves certain parts of the world (for instance, certain works of 
literature) our hermeneutical enterprises are lent sufficient depth and scope by 
such methodologies as achieve transparency within the existing discursive 
frameworks. If so, then a break with these methodologies will resemble nothing if 
not a break with the world, or at least with productive ways of communicating 
about the world. If not, however, then it becomes apparent that such a break 
attempts to articulate the possibility of the world itself undergoing change in ways 
not anticipated by the current frameworks – but articulation is precisely the 
problem under such conditions. 
It could be argued that the price paid for a deviation from existing 
structures of expression is too high: that a writer or speaker who challenges the 
need for intelligibility within the existing frameworks fails, by the same token, to 
communicate whatever vision of alternative frameworks they may have. There is 
certainly a question here of a balance to be struck; yet this line of thought also 
risks foreclosing interaction with certain frameworks not on the basis of their own 
merit (or lack thereof) but on the basis of an axiomatic preservation of stability. 
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The argument reveals, therefore, the extent to which “the order of intelligibility 
depends in its turn on the established order which it serves to interpret. This 
readability will then be as little neutral as it is nonviolent” (Derrida, “Force of Law” 
270). In order to counteract this violence, a discourse has to remain open to 
reviewing the repercussions of its own axioms – its own stability. For instance, in 
the case of the Wake, stability violently reasserts itself whenever we operate on 
the implicit or explicit assumption that reading one of the most difficult works of 
literature in existence should not, in the long run, cause us any anxiety or 
uncertainty. Reviewing this assumption means confronting the fact that we cannot 
read Finnegans Wake at all unless we destabilise the frameworks within which we 
read – even if doing so should mean putting into question some of the foundations 
of our hermeneutics. The point is precisely to refrain from casting such questioning 
as inherently negative. 
To give another example: in a democratically organised society, in which 
public debate contributes to the negotiation of social structure, contributions that 
confront us with alterity should not be understood as automatically positioning 
themselves outside the process of negotiation or its juridico-political formalisation 
(alterity aspiring to override debate). The demand that alterity often makes of us, 
in such a constellation, is that we respond to it without confining our response to 
the acknowledgement of a position we refuse to interact with. But neither can 
interaction consist in a gesture of control that undoes alterity, codifying a position 
until it appears as the object of pre-existing modes of knowledge, no longer as a 
challenge to these modes and to their claim to unlimited applicability. 
Avoiding both of these forms of appropriation depends on our ability to 
conceptualise discourse itself, the very process of knowledge-production, as 
mobile. In the case of political structure, such an ability is what Derrida describes 
as the democracy-to-come, which – in spite of what the term may suggest – is a 
configuration of the here and now. As David Wood notes, “Derrida is arguing, not 
for some utopian future, but for a certain anticipation of openness to the other, 
of justice, an imminent possibility” (52). The implementation of otherness is not 
an ideal whose achievement in the future is to be worked towards, but an activity 
in the present: an activity of working out what kind of future we want to achieve. 
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Therefore, to make possible the political and social sphere in the here and now as, 
precisely, a social, intersubjective, interactive one, there has to be, at the very 
heart of the public, an element that escapes the public, a possibility of change not 
yet symbolised or knowable: a secret. 
The meta-textuality of Finnegans Wake can be read as being concerned 
with this dimension of the secret. Joyce’s text questions any division between the 
public and the private as a division between the self-evident and the irrelevant. By 
staging for us the precariousness of public space – both of shared physical space 
(seen in HCE’s city) and of participation in the symbolic order (seen in the non-
words, in ALP’s letter, in Shem’s writing, in Shaun’s ventriloquism) – the Wake 
subverts the notion that what is communal or shared is, by virtue of these 
qualities, morally good or objectively correct. The public space of the Wake is 
precisely not partaking in anything like eternal or indeed local truth, but is self-
consciously flawed, split, postlapsarian. 
This must raise the question how this kind of public space can give rise to 
any values. Would not the very mutability of meanings place us in a sphere where 
my proposition that there are ethical implications to Joyce’s procedure is void? 
The response I would give is yet another iteration of the above point that the 
questioning of stability breaks not with the world and the necessity of inhabiting 
it, but rather with the notion that certain representations of the world are neutral. 
We have seen, for instance, how Joyce’s depiction of HCE as a pure name or legal 
fiction undermines both the idea that legality/public acknowledgement is an 
indicator of factuality and the idea that fictions can be cast aside. We must 
recognise the significance of fictions whilst seeing them for what they are – in 
short: recognise the instability and the importance of our own constructions. This 
corresponds to what Lacan aphoristically expresses in the title of his unpublished 
twenty-first seminar: Les non dupes errent (punning on “les noms du père” – the 
names of the father). Those who are not fooled are mistaken; refusing to take 
fictions seriously (to be fooled by them), they miss the seriousness that lies, not in 
some underlying truth, but rather in the necessity of fictions themselves. 
The importance of constructions that Joyce’s text exemplifies extends to 
the discursive practices that textual interpretation is concerned with. Texts 
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transport information whose visibility and relevance depend on paradigms of 
observation, without the information therefore being divorced from the singular 
and contextualised process of a text’s original formation. Clarity, in this view, does 
not only open up interpretation by making it transparent, but also closes it down 
by reducing the scope of its results, and pre-emptively so. As in the above example 
of democratic debate, the link between convention and validity that is thus 
problematized is one that often serves to underpin the value of interaction and of 
compromise. Yet even in stressing the need for debate, the merging of convention 
with objectivity already tends towards a solidification that also opposes itself to 
debate. Difficulty, in turn, may be used as a means of continuing the debate by 
challenging solidification. 
The illegibility of Finnegans Wake interrupts our interpretative activity, 
interfering with it from what seems to be a realm outside this activity’s 
appropriate means and procedures. But it is precisely by doing so that difficulty 
reminds us that relevance can never be guaranteed by these procedures, but is 
ultimately bestowed by our using them to newly inscribe us into the world. 
Therefore, difficulty, in the sense we are concerned with here, does not obscure 
what is actually the case; it challenges us to think what is the case with new rigour 
and vitality. The fundamental mobility and instability of the interpretative process 
gives rise to a responsibility that reinforces the ties between discourse and world. 
We could say that difficulty is annoying, but that it is annoying in much the same 
way the sound of a street festival outside your window is annoying when you are 
trying to concentrate on your work. 
Let us, in fact, get distracted for a moment, and consider that as I write this, 
there are children outside my window, yelling and playing a game of football. 
Hearing the noise, I do not get up but concentrate on the voices, attempting to be 
hospitable to a sound that enters my room unbidden, before I can do anything to 
respond to it, and that distracts me from my work. The children shout, sometimes 
in triumph, sometimes in anger. Occasionally, one breaks into song. It occurs to 
me that they are playing a game: that is, they are applying rules, they are teaching 
themselves – and each other – the application of rules. They probably even invent 
the rules at times. In more than the athletic sense, this is training, and if I describe 
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it here, it is because I believe that their game, informal as it may be, and my 
writing, confined as it may be to a fairly narrow section of cultural space, both 
partake in the same activity: world-building, the building of public space itself. 
I hope that this example can go some way towards showing that, in writing 
about world-building, I do not have in mind some activity of Promethean 
dimensions. The point is rather that the world as we experience and inhabit it is 
not an inert container for our lives to take place in, but in a crucial sense consists 
in these lives, down to their smallest events. This line of thought can furthermore 
be brought into dialogue with the moment in Ulysses when Stephen, perhaps 
exasperated with Mr Deasy’s declaration that “[a]ll human history moves towards 
one great goal, the manifestation of God” (2.380-1), opposes to this vision the 
sheer actuality of “[a] shout in the street” (2.386). In this scene, too – which my 
real-life event might be accused of plagiarising – the noise in question is that of 
children playing a game: “Hooray! Ay! Whrrwhee!” (2.384). 
These shouts stand in contrast to a stance that Stephen attributes to the 
same children only moments earlier. Sitting in his classroom, shortly before their 
game of hockey begins, they produce the sort of remarks that he internally 
classifies as “[a] dull ease of the mind” (2.15). In a reading of the passage in which 
this phrase occurs, Eide proposes that Stephen is trying to counteract this dullness 
by means of a teaching method that stimulates rather than punishes what 
unorthodoxy it can find in his pupils’ ideas: “thus cultivating  creative thought 
processes and promoting […] curiosity”, whilst destabilising “a codified distinction 
between fact and error” (65). I would subscribe to this reading, and I moreover 
hold that the shout in the street, which Stephen posits as an alternative model to 
an ultimate code, can be seen in much the same light. It interferes with 
codification itself, thus aligning itself with difficulty as I describe it here, forming 
an interruption that reminds us of complexity and of the hermeneutical value of 
liveliness: the value of the unexpected or the unexpectedly meaningful. 
The shout in the street – insofar as it can be seen to embrace a life heartily 
unconcerned with Mr Deasy’s one great goal – opposes itself not only to solidified 
codification’s dull ease, but also to its hasty pragmatism: what Attridge calls the 
effort of “the too full, excessively goal-oriented consciousness” (Singularity of 
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Literature 123). Difficulty strives to replace this ease and this pragmatism with a 
slowness that is deliberately uneasy. In Stupidity, Avital Ronell ventures that there 
are types of intelligence that lay claim to great efficiency through sheer velocity 
and agility – that is to say, ultimately, through ease – but whose operations are 
“smooth and unproblematic in terms of the results they yield” (300). Her 
conclusion is that “[i]t could be that fast is slow, where mind hasn’t stopped or 
been stopped, made to give pause over some imponderable or stumped by an 
effect of paradox” (300). I take Ronell to be postulating here an alternative 
understanding of efficiency in knowledge production: an efficiency not tied to 
quantities of speed, volume, or density, but to a quantity of interaction. This 
efficiency is opposed to the goal-oriented mind-set that wants its knowledge in 
neat units and therefore equates uncertainty with ignorance. It is an efficiency for 
which a solution should not distract from the complexity of a problem and for 
which the result of a successful internalisation of this complexity is a certain 
remainder of uncertainty or doubt. 
This, I argue, is precisely the attitude towards knowledge-production 
expressed in Finnegans Wake. The Wake resists the solidification, the 
commodification, the streamlining of knowledge. As Beckett suggests in his essay 
on “Work in Progress: “The danger is in the neatness of identifications” (3). And in 
the way that Finnegans Wake makes palpable this danger with respect to its own 
meaning, it can be seen to also comment on the practice of literary criticism in 
general. It demonstrates that we need a hermeneutics not only of the legibility of 
texts, but also of their illegibility: of their difficulty. The aim of such a hermeneutics 
must be, on the one hand, to avoid merely acknowledging difficulty without 
reading it, and on the other hand, to avoid reading it by making it legible. Instead, 
it must examine the very terms of a text’s illegibility. 
By confronting us with how much of our own desire, our own voice, and 
our own constructive activity goes into reading, Finnegans Wake provides us with 
crucial aspects of such a hermeneutics of difficulty. Exploring how difficulty 
impacts processes of discourse formation that are also processes of world-
building, Joyce’s text shows that a hermeneutics of difficulty is also an ethics of 
difficulty, whose primary imperative is that we preserve the openness of discourse 
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by accepting the partiality of our responses. This is not necessarily bad news for 
interpretation. The more a text escapes appropriation, the more it will interrupt 
any towering solidification and instead locate a debate on a horizontal plane 
where it can generate meaning by growing into multiple habitats, separate or 
interlocking but always without an absolute centre, and by executing such shifts 
as escape any teleological zeroing in. One key rationale of the Wake’s 
unreadability, then, is to enact all this at the level that has the single greatest 
impact on its readers: the level of reading itself. If meaning is not legibility, then 
community is not homogeneity, and negotiation is not stability or accessibility. 
This means that the building of a future is difficult. Exemplifying this difficulty, 
Finnegans Wake, often decried as a formalist extravaganza or a bad literary joke, 
is a text in which we are confronted with unreadability only to find that, through 
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